


JPRS-TAC-87-022

27 MARCH 1987

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET NST DELEGATION ON U.S. ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 26 Feb 87 pp 1-2

["Announcement by the Soviet Delegation at the Geneva Talks"]

[Text] In connection with the press conference on the issue of strengthening the regime of the ABM Treaty, which was held at the USSR mission in Geneva on 24 February, the U.S. delegation at the talks on nuclear and space weapons issued a "refutation". An unfounded accusation is made in it that in the course of the above-said press conference the public was misinformed about the U.S. stand at the talks on the space weapons issue.

The contents of the statement for the press made by the U.S. delegation shows that it is by no means Soviet representatives, but the American side that has embarked on a path of misleading public opinion.

It is a fact that precisely at the current round of the talks the U.S. administration has for the first time officially tabled at Geneva the text of a proposal to legalize the so-called "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty. It can be denied by one single method--by radically revising the above-said U.S. proposal. But, to all appearances, the U.S. side is not yet ready to make such a sensible step. For known reasons Washington is currently concerned not with taking measures directed at strengthening the regime of the ABM Treaty, but with finding an excuse for the planned large-scale testing of the ABM space-based weapons being developed within the SDI program.

That is why they needed to invent in the 13th year of the ABM Treaty a "broad interpretation" designed to distort by means of pseudo-legal casuistry the essence of the limitations imposed by the Treaty and thus open the way for U.S. strike weapons into outer space.

The references made in the statement of the U.S. delegation to the effect that the U.S. administration has since the autumn of 1985 been declaring its commitment to a "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty is proof of the unconstructive attitude of the United States to the key issue of the talks--the space weapons.

The attempts of the U.S. side at legalizing the "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty under conditions where even many of Washington's allies in NATO and prominent figures in the USA itself are expressing concern over the dangerous consequences of torpedoing the regime set by that important document, constitute a serious obstacle for advancement at the talks, prevent consolidation of the accord reached at Reykjavik on non-use for a term of ten years of the right to abandon the ABM Treaty during which time all its provisions would be strictly observed.

(TASS, 25 February. In full.)

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR COMMENTARY ON 'SECRET' REAGAN GUIDANCE TO NST DELEGATES

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 26 Feb 87 pp 1-4

[APN item under the headline "News and Views"]

[Text] The U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks has received a secret presidential directive, whose content immediately became known to the whole world. Apparently, that was part of the plan, writes Novosti's Vladimir Katin. The President told the delegation that it should not discuss any proposals that could prevent the United States from adopting a "broader interpretation" of the ABM Treaty.

There is reason to believe that the President's directive may wreck chances for the conclusion of an arms control agreement in Geneva, at least as long as the present U.S. administration stays in office.

The breaching of the ABM Treaty would seriously undermine trust in the United States. On the one hand, it would further complicate the process of normalisation of Soviet-American relations. On the other, it would be a hard blow at the keen sense of pride of the Western Europeans, who believe that they enjoy the privilege of having confidential relations with the United States. Many people in Western European capitals were shocked when they learned about Washington's decision on "broader interpretation" from papers, not by diplomatic channels.

Trust is a fundamental issue in relations between states.

Experience serves to show that cooperation is the most effective way to build trust between countries and peoples. The simple fact is that the broader cooperation, from tourist exchange to participation in arms control, the higher the level of trust. And vice versa, the more intense war preparations and the efforts to develop ever new types of weapons and place all sorts of curbs on trade and in other areas, the more there is distrust, suspicion and anxiety.

Take, for example, the U.S. plans to militarise space. If this happens, the level of confidence between countries and peoples will not rise and the very idea of arms control will be compromised. Who will trust the United States if it blows up the ABM Treaty and hangs over the Earth battle stations with nuclear, laser and other weapons?

The Soviet Union, of course, will find a way to counter such threat from space. But what about other countries? For the United States will give no guarantee even to its allies that one day it won't try to use space weapons and thus make its allies a target for a retaliatory strike. No one in Washington would give a guarantee to any country in Asia, Africa or Latin America that in the event of what the Americans call a "crisis situation" space weapons would not be used. Today every state has indisputable sovereignty over the atmosphere above its territory and the right to defend it from intrusion in the interest of its security. However, they will face a far greater threat from space if the Americans deploy weapons there.

Even though I am not exaggerating things, the prospect is bleak. Suspicion would grow sharply as well as the fear of being "punished" in a surprise attack not from U.S. ships and planes, as was the case in Vietnam, Grenada, Lebanon and Libya, but from space. As mutual distrust would grow, the temptation of being the first in deploying every new weapons system grow too. The international situation would be destabilised and the risk of an accidental outbreak of war would increase many times over.

Where is a way out? In eliminating nuclear threat.

If we want peace, we must prepare for it, live in peace and be able to defend it, Marshal Francisco da Costa Gomes, Portugal, told Novosti's A. Chernoshchyok. And this should be supported by all sensible persons, who are perfectly aware that nuclear war would spell an end for all mankind.

It is alleged in the West today that war danger is emanating from the East, in the first place, the Soviet Union. It's a downright lie. The myth about a "Soviet threat" owes its appearance above all to NATO leaders who need an official adversary, an enemy image for vindicating the arms build-up. That is why they have chosen for this the USSR and the other Warsaw Treaty countries. However anyone who has an idea of the hardships which the Soviet people had to suffer in World War II, realizes perfectly well that the Soviet Union does not want a repetition of it.

Advocating the idea of research and development under the SDI programme, the U.S. asserts that such a system is 100 percent capable of protecting its territory against nuclear attack. But this is only theory. The system is helpless in the face of cruise missiles and air-borne missiles. Similarly, it is incapable of fully protecting the U.S. against missiles from space.

Is SDI a defensive or offensive weapon? It must be said that arms cannot be purely defensive or offensive. I believe that SDI can be used, among other purposes, against land targets, that is, it can be an offensive weapon.

The Soviet Union came up with a proposal to completely eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and to enter a nuclear-free era. I am confident

that this is possible, provided there is political will on all sides, a genuine desire to reach this goal. Today, as it appears to me, the necessary conditions for eliminating nuclear weapons by the year 2000 have not yet been created.

In our troubled time, the question arises ever more frequently of whether the professional duty of a military man is compatible with struggle for peace, freedom and independence. I believe that a military man, just as any other person, must reject the very ~~idea~~ that it is possible to resolve controversial issues only by pressure and force. Indeed, the military know better than anyone else that arms in use today are much more deadly than those used in World War II. Besides, it is known that in terms of fire power modern conventional armaments come close to weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear. Therefore, the devastating effects of a possible war between states, even non-nuclear, would be horrible.

(APN, 25 February. In full.)

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

IZVESTIYA ON REAGAN'S ANTI-ABM TREATY STANCE

PM191633 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Feb 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Stanislav Kondrashov "Political Observer's Opinion": "The Last Hurrah?"]

[Text] Ronald Reagan celebrated his 76th birthday in Washington recently — to the accompaniment of speculation, voiced aloud and muttered in whispers, about the President's health. On the subject of his health, some say: It is tremendous for someone his age, although the President is nevertheless working to a "limited schedule" after a recent minor operation. Others say: The President's hearing and powers of concentration are deteriorating, his mind wanders, and he is losing his energy. Both agree Reagan's political health has been fairly shaken as result of the unforeseen chronic illness called "Irangate." They are non in agreement in their suppositions as to whether his health will recover by the end of his presidency — which is now quite close.

Another inevitable subject now is that of the President's legacy in domestic and foreign policy — and we are primarily concerned with the latter. We hear Nancy Reagan is still going to great pains to ensure her spouse is viewed with gratitude by posterity as a venerated peacemaker. What is the value of this lady's vague hopes of veneration when the legacy question has been taken up with unprecedented zeal by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, who is backed by powerful forces, including the armed forces and the military-industrial complex? They too are looking beyond the Reagan Presidency and trying to boost and speed up the arms race to such an extent that even the President's immediate successor will not be able to stop the powerful inertia of the speed that will have been reached. It is with this aim in mind that an extensive operation is now under way in Washington to wipe out the 1972 ABM Treaty and thereby clear the way for the earliest possible phased deployment [razvertyvaniye] of the SDI program.

Let us move on to specific explanations. While a political battle is being waged over the "Star Wars" program, inside the Pentagon its exponents are working tirelessly under the leadership of General James Abrahamson. Persistent reports that the SDI program is progressing more successfully than expected have been coming out of the Pentagon in recent weeks. It is going to be possible to test combat systems in space earlier than expected and then, as long as the pace is maintained, in the first half of the nineties it will be time to deploy [razvertyvat] the first space-based stations capable of knocking out Soviet ICBM's during the boost stage. All this must be decided now — whether to go into space or not, whether to deploy [razvertyvat] or... Incidentally, this word "or" does not exist as far as Weinberger and his kindred spirits are concerned.

What does exist, however, is a certain international commitment made quite voluntarily by Washington — the U.S.-USSR ABM Treaty, which prohibits this kind of test and this kind of deployment [razvertyvaniye]. As far as extreme militarists are concerned, this treaty now has the same effect as a straitjacket: "not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based."

So, is the treaty to be observed or not? This word "or" counts for nothing in the eyes of those whose attitude has been formulated not very elegantly but certainly very accurately by one U.S. newspaper: "Spit on everything for the sake of SDI." It is therefore a question of how to do the spitting a little more diplomatically.

This is because a direct rejection of the treaty would be too provocative an action, fraught with unacceptable damage to the politically weakened administration both at home and abroad.

The method of adopting a so-called "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty has been chosen for the purpose of spitting more diplomatically. The idea of finding a loophole for getting out of the treaty, of its "broad" interpretation was put forward about 2 years ago by Abraham Sofaer, a legal consultant with the State Department, who delved into the stenographic records of U.S.-USSR talks. Sofaer himself was not involved in drawing up the ABM Treaty. This fact helped the legal consultant to turn the treaty upside down with the claim that its prohibitions do not extend to ABM systems based on physical principles not referred to in the text -- lasers and particle beam weapons, for example.

The ABM Treaty is basically being very cynically turned into an ABM anti-treaty. Or -- just as bad -- into an anti-ABM Treaty. Meanwhile, after the aforementioned research President Reagan approved the "broad" interpretation in principle in October 1985. But, not wishing to cause unnecessary, premature irritation, he gave instructions at the time to stay (for the meantime!) with the "narrow" interpretation. The "broad" interpretation was thereby kept on ice until such time as it would be required by the next stage in the SDI program. That time has now come.

A council chaired by the President met in the White House on 3 February to discuss the next step with SDI. Three days later the ultraconservative WASHINGTON TIMES newspaper, which stands high in the administration's favor, published the session's minutes -- obtained, it said, "through legitimate channels."

Since White House sources have actually confirmed the authenticity of the minutes, we publish the following extracts:

Weinberger: Do we want deployment [razvertyvaniye]? It is quite clear this question must be answered in the affirmative. We do not as yet have anything comprehensive, but we should deploy [razvernut] the individual elements which would become part of the general system.

Carlucci, national security adviser to the President: Partial deployment [razvertyvaniye] is the right answer in both military and strategic respects. What can be said about it from a political standpoint?

Admiral Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff support SDI and its phased deployment. However, we do not as yet have sufficient grounds for making a decision.

Weinberger: But we have to make certain decisions now.

Secretary of State Shultz: Making any decision would be inappropriate at present.

Weinberger: We have made great progress in the development [razrabotka] of weapons using kinetic energy to knock out missiles in the boost phase. Do we intend to deploy the system gradually or immediately? Let us deploy 60 of these weapons, which would allow us to knock out 2,000 warheads. We can conduct tests to knock out missiles using the Delta-181 missile. If the tests are successful we could deploy by 1993.

Shultz: General Abrahamson believes this can be done by 1993. Others are more skeptical. Let us add another couple of years to that date.

Weinberger: The question is whether to deploy the system gradually and begin broadly interpreting the ABM Treaty. Then we could begin deploying lasers, particle beam weapons, and so forth. But we need a specific program.... We need a phased deployment because it cannot all be done at once.

Reagan: It would be interesting to see how the Soviet Union reacts to this.

Shultz: It is hard to say how the Soviets will act.... The problem with deployment even in 1993 is that some of the tests (Delta-181) require a broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

Weinberger: The Soviets have their own agenda.... They want to ban something. We should not argue with the Soviets over what can and what cannot be banned.

Shultz: We must see what we can find out and whether we can find this out in particular, and then hold talks with the Soviet Union.

Reagan: Don't ask the Russians. Tell them: The United States could begin deployment. I will say that I have reappraised the situation. I am aware what this is going to cost us and am prepared to pay....

These were the opinions exchanged. Shultz' timid opposition was broken down once again. The President was capable enough of confirming his hostility to the ABM Treaty and taking Weinberger's side. His key words were: Don't ask the Russians. I am prepared to pay....

The President is ready to cast off the ABM Treaty, and this is in line with his credo of disarmament through superarmament. But, thank goodness, others are not prepared either to bid farewell to the treaty or to share the President's credo. Outside the White House this new enterprise has met with strong opposition. Objections -- in the form of confidential letters to Washington or through other channels -- have been voiced by Canadian Foreign Minister Clark, FRG Chancellor Kohl, Italian Prime Minister Craxi, NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington, British Foreign Secretary Howe, and also British Prime Minister Thatcher who, incidentally, had previously been assured that the White House would respect the ABM Treaty. The allies, of course, have become used to U.S. hegemony, but in this case they simply cannot explain Washington's dangerous caprice to their peoples.

Nevertheless, the extent of their influence on the Reagan administration should not be exaggerated. More important is the stand taken by the U.S. Congress, where all the key positions are held by Democrats. If they oppose the Republican administration in foreign policy, they come from the left and not from the right, for all the arbitrariness of those terms. New Speaker Jim Wright, House Democratic Majority Leader Thomas Foley, and others sent the President a letter pointing out that the earliest possible creation [sozdaniye] and deployment [razvertyvaniye] of ABM elements is not in the interests of U.S. national security and "could wipe out our chances" of reaching an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union.

The most weighty opposition to a "broad" interpretation has been formulated in another letter to the President -- from Democratic Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the influential Armed Services Committee. He singled out three points in particular. First, 15 years ago, when the Senate ratified the ABM Treaty, it proceeded not from the interpretation toward which the administration is now inclining but from the interpretation proposed by the treaty itself. In view of this, the administration's behaviour would cause, second, "serious constitutional confrontation" with Congress. Third, the new interpretation of the treaty would mean, as the senator pointed out to the President, "the end of arms control under your administration."

The administration has also been sharply criticized in the "big press" on the U.S. east coast. The state of affairs has been portrayed most strikingly of all by NEWSDAY, published in Long Island, New York.

"There is no doubt as to what is happening," it says in an editorial. "A group of people who want to scrap the arms control process are trying to use the political vacuum created as a result of the Iran-Nicaragua scandal. They are led by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and by Richard Perle, his chief adviser in the arms sphere, sometimes known as the 'Prince of Darkness.'

"President Reagan," NEWSDAY continues, "obviously believes he can disregard previous treaties and conclude an arms control agreement nevertheless... Anyone, however, who understands USSR-U.S. relations comprehends the situation better than he does. No agreement will be reached under the present administration or even, possibly, in the years to come if Perle is allowed to fill the vacuum with his extremist ideas."

A justified warning.

On the whole, the friendly rebuff from the Capitol Hill end of Washington's Pennsylvania Avenue and the European side of the Atlantic has had an effect, for today at least. The White House has backed down a little -- Secretary of State Shultz is assuring the press and the public that no decision has been taken and that it will not be taken for weeks and months yet -- and then only after close consultations with Congress and the allies.

...When a veteran fighter is going into the attack for the last time in his life, in America that is called the last hurrah. The expression has migrated from military to political vocabulary. Reagan's election publicity marathon last fall on behalf of the conservative Republican candidates for Congress was christened "the last hurrah." That

attack misfired: The Democrats took Capitol Hill and both chambers of Congress. Are we nowe hearing Reagan's last hurrah in the arms control sphere? Having failed to conclude a single agreement with the Soviet Union and throwing the SALT-II treaty to the winds, the President's army is now attacking the last of the agreements left to the present master of the White House by his predecessors.

The new attack launched in the twilight of the Reagan administration by various "princes of darkness" can -- and must -- fail, because in one way or another common sense in America is growing stronger. What a strange and sorry sight! What a combination of destructive reflexes and shortsightedness, which has prevented the administration from seizing a truly historic opportunity!

President Reagan has a partner -- the Soviet Union, which is showing more willingness than ever to achieve a realistic agreement on a sharp reduction in nuclear weapons. He has allies who are ready to support this kind of agreement, which takes their interests into account. He has Congress which, with the present arrangement of forces, will cooperate in this historic task, giving voice to the American people's indisputable desire for peace. The halo of peacemaker would appear to be within easy reach -- not a bad way out, incidentally, of the paralysis caused by "Irangate." There it is, the path of fruitful cooperation, on which the presidency's political strength could be preserved rather than lost in the time it has left. In actual fact, however, despite everything, instead of statesmanship we are still witnessing something akin to reckless imperial folly -- in both the broad and the narrow interpretations of the word.

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CSO: 5200/1348

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: UPCOMING REAGAN REPORT ON USSR ABM TREATY COMPLIANCE HIT

PH021435 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Feb 87 Second Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Borin article: "Why Fabrications Are Needed; United States Flouting ABM Treaty Provisions" -- passages between slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] First the White House "dumped" the Salt II treaty. Now Washington is undermining the ABM Treaty, hiding behind the fig leaf of references to a new and more free, or, as they put it, "broad" interpretation of it.

"This interpretation is such," THE WASHINGTON POST notes, "that, honestly speaking, it would be easy to abandon the 1972 treaty."

Why is all this being done? To give even a semblance of "legitimacy" to the Pentagon's schemes to carry out early deployment of an ABM system with space-based elements, or, more precisely, to transfer the arms race to space. That is why they are looking for "broad" loopholes, so as to push through them the "right" to test and develop [razrabotka] "exotic" new arms such as nuclear-pumped lasers and particle-beam weapons. At the same time they are preparing another propaganda act. Under development, the U.S. press writes, is a "report which is expected to repeat the previous accusations that the Russians have violated certain treaty provisions and have possibly failed to observe others."

The aim of the administration's latest falsehood was correctly noted by B. Scowcroft (former national security adviser under President Ford), W. Perry (a ranking Pentagon staffer under the Carter administration), and (J. Nay) (Harvard University professor and former State Department official). The aim, in their opinion, is to use slander against the USSR to "emasculate the importance of the ABM Treaty and allow the United States to encroach on its margins [vtorgnutya v yego pogranichnye oblasti] and derive the maximum opportunity for implementing SDI."

For the White House this "saving lie" is a real find. Many of the practical actions to implement "Star Wars" can already be described as failing to accord with the ABM Treaty provisions. Need some facts? Here they are.

The so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" is aimed at creating [sozdaniye] a large-scale ABM system, which is strictly forbidden by Article 1 of the treaty. Contrary to the obligation /"not to develop [sozdavat], test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based"/ (Article V), on 5 September 1986 the United States held a so-called "proof-of-feasibility experiment" codenamed "Delta 180."

Moreover, the U.S. desire to put strike arms into space and position them over the territory of any sovereign state contravenes the obligation enshrined in Article IX /"not to deploy outside its national territory ABM systems or their components."/ Since when has space been U. S. national territory? "A state's sovereignty now extends to the atmospheric space above its national territory. A state has an indisputable right to protect that space from invasion," M.S. Gorbachev said at the meeting with participants in the international forum "For a Nuclear-free World, for the Survival of Humanity". "But a far greater danger will be posed by space, where people now want to place weapons... Is it not time within the framework of international law to posit the question of banning the 'race' to put weapons into space over the heads of people in other countries?"

Behind a smoke screen of waffle about some "violations" of Article VI of the treaty by the Soviet Union in building in the Krasnoyarsk region a radar designed to monitor space and not falling within the limitations imposed by the treaty, the United States is blatantly violating its commitments. It is a question of the commitment /"not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward,"/ not to deploy large radars with a potential of more than 3 million watts per square meter outside the areas permitted by the treaty (Articles III, IV, and VI), including outside of U.S. national territory.

Nonetheless, on the pretext of an "ordinary modernization," the United States has completed construction of a powerful multirole phased-array radar with a potential of more than 3 million watts per square meter in the region of Thule (Greenland). It is planned to deploy a second similar radar in the very near future in the Fylingdales Moor area (Britain).

Washington's inclusion of other states in the implementation of its so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" is yet another violation of its treaty commitments. The transfer to them of technical descriptions, blueprints, and technologies constitutes a direct failure to carry out the provisions of Articles IX and X of the treaty.

This list could be continued. However, it is clear why the U.S. Administration is gearing itself to a "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty by pinning the blame on others, as the saying goes. This "interpretation" gives the Pentagon the green light to create [sozdaniye] and test space strike arms. In accusing the Soviet Union of all the deadly sins, the United States is aiming also to obtain justification from the world public for its extremely dangerous schemes to transfer the arms race to space.

The fact that "Star Wars" is leading precisely to this situation can no longer be denied even by a General J. Abrahamson, leader of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. Recently he bluntly admitted that through its actions the United States is cranking up yet another spiral in the arms race. This is also confirmed by R. English, a leading U.S. disarmament specialist: "The technology currently being tested in U.S. laboratories is leading to the creation [sozdaniye] of an entirely new generation of arms... with hardly predictable consequences. If these weapons are deployed in space it will destabilize the strategic correlation of forces." It is difficult not to agree with that.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS COMMENTATOR DECRIMES U.S. UNDERMINING OF ABM TREATY

LD261835 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1715 GMT 26 Feb 87

[Text] Moscow, 26 Feb (TASS) — TASS observer Leonid Ponomarev writes:

It has long been observed that a man on the path to Hell will always look for a fellow traveller. In this sense, the trip by representatives of the U.S. Administration Paul Nitze, Edward Rowny, and Richard Perle through West Europe, Asia, and the Pacific pursues precisely this aim: to find themselves fellow travellers on the path to Star Wars, being convinced that the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty, which has to date served as a reliable barrier to sliding towards nuclear catastrophe, is unnecessary. The Reagan administration intends to disguise the launching of weapons, including nuclear weapons, into space by its so-called "broad interpretation" of the existing ABM Treaty, according to which Washington allegedly has the right to test and deploy space-based combat systems under the SDI program.

The ABM Treaty gives no such right either to the U.S. or the Soviet side. According to the London GUARDIAN, the U.S. visitors assured the British prime minister that the U.S. Administration had no intention of speeding up testing and deployment of Star Wars arms without consulting its NATO allies. However, U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger indicated almost at the same time that there was a possibility of such tests starting as early as next year. Who is to be believed? The U.S. Administration has evidently embarked on a course of undermining the ABM Treaty, but would also like its NATO allies to give their blessing and agreement to Washington's international arbitrariness toward such an important agreement. On one hand the United States signed the ABM Treaty, while on the other it waited for the moment to cast it aside as an empty piece of paper, by this time having created [sozdav] certain space strike weapon systems.

Naturally the question arises as to whether one can rely on accords with Washington if its administration negates documents of fundamental importance for peace for the sole fact that these accords hinder the militarization of space.

The Soviet Union, for its part, makes every effort to prevent arms being put into space. Were this to happen, thousands and tens of thousands of warheads, capable of crashing any moment to earth, would be flying in earth orbits above people's heads. THE WASHINGTON POST is correct when it says that if such missiles are deployed in space, the United States may destabilize the strategic equilibrium that now exists.

There are now up to 50,000 nuclear weapons stockpiled in the world. Their yield is the equivalent of a million bombs similar to the one that was dropped on Hiroshima. To add

space weapons to such an arsenal as well is simply lunacy. Describing the position of the Reagan administration on the ABM question, Gerard Smith, former head of the U.S. delegation at the SALT I talks, says in THE BALTIMORE SUN that the administration's decision to unilaterally alter the ABM Treaty's interpretation jeopardizes not only one of the last foundations of Soviet-U.S. agreements in arms control, but may also preclude the possibility of Washington concluding any new accords with the USSR. The current Washington Administration is evidently trying to achieve precisely this.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRAVDA: SDI STILL 'MAIN OBSTACLE' TO NST AGREEMENT

PM031245 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Mar 87 First Edition p 4

[Yuriy Zhukov untitled "International Review"]

[Text] Rays of Light in an Overcast Sky [subhead]

As M.S. Gorbachev noted in his speech at the 18th USSR Trade United Congress, the tasks proclaimed by the party, especially since the CPSU Central Committee January Plenum, are attracting tremendous attention throughout the world.

This week, too, all the world's press continued to discuss the constructive results of the recent Moscow forum "For a Nuclear-free World, for Survival of Humanity," which brought together what was truly the flower of world science and culture and the most prominent businessmen and social and religious figures from all four corners of the globe. What attention was paid for the Soviet Trade Union Congress this week by the representatives of 188 national trade union centers from 134 countries and 10 international organizations who attended it!

All this is happening at a time when the international situation remains unsatisfactory and when our class enemies are maintaining the pitch of their anticommunist propaganda and are continuing to try to frighten the peoples by presenting the Soviet Union as the "image of the enemy." This propaganda is still doing its dark deeds. Nevertheless, under the direct influence of the events now taking place in the Soviet Union, an ever-increasing improvement has been noted in the atmosphere of international relations. People everywhere are beginning to understand -- albeit still slowly -- how crudely and impudently they have been deceived by those who state ad infinitum that the Soviet land is the dangerous "empire of evil."

Metaphorically speaking, we can now say with full justification that, although the international horizon is still darkened by black clouds, rays of light are already appearing. This is due to the tireless force of the new thinking which was adopted by our party and people as a result of the 27th CPSU Congress.

I could not help thinking of that yesterday when reading the report of the conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti, as a result of which the interlocutors found much common ground in their understanding of the fact that it is now more important than ever for politics to be inspired by present-day realities: Having freed themselves from the position of being nuclear hostages, the countries of the West and East must now begin to resolve the problems which are vitally important for them and for others.

Hence the need for new thinking which proceeds from an understanding of universal interdependence and is based on the idea of the survival of civilization, in which all people without exception are interested.

The activity of the Soviet branch of the "world laboratory," which opened 2 days ago in the presence of the USSR and Italian foreign ministers, is a new form of international scientific cooperation which will surely be a significant contribution to the resolution of the task in question.

Increasingly broad circles of the world public, including many representatives of the ruling elite, as they say in the West, are coming to understand the need to create a genuine coalition of reason which would help to consolidate trust and international cooperation. Even in the NATO countries some movements toward equitable international cooperation are now being seen, although they are still modest and by no means always consistent.

An example of that is provided by the debates and discussions which flared up with new force there last week over that most important question on whose solution universal security depends — whether or not there will be space weapons and, ultimately, whether or not there will be nuclear disarmament.

What Washington Is Striving For [subhead]

Next Wednesday, 4 March, the seventh and latest round of Soviet-U.S. talks aimed at reaching accords on the reduction and, subsequently, the elimination of nuclear arms and on preventing the militarization of space ends in Geneva. To date no progress has been seen in this direction even though it is almost 18 months since the Soviet-U.S. summit in Geneva resulted in the decision being taken to speed up the achievement of accords during the talks.

The world public was entitled to expect that substantial progress would be achieved — and without delay — during the present talks, which have before them important accords reached at the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik. These hopes were not borne out this time either — the U.S. side is not only unwilling to seek mutually acceptable compromises but is taking an increasingly hard line by repudiating what was agreed in Reykjavik.

Once again Reagan's notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) or, more simply, the program of preparation for "star wars" is the main obstacle to agreement.

Last Sunday THE NEW YORK TIMES reported that the U.S. President had ordered the Pentagon to present by the end of April a list of proposed tests in space which the U.S. Administration intends to carry out in breach of the 1972 ABM Treaty, which bans such tests.

Washington does not intend to openly declare the treaty defunct. So it has thought up an outflanking maneuver — the so-called "broad" interpretation of the treaty which apparently permits... the testing and deployment of "Star Wars" weapons in space.

In so doing the United States effectively intends to cancel out this treaty. Weinberger makes no secret of this: "Regardless of how the ABM is interpreted," he stated recently, "observance of it must be abandoned (!) so as to be able to deploy a space-based defense system." Thus he made short shrift of it!

What specifically is at issue? According to the U.S. press the intention is to deploy tens of thousands (!) of missiles in space on board 2,000 battle stations placed in orbit hundreds of miles above the earth. To this it must be added that Washington stresses that this is only the first stage in the implementation of the "Star Wars" program!

The thousands of missiles intended for deployment in space are to operate for the time being without the use of "exotic" means of warfare, as they say over there -- lasers, elementary particle beams, and so forth. [paragraph continues]

Their creation is delayed, but the Pentagon is demanding to have space weapons at its disposal by 1994. Thus the so-called "initial" system of this weapon has now been chosen -- that is, missiles, which, according to THE NEW YORK TIMES, "would destroy targets by crashing into them at high speed or by exploding near them."

Naturally, this truly reckless and adventurist program has caused profound alarm not only among the peace-loving public but also among the government circles of America's NATO allies and in Congress. Back on 6 February Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, sent the President a sharp letter in which he said: "If the administration now decides to abandon the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty without achieving unanimity within NATO and in Congress in support of the justification of the measure, this will have some extremely unfavorable consequences... Such a decision would also very likely be taken on Capitol Hill as the end of the arms control process under your administration."

The President ignored this warning. He also ignored the objections of his allies, including the FRG, British, Italian, Canadian, Norwegian, and other governments. Not everything is going smoothly for the "Star Wars" supporters. On Tuesday D. Wright, speaker of the House of Representatives, warned the administration that if it tried to expand the tests and developments within the SDI framework in keeping with the "broader interpretation" of the ABM Treaty, Congress could cut the appropriations for SDI.

In this situation the President has already maneuvered since taking his decision: Last Wednesday he sent his representatives, P. Nitze and R. Perle, to Western Europe for discussions with the leaders of allied countries. The latter harbor no illusions about the content and point of these "consultations." Essentially, according to the British conservative newspaper THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, they amount to terse briefings whose content may be expressed as: "Take it or leave it."

One Scandal After Another [subhead]

Well-informed observers are noting these days that the U.S. administration's provocative behavior is explained to a considerable extent by the complicated U.S. domestic political situation.

The prestige of the present administration and, above all, of its head has fallen drastically in the public eye as a result of the scandalous disclosures regarding the covert dealings in arms sales to Iran, the income from which financed the arming of the Nicaraguan "contras." Trying to somehow restore their prestige, the administration's leaders are now attempting to influence the average American by a show of ostentatious resolve and bellicosity.

Here is how THE NEW YORK TIMES interpreted the propaganda meaning of these provocative actions recently: "'Reagan is still the President, even if he is asleep on the couch in the Oval Office,'" the administration says, trying to convince Americans who have begun to lose confidence in him. 'Reagan still has extensive presidential powers; In many cases neither the Congress nor the public can do anything to limit or direct his actions. The weightiest evidence of this is provided by the purposefulness with which Reagan is leading his administration or allowing it to move toward abandoning the ABM Treaty'."

Of course, it is up to Americans themselves to examine what Washington is now saying and what motives are guiding their elected representatives, who are acting contrary to the aspirations of all the people, including the American people. We can only state that the chain reaction of disclosures, which began back at the beginning of November, is not only holding but intensifying.

In Washington on Thursday the report of the special commission headed by the conservative former Senator J. Tower was published. The commission had been investigating the scandalous covert deals with Iran and the "contras." This report contains sensational new revelations which, as it is reported from Washington, will probably lead to the resignation of prominent presidential advisers convicted of unlawful actions. The most influential of them, White House Chief of Staff D. Regan, has already resigned.

This week brought to light new developments in the vile stories in which the administration has become entangled. THE NEW YORK TIMES, for example, has written about the connections between Oliver North, one of the participants in the "Iran and the contras" affair, and the participants in a plot aimed at assassinating the president of Honduras, who was clearly hindering the actions of the "contras" active on that country's territory. This plot, as the paper writes, was to have been carried out using 10 million dollars obtained from U.S. cocaine sales. Then it became known that U.S. specialists were also preparing the assassination of Nicaragua's leaders headed by the country's president. That operation, codenamed "Pegasus," also failed.

This week the chain of events in another scandalous story continued to unfold -- namely, the attempts to organize military intervention against Libya aimed at overthrowing its government and assassinating M. al-Qadhafi. This plan, codenamed "Rosa," was devised in secret by the National Security Council and envisaged in particular landing 6 U.S. combat divisions numbering around 90,000 men in Libya.

All these revelations confirm time and again the danger presented to the cause of peace by the extreme reactionary wing which is now setting the tone in Washington.

The Struggle Continues [subhead]

In this atmosphere the Soviet Union is bound to do everything necessary to reliably safeguard its own security and that of its friends and allies. That is precisely why the USSR was forced last Thursday to conduct its first explosion of a nuclear device after more than 18 months of silence at our test ranges. We were forced to terminate the unilateral moratorium by the irresponsible adventurist policy of Washington, which is prolonging the insane nuclear arms race.

Nevertheless, the USSR continues the determined struggle to end that race and, in that connection, to achieve the complete ending of nuclear tests. As our leadership never

tires of stressing, the USSR will continue to keep all doors open for any honest steps to limit and reduce arms, to ensure reliable monitoring of this process, and to strengthen international mutual security.

The many responses from overseas demonstrate tha this USSR stance finds understanding although, predictably enough, the U.S. and NATO psychological warfare services and trying to organize another anti-Soviet campaign on this theme.

U.S. Congressman Les Aucoin called the resumption of our nuclear tests of "logical consequence of the erroneous foreign policy" of the United States. Many West Europeans spoke in the same time. As the Paris newspaper LE MONDE recalled last Friday, the termination of our moratorium is an enforced response to the U.S. tests in Nevada.

Here is what the Japanese council for banning atomic and hydrogen weapons [gensyyke] stated: "For 18 months the Soviet Union unilaterally refrained from conducting nuclear tests and appealed to the United States to end its nuclear explosions, but... the appeals went unanswered." The cause of this situation, the [Gensuyke] document points out, is the stance taken by the U.S. Administration, which stubbornly clings to nuclear weapons. "Washington has thus issued a challenge to the international public," the statement notes. The Japanese peace campaigners have proclaimed their determination to "continue the struggle for the complete banning of tests."

Yes, the peoples of the world will continue to wage this struggle with redoubled energy. Soviet people will continue to be in its front ranks!

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR ALLEGES LINK BETWEEN THULE RADAR MODERNIZATION, SDI

Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 18 Feb 87 p 3

[Article by Sergey Astakhov under the "Commentator's Opinion" rubric: "They are Consolidating..."]

[Text] Recently the Pentagon proceeded to "modernize" the radar station on the American military base in Thule--in the northwest part of the island of Greenland. This station, as many observers note, has long been used by the American military as a springboard for electronic espionage against the USSR and for collecting intelligence information from satellites but it is also one of the centers for possible nuclear missile operations in the north. During the course of the current "modernization" it is planned to equip the radar installation in Thule with a "Pave Paws" phased array antenna system, which will increase the station's operating radius to five thousand kilometers. Thus, the U.S., in essence, is creating a qualitatively new station which, when put into operation, as observers note, violates the Soviet-American ABM Treaty of 1972 and, according to the Danish newspaper POLITIKEN, is closely linked with the Pentagon's plans for "star wars". It is significant that a similar station is now being created in the region of [Filingdales] in Great Britain.

In this connection it is impossible not to pay attention to the aspirations of the Pentagon strategists to proceed in the near future with the expansion of the American military base at Keflavik where, according to press reports, there are more than 3,000 U.S. servicemen and dozens of "Phantoms" and AWACS planes equipped with espionage equipment as well as existing systems of electronic espionage, fixed on the movement of ships in the North Atlantic.

The creation in Thule of a qualitatively new station roused legitimate concern in Denmark. This is understandable. Greenland, as is known, has the status of an autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, however, all of its military and foreign policy issues are conducted in Copenhagen. This concern has also been aroused by the fact that according to an agreement by the Danish parliament, the government of the country is obliged to come out against the "star wars" plan and the militarization of space in general.

As the local press testifies, the Danes do not want to be participants in the American program of "star wars" (SDI) into which the Pentagon would like to involve them.

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR ARMY PAPER VIEWS U.S. SDI SPENDING PLANS

PM271549 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Feb 87 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Billions on SDI"]

[Text] Washington, 26 Feb -- The Reagan administration is sharply pushing ahead with the development [razrabotka] of the latest arms systems intended for deployment within the framework of "Star Wars" program. This is attested by its financial requests for upcoming years.

Thus, in fiscal 1988 the administration has asked Congress for \$5.68 billion for the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) program, compared with \$3.5 billion in the current fiscal year. A year later — in fiscal 1989 — the sum will grow to \$6.8 billion according to White House requests.

The Pentagon intends to devote particular attention in the next few years to the accelerated creation [sozdaniye] of key SDI strike systems. It is planned to sharply increase spending on the development [razrabotka] of strike systems using kinetic energy. In the next fiscal year alone \$303.5 million — 140 percent more than in the current fiscal year — have been allocated for these purposes. [paragraph continues]

Another large sum, \$357.4 million, has been requested for fiscal 1989 for the development [razrabotka] of "space killers" — special space-based interceptor missiles. The Pentagon intends to stage practical experiments this year as part of their development [sozdaniye]. In a Tuesday conversation with correspondents from THE NEW YORK TIMES U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger stated in this regard that the tests "will promote the deployment of an ABM defense with space-based elements by the start of 1994."

As part of the administration's request it is planned to increase appropriations for the creation [sozdaniye] of an "exo-atmospheric" ABM system — the ERIS interceptor — by more than 100 percent, to \$221 million next year and to \$308 million in fiscal 1989. This ground-launched system is considered by the Pentagon to be one of the most promising systems for the first echelon of a "multilayered" ABM defense. Spending on the creation [sozdaniye] the HFBI ground-launched missile interceptor, which is designed to destroy warheads during their re-entry phase, will also more than double in the next fiscal year — to \$238 million.

The administration also intends to spend enormous sums on the creation [sozdaniye] of various types of "exotic" systems, particularly laser and particle-beam weapons. In the next fiscal year \$558 million are to be allocated for the development [razrabotka] of a free-electron laser and a space-based neutral particle accelerator alone.

Nor has the Pentagon forgotten about the development [razrabotka] of new enhanced-payload launchers, for which several hundred million dollars have been requested for each of the next few years.

Although the Reagan administration continues to claim in public that its "Star Wars" program is "nonnuclear in nature," in actual fact the creation [sozdaniye] of nuclear power plants for deployment in space is becoming one of the main areas for financing within the SDI framework. The Reagan administration would like to spend \$158 million in fiscal 1988 and another \$187 million in fiscal 1989 on these purposes.

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CSO: 5200/1348

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET ECONOMIST ON BUDGET, FISCAL ASPECTS OF SDI

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 26 Feb 87 pp 1-5

[Article by A. Kireyev, doctor of economic sciences: "Borrowing from the Future: 'Star Wars' Programme and U.S. Economy"]

[Text] The United States is the main catalyzer of the arms race. But it is a specific feature of military production that the value created in it is not added to the country's national income but is deducted from it because military output acquires the form of objects which are altogether useless to society. For this reason, violation of the proportion between the civilian and military sectors of production is the major symptom of militarism's economic crisis. At the same time, further growth of civilian production becomes impossible in the context of the existing growth rates of military spending.

On the verge of the 1980's, the United States came close to such a crisis. At that time, the Reagan Administration faced the dilemma of either continuing the militarist race through direct reduction of the growth rates of civilian production or, conversely, limiting the military expenditures and giving a breath of fresh air to the civilian sectors. The first variant disaccorded with the election platform of the Republicans because the latter promised the Americans to considerably improve their well-being, while the second variant did not suit the Republicans for military-political considerations because revival of a "strong America" was a major thesis in the Administration's programme.

The market economy prompted a temporary way out. The Federal Government's high demand for loan funds needed to patch the budget holes resulted in an upswing of the interest rate which began to serve as a pump syphoning capital out of other Western countries. Furthermore, Washington, displaying the skill of a fakir, started manipulating the dollar's exchange rate with a view to attaining the same objective.

And in that situation there took place coincidences which looked surprising on the surface but were logical in essence. In 1981-1985, the United States spent about 1,020 billion dollars for the military purposes, 600 billion more than in the previous five-year period. While in 1976-1980 the U.S. national debt increased by 160 billion dollars, the astronomic budget

deficits in 1981-1985 pushed it to 760 billion dollars. As we see, the difference stands at 600 billion in this case, too. During the same period the USA lured capital to the tune of 300 billion dollars to the USA from Western Europe alone by means of the high interest rate. If the imports of many billions dollars of capital from other countries are added to this it becomes perfectly clear that in the first half of the 1980's the United States fully covered the increment in its military expenditures by using the loan funds the lion's share of which came from abroad.

It took several years for the idea of space-based weapon systems to mature in Pentagon strategists' brains. They could hope for success only if they explained where they would get the money for the necessary research. Before Reagan came to office, America could offer them only social expenditure cuts and plundering the developing countries--not enough for the mammoth war programme. Hence the requisitions from the rest of the capitalist world starting with the first year of his presidency.

Only then did it become clear that the outer financing process was gaining momentum necessary to launch a new stage in the arms race: SDI made its appearance on the political scene, first as an unassuming research programme to account for 1 or 2 percent of the U.S. military budget. That was how it was introduced to Americans. The propaganda machine took pains to prove that only an inexpensive space shield could save America from the alleged Soviet threat.

The very first year of the Star Wars programme, US\$992 million was squandered to implement it: a tiny visible part of the arms race iceberg whose summit reaches into space. The White House's SDI promptly integrated all ABM research which cost the U.S. about \$40,000 million between 1954 and 1983. War lasers alone--an essential SDI component--cost over \$2,000 million. Getting fat on Reaganomics, the military-industrial monopolies supplied \$30 million a year from their internal revenues to develop space-based weapon systems they saw as the most promising. So SDI was started with a considerable initial capital.

After 1983, Star Wars allocations skyrocketed to reach \$3,500 million by the 1987 fiscal year. To support SDI's reputation for cheapness, the NBC asked economic advisers of the four preceding Administrations how the effort would influence the U.S. economy. The experts came to the opinion that SDI implementation presented no economic or financial problem, and calculated that it could well stay within the usual annual Defence Ministry budget throughout the decade.

Really, at its first stage SDI will be an economic problem not so much for the United States as for its allies which will have to finance the new militarist venture. The allies have already sent funds for this to the U.S., tempted by the prospect of easily cashing in on high interest rates.

In their turn, Pentagon men are doing everything to prevent SDI from exceeding the budget of the Defence Department, at least during the first

years, as the development and testing of prototypes do not call for huge spending yet. That is why they are coming out for the further reduction of social spending, are manipulating the military budget, channelling money from one programme into another and are calling upon contractors to fork out for SDI from internal corporal funds.

However, to delay economic cataclysm does not mean to eliminate its prime cause. A serious warning to Washington's reckless course was given in February 1985 when foreign assets in the United States exceeded its investment abroad. The BUSINESS WEEK journal gloomily stated then that Americans "have to pay for their credit run". The continuation of the policy of high interest rates has become not only impossible but also dangerous. Today high interest rates can play only the role of a buffer hindering the reverse flow of capital lured into SDI project.

If the United States succeeds in maintaining the existing status quo, the funds received will be enough for several years of militarist preparations. But if Washington fails to heed the voice of reason and starts a full-scale production and deployment of the space-based ABM system, the bill will run into hundreds of billions of dollars and even the richest ally will be unable to fill it. And this will trigger off a deep crisis of not only the American but also of the entire capitalist economy.

Trying to keep on the safe side, the U.S. is enticing its allies directly into manufacturing space weapons systems, the aim being to shift onto them part of its financial burden and get their know-how cheap. Yet this method might yield result only if Uncle Sam himself were not as naked as the king from Andersen's fairy tale. His heavy borrowings from the purses of ordinary Americans, 34 million of whom live below the official poverty line as it is, have long been up against the objective minimum of funds needed for the reproduction of the workforce. By putting his hand on other countries' resources, he will only worsen the entire array of interimperialist antagonisms.

Washington has been acting as a showman calling visitors into a U.S.-masterminded transnational "vanity fair", where it will attempt to sell to its allies a nicely packaged merchandise called SDI. At the same time, like the famous woman character of William Thackeray's novel, the U.S. intends to skim the cream and go on living in clover on God knows what.

The world community is strong enough to prevent the U.S. military-industrial complex from satisfying its ambitions at the expense of a nuclear-free future which mankind is out to get for itself.

(SOVETSKAYA ROSSIA, 26 February. In full.)

/12858
CSO: 5200/1314

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET SPACE INSTITUTE DIRECTOR DETAILS OBJECTIONS TO SDI

WA261500 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 7, 23 Feb 87 pp 10-13

[Interview with Roald Sagdeyev, director of USSR Space Research Institute, conducted by NEW TIMES reporters Yevgeniy Alekseyev and Leonid Mlechin, date and place not given: "Strategic Defence Initiative: Chaos Instead of Stability"; first paragraph is newspaper's introduction; passages within slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] What is the U.S. after: space shield or space sword? Why isn't the Soviet Union creating its own SDI? NEW TIMES reporters Yevgeniy Alekseyev and Leonid Mlechin put these questions to Roald Sagdeyev, member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences and director of its Space Research Institute. The interview follows.

Judging from some letters to the editors, not all our readers understand why the Soviet Union objects to SDI. Its advocates put forward extremely plausible arguments in its favour: they believe SDI will bring the world deliverance from nuclear weapons and ensure stability. SDI, they argue, threatens no one--it is a shield, a defence system...

The purpose of SDI is to provide protection from offensive nuclear missiles, but did not the Reykjavik summit demonstrate the possibility of eliminating such missiles? Both sides being prepared, in principle, to scrap their strategic nuclear arsenals makes so much nonsense of SDI. Supposing nuclear arsenals have been reduced to nought, and one side deploys such a system. This will amount to a serious strategic imbalance.

/Could you please elaborate on that?/

Take one SDI scenario which Edward Teller advocates (incidentally, official support for this scenario was one reason why the U.S. refused to join our nuclear test freeze). It provides for submarines, fitted with special launchers and missiles capable of lifting X-ray lasers to an altitude of 1,000 km, being moved as close to the Soviet Union's borders as possible. The lasers are to go all the way up in a fraction of a minute so as to hit an enemy ICBM before it completes the boost stage. No missile has so far been able to pick up such fantastic lift-off speed. Experts say that supermissiles are needed for the purpose. Each supermissile is to carry an X-ray laser pumped to an energy level high enough to emit X-ray radiation capable of destroying enemy missiles. Such a laser can be pumped only by means of a nuclear explosion, and the SDI programme provides for that.

Nuclear explosions will be set off by warheads similar to those with which nuclear missiles are equipped. SDI calls for a whole fleet of submarines carrying missile-borne X-ray lasers which depend chiefly on nuclear warheads for their action. I wonder how any sober-minded statesman could believe such a system to be just an innocent "safeguard" against a "trigger-happy madman." Altering the trajectories of such missiles so as to hit any ground targets with them is no problem at all.

/And this is just one of the early SDI versions. The current idea is to deploy the whole system in space in advance./

By SDI the U.S. means a large complex of measures, an echeloned system. Some of the missiles are to be deployed in space, and the rest on submarines. The system is also to comprise space elements for target detection and guidance.

/Can't such submarines be monitored?/

What do you mean by monitoring? Ascertaining their existence? The important thing is not so much to keep an eye on these submarines as to make sure that the "launch" button is never pressed.

/Supposing an international inspection is authorized to check every such laser device for a nuclear warhead!/

Nuclear warheads are necessary for an X-ray laser.

/What if such an inspection restricts these nuclear warheads to sizes that rule out the possibility of their being used as an offensive weapon?/

Any nuclear warhead can be used as an offensive weapon.

/Can the computer programming of these missiles' trajectories be brought under control?/

This is absolutely impossible. By checking a programme once we shall achieve nothing: after the checkers have gone, the programme can be altered immediately. Modern computers owe their versatility to being reprogrammable. This is just one of the numerous problems that virtually defy solution, such as the problem of confidence, the problem of reprogramming, the problem of control. Why all this fuss about the space shield, one may ask. Haven't parties concerned already expressed their readiness to give up their strategic nuclear arms? What's the use of a "safeguard" then? What is there to safeguard oneself against?

/Well, there are three other nuclear powers, and about ten countries capable of getting hold of nuclear weapons./

Let us take a look at the road to a non-nuclear world outlined in the Soviet proposals, as for instance the programme put forward on January 15, 1986. All the concrete schemes for making the world nuclear-free envisage a stage-by-stage process involving these three and other nuclear powers.

/What about those which have not joined the nuclear club yet but are knocking at the door?/

The all-round Soviet proposals presuppose a still stricter abidance by the letter and spirit of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The dismantling of nuclear warheads, multiple warhead vehicles and the entire nuclear-weapon assembly line is to be carried out under international control. This naturally applies to the countries which have no nuclear warheads so far but are about to get hold of them.

/And what if we suggest a compromise to the Americans: you don't go ahead with the deployment of an SDI system with first-strike capability, and we make strategic defence arrangements of our own? This will result in two shields which will threaten no one and guarantee either side against any attack. What would you say to those readers who think the U.S.S.R. is making a mistake by not developing its own version of the SDI system?/

Two SDI systems would devour whatever stability remained in the world twice as fast. "SDI versus SDI" symmetry would be extremely precarious and dangerous. Theoretically speaking, the side which got ahead of the other "competitor in the race" might feel tempted to make a preemptive strike. This is a convincing enough argument against this option and in favour of alternative ones. Today we can say that asymmetry in this matter would make for a higher degree of reliability, and for a more stable configuration.

/In other words, no space-based ABM systems offers the hope of maintaining stability, is that right? Consequently, even if nuclear weapons are eliminated SDI will not make the world any safer, will it?/

The combination of SDI and offensive nuclear arms is clearly an explosive mixture. But SDI in a non-nuclear world is another matter. [paragraph continues]

Whether space systems armed with high-power free-electron or chemical lasers instead of nuclear-pumped ones can be an element of strategic equation or not is a problem that needs serious study. As I see it, in a non-nuclear world depending for its balance on ground-based conventional weapon systems, the existence of exotic orbital arms capable of hitting control centres with pinpoint accuracy would be a powerful destabilizing factor. In case of war, these arms--albeit non-nuclear--would give their owner a considerable advantage from the start.

/You mean..../

I mean the advantage of being able to use space-to-earth offensive weapons. Judging from the concrete SDI scenarios now being discussed by American militarymen, scientists and politicians, almost all versions of the system are to include offensive weapons.

/What kind of weapons, specifically?/

Lasers, for instance. The atmosphere is opaque to an X-ray laser beam, but transparent to an optical laser beam.

/Won't the beam disperse in the atmosphere?/

It will, but to a negligible extent. One of the SDI options provides for ground lasers which hit space targets (missiles, for instance) either directly, or on the earth-to-space-to-space principle, meaning that a ground laser's beam is trained on a space mirror which turns in such a way as to bounce the beam off to a target.

/You say that an X-ray laser beam disperses in the atmosphere. Surely this makes it unfit for use as an offensive weapon. Is it of any danger then?/

The X-ray laser is included in the strategic equation as an anti-retaliation element. The X-ray laser destroys strategic missiles, the potential deterrants. You can hit the other side and parry the retaliatory strike by means of the X-ray laser. Defensive and offensive weapons are organically connected, and this interconnection is inseverable. You can use one and the same device both to beat back an attack, and to attack. The X-ray laser is a case in point.

/On the one hand, SDI is described as a threat to peace; on the other, the very feasibility of a space defence system -- and its efficacy, if it ever comes about -- is being called in question. Isn't there a contradiction here?/

Most analysts believe that SDI will not be of help in achieving strategic superiority, because countermeasures will be taken. Modern science and military technology guarantee this. A direct countermeasure would be a simple buildup of offensive potential. It will cost much less to increase the number of nuclear missiles than to set up a defence system. The latest advances in science and technology can be embodied in offensive weapons as well. Strategic equilibrium can be restored this way, but its price will be still more nuclear weapons around, an added risk of a nuclear conflict breaking out in a critical situation, and lower overall strategic stability.

Therefore when we say we are not afraid of SDI we mean it's impossible to gain any unilateral advantage by means of SDI. [paragraph continues]

But as entirely new components of the strategic balance equation appear, the balance will become still more precarious, and all countries -- the U.S. included -- will be less secure.

You say that SDI is an illusion, but the Americans do not regard its as such. Why is the U.S. so eager to set up an ABM system?

I happen to have discussed this problem with Americans from all walks of life: servicemen and scientists, politicians and public figures. Most of them told me they regarded the hope of achieving superiority through SDI as a dangerous illusion. Why then do generals and politicians hang on to this programme?

American political life is like a pendulum, with public opinion intermittently swinging from one extreme to the other. This happens chiefly on account of those who are in no position to weigh all the pros and cons on their own. They are not to blame for that because their ideas are formed largely under the influence of the mass media. There was a period when most Americans thought the world had stockpiled more weapons than was good for it, and it was time to reach an agreement with the Russians. That was followed by another swing of the pendulum. The point is that quite a few people in America have a financial interest in military programmes.

I am certain, of course, that even in the military-industrial complex there are sober-minded people who are not at all eager to unleash a war. Their reasoning is probably as follows: mankind has been living with nuclear weapons for forty years, but war has not broken out because both sides know -- the button must not be pushed. So if there is still a chance of cashing in on arms manufacturing -- well, why not? Unfortunately, a more serious analysis of things is still beyond them.

These people constitute only a fraction of American society. All right, the military-industrial complex is concerned exclusively with profit. But what about statesmen, Congressmen, the administration?

American political life is governed by rather complicated laws. There is no simple formula that makes it possible to predict what Congress will do, and whether it will come to terms with the administration in any particular case. But you must always bear economic factors in mind. The prospect of having military installations built in its territory and getting munitions orders (which mean more jobs) may look attractive to certain electoral constituencies. The circles connected with the arms manufacturing companies and the army are a politically organized force. There are numerous think tanks like the Heritage Foundation busy inculcating in people the need for the technological arms race.

General Daniel Graham, author of the notorious book "High Frontier" (lauded to the skies by the Heritage Foundation) on setting up a space-based ABM system, wrote that the task of the current administration was to make the SDI programme irreversible.

The advocates of SDI are inviting us to join in. In doing so they are acting from pragmatic motives. How can you admit in public that a nuclear war is impossible -- and stimulate investment in the development of new military programmes at the same time? The best way is to point to a potential enemy and scream: look, he's building up a space defence system! And if he does not want to do so, to try and persuade him by any means, even by promises of passing on the latest in high technology to him.

And now, our magazine's traditional question: on what, in your opinion, should international stability rest in a nuclear-free world?

It will be possible to find concrete ways of maintaining stability in a world where only conventional weapons remain. This is not going to be an easy matter, of course. What should we -- all of us on earth -- fear most? The problems that will certainly spill over to a nuclear-free world or one day being blown sky-high together?

Those who deal with problems of strategy will have something to think about when probing for the right path towards a nuclear-free world. The process of reducing the present level of nuclear confrontation to zero will pass through numerous intermediate stages: the number of nuclear warheads will continue to diminish, and certain kinds of weapons will disappear altogether. Each stage should be well balanced. The first step, to be taken by the two great powers only, is to cut their nuclear forces by half. The next tasks will be to draw the rest of the nuclear powers into the global nuclear disarmament process, and to maintain stability at each stage so as to preserve equilibrium.

One school of thought -- to which Henry Kissinger belongs, for instance -- maintains that the fewer nuclear weapons, the greater the danger of critical situations. Kissinger believes that a high level of nuclear armament guarantees greater stability. Robert McNamara takes a different view. He thinks that 500 warheads apiece (preferably single rather than multiple) are enough to ensure stability. Other experts are of the opinion that an intermediate level of minimum deterrence requires only a few dozen warheads.

Just ten warheads or so, instead of the 10,000 stockpiled to date, would be enough to deter a potential warmonger. Those who insist on the further, stockpiling of nuclear weapons argue that nuclear missile systems may misfire, and therefore reserves are needed. Even the Challenger disaster has failed to convince me of that. The rate of failure of modern space weapons can be calculated. Information on the propensity of nuclear warhead control systems to malfunctions is less readily available but it follows from the discussions over the past year of the problem of a nuclear test ban that experts are pretty sure the electronic systems or any other warhead components are unlikely to malfunction in combat. As for the means of delivery, statistics pertaining to the use of modern space technology tell us that some missiles occasionally fail to take off, develop engine trouble, and so forth — but such cases are few and far between. All the more so as the armed forces use thoroughly tested and reliable systems. In peacetime, however, even an isolated incident can spark off a nuclear war. This is a terrible price to pay for the buildup of enormous nuclear arsenals.

Won't the scrapping of nuclear weapons give an impetus to the development of new arms?

The proposal of January 15, 1986, links the changeover to a nuclear-free world with banning other weapons of mass destruction. If mankind proves able to implement this changeover, this will pave the way for the appropriate control arrangements all along the line, from the research stage on. After all, there does exist a convention banning all kinds of research connected with the development of biological weapons.

The climate of mutual trust would be most welcome, of course. But even if we fail to create such a climate, we must reach an agreement, because we have a common goal, survival, which calls for the elimination of nuclear weapons. [paragraph continues] The U.S. and ourselves face the same horrible enemy, we are companions in distress, chained together and confined to the same cell. It is not at all necessary for the Americans and us to love each other; it is enough to realize that our two nations will survive provided we reach an agreement, even if we are only guided by the instinct for self-preservation.

Shan't we confront, some time in the future, the need to set up a space shield to protect us from, say, extraterrestrial aggressors or from large meteorites?

The chances of a very large heavenly body falling on the earth are rather slim. Such events occur very seldom. A scientific hypothesis has it that an enormous swarm of comets and asteroids invades the environment of the sun, our solar system included, once every 25 billion years. What ensues is a merciless bombardment of planets causing ecological catastrophes. It was probably such a catastrophe that exterminated the dinosaurs. Mankind has ten million years or so to prepare for such an "attack." I hope we shall cope with the problem of SDI earlier than that because the danger it poses is much more immediate. Illustrations from CAMBIO 16 (Spain), TIME (U.S.A.) and the book "Weaponry in Space: The Dilemma of Security" (U.S.S.R.).

[The following caption accompanies a photo and chart:

The SDI system will comprise mostly laser weapons to be used against missiles and ground targets. American scientists are now working on four types of laser:
— hydrogen fluoride chemical lasers;
— free-electron lasers;
— excimer lasers (using chemical compounds of inert gases in an unstable excited state as the active medium). The beams emitted by these ground-mounted laser are to be trained upon enemy targets by means of a system of space-based mirrors;
— nuclear-bomb-pumped X-ray lasers (see chart: 1 — nuclear bomb; 2 — laser rods; 3 — tracking telescope; 4 — targeting and propulsion unit). These lasers have a special role to play in carrying out the SDI programme.]

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR SCIENTISTS CONFIDENT OF COUNTERING SDI

PM141101 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 11 Jan 87 p 3

[Article by B. Komzin and A. Poberezkin, scientific assistants at the USSR Academy of Sciences World Economics and International Relations Institute: "The Response Will Be Effective; Scientists Discuss Possible Countermeasures to 'Star Wars'"--first paragraph is reader's letter]

[Text] "Last year showed that the U.S. Administration is stubbornly dodging a solution to the questions of limiting the race in both nuclear and space arms. In an attempt to achieve military-strategic superiority, Washington is gambling on the 'Strategic Defense Initiative.' What might our response to SDI be?" asks A. Dadashov, chief power engineer at the Montin Oil Drilling Machine Building Plant in Baku.

It must be borne in mind that U.S. President R. Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative"--or SDI for short--is not just a program for creating [sozdaniye] an anti-missile defense system with space-based elements. SDI is a range of programs for the creation [sozdaniye] of offensive arms and military hardware which could be used for aggressive purposes. And we realize that we must be prepared to rebuff aggression. That is why measures to counter SDI must inevitably be developed [razrabatyvatsya]. Soviet and U.S. specialists are spotlighting active and passive measures.

Active measures include various land-, sea-, and space-based means. Their use derives from the features of the SDI system. First, the elements of this system, as R. Bowman, director of the U.S. Institute for Space and Security Studies, has noted, are extremely vulnerable. Their sensors [datchiki], energy sources, and electronics are undefended. "Star weapons" elements such as reconnaissance, identification, target indication, and combat control satellites have outer shells no thicker than saucepans or car bodies. And all these objects have been in full view of active countermeasures for quite a long time.

One possible means is to exploit the high orbiting speed of the space objects themselves. Even a simple encounter with an obstacle--"artificial meteorites," for instance--would be a devastating "blow."

Elementary calculations show that given a closing speed of 15 km per second a particle weighing the equivalent of six 5-kopek pieces could literally "pierce" a modern tank's 150 mm armor, not to mention the outer shell of a satellite. This is confirmed by direct observations, during which a U.S. electronic "cannon" easily pierced a massive aluminum casting by using a "shell" weighing seven grams accelerated to a speed of 7 km per second. The dispersion of small clouds of even microscopic particles in orbit could create defects on the mirror surfaces which would hamper the focusing of the laser beam, while larger shrapnel-like objects would be equivalent to a catastrophic meteorite strike in terms of their consequences.

Nor should we fail to mention the possible use of anti-satellite systems which are already an effective weapon at the present time. Thus, one Pentagon expert has claimed that several squadrons of aircraft equipped with interceptor missiles could "clear the sky" of enemy space hardware in 24 hours. If that is so, the same missiles could also destroy space-based elements in the SDI system.

Second, irrespective of what kinds of "star weapons" are deployed where, they will be totally dependent on various types of auxiliary space systems--combat control and communications satellites. The operation of nuclear-pumped lasers--which are planned to be sited on SLBM's--is also dependent on them. This means that any arm of the SDI system is potentially vulnerable to both traditional and new anti-satellite means. And in order to neutralize this system it is by no means vital to hit all the system's space-based components. It is sufficient, for instance, to put the early warning satellites or some other component out of action.

Thus, by detonating a nuclear device at high altitude the "working life" of most of the satellites could be sharply reduced. On passing through the radioactive belts they would pick up radiation dangerous to their electronics, sensors, and optics. According to foreign specialists, the detonation of a single nuclear device in the atmosphere would be guaranteed to "blind" all sensors within a 100 km radius and put them out of action for minutes.

It is quite possible to even avoid detonating nuclear devices. "It is not ruled out," Soviet specialists R. Sagdeyev and S. Rodionov believe, "that existing millimetric wave generators can produce something equivalent to an electromagnetic pulse over distances of up to 1,000 km." The only way of defending the highly complex range of SDI systems is to reliably shield all important components and elements. And that is currently an unresolved task.

Third, the vulnerability of space strike arms is further complicated by the fact that the space platforms on which they would be based would be comparatively large in size, heavy, and placed in relatively low orbits. Whereas countermeasure devices installed on the ground, say, would be considerably smaller, many more of them could be made, they could be made more powerful, would be cheaper, and could be defended better and aimed more

accurately. Finally, ground-based counterlasers, for instance, would not be limited in terms of power or size. Space-based weapons, A. Carter, the well-known U.S. specialist, believes, are "first-class targets" for countermeasures rather than positions for launching an attack.

Specialists in the USSR and abroad are also examining a number of passive but effective measures for countering SDI systems. In particular they believe that if the United States deploys space strike arms the response could be a quantitative buildup in the Soviet Union's offensive strategic means. Under these circumstances the USSR would be relieved of its voluntary commitment under the SALT II Treaty to limit the number of its nuclear delivery means and the construction of launch facilities for them. Understandably, this would substantially impact the effectiveness of the proposed SDI system.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union could also embark on a quantitative buildup in nuclear munitions deployed on delivery means. Or it could equip these means with a greater number of dummy warheads. This would also make it much harder to intercept them. In principle these measures could lead to a 10-fold increase in the real targets and a 100-fold increase in the dummy targets which the SDI means would have to destroy. Washington understands the situation. As R. De Lauer, U.S. under secretary of defense, has stated, "without limits on numbers (of offensive strategic arms--author's note) no defense system will work."

A straightforward quantitative buildup in developed missile and combat charge designs and in dummy delivery means and warheads not only devalues SDI. The workload placed upon certain space-based stations will exceed their combat potential.

Needless to say, this does not exhaust the possible retaliatory measures for countering SDI. Were a large-scale system of space strike arms to be created [sozdaniye] and deployed by the United States the latest achievements in the fundamental sciences and modern technology would make it possible to resolutely rebuff it, as a result of which the aggressor's actions would be neutralized.

But the USSR advocates a political solution to the problem of security, not a transfer of conflict to the sphere of military-technical rivalry. We have everything we need--the material and intellectual resources and the political will--to oppose the whipping up of the arms race.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW COMMENTARY ON ROWNY TALKS WITH JAPAN ON SDI

OW020155 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 28 Feb 87

[Dmitriyev commentary]

[Text] The debate on the early deployment of the SDI system is now at its height in Washington. In the midst of this debate, the U.S. Government has ventured on persuading the governments of its allies who had expressed disapproval. Mr Nitze, an associate of Mr Rowny, and Perle, assistant secretary of defense, have set out for European countries. The purpose of their visits is to hold consultations with U.S. allies on a broad interpretation of the 1972 USSR-U.S. ABM Treaty. And Adviser Rowny has visited Japan for the same purpose. A broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty actually means the abolition of this important treaty. West Germany has indicated its strong stand on this issue to the U.S. side. It is reported that a not too heated debate took place in Japan. The Japanese Foreign Ministry once again stated its concerns over the future of the ABM Treaty. Meanwhile, Mr Rowny attempted to play a trick by saying that the U.S. Government had not reached its final decision.

Nevertheless, the news from the United States cannot make one feel at ease. Komeito Chairman Yano who has just returned from his visit to the United States indicates that he has the impression that Washington has already made its decision on the broad interpretation. Many mass media agencies in the United States have made the same judgment. The PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER reported in its 24 February issue that it seems certain that the president is trying to reduce this important treaty with the USSR into mere form. Then it can be said that in sending its representatives to Japan and the West European countries, the United States has merely tried to fulfill its obligations for holding prior consultations with its allies just for the sake of formality.

Meanwhile, the Japanese mass media has already reported that if the U.S. Government should decide on giving the ABM Treaty a broad interpretation, the Japanese Foreign Ministry intends to follow the decision. It follows that for Japan, the recent consultation was merely perfunctory. And the consultation can be said to be merely a tranquilizer used for temporary relief from the serious issue of what relations should exist between Japan and the United States. In other words, the United States will then be able to say: You see, we did have consultations with Japan. Judging from past experience, however, such consultations will impose no obligations on high-ranking officials of the United States. And there is no sign that the current case will be an exception. It will not be difficult to imagine that some day in the early 1990's, a representative will come from the United States to inform Japan, courteously and smilingly, that the first contingent of space arms developed with Japan's cooperation has already been deployed in orbit.

If the hawks in the United States should ever succeed in abolishing the USSR-U.S. ABM Treaty as they once did with the SALT II Treaty, nothing would be more dangerous than their success. In that case, the final brake on the nuclear arms race will be removed and the arms race will be expanded into outer space. This is the implication of Mr Rowny's visit to Japan.

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

U.S. SDI POLICY DEBATED IN COMMONS, DISCUSSED BY THATCHER

Clashes in Parliament

London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 18 Feb 87 p 7

[Article by William Weekes]

[Text]

THE Government should tell President Reagan not to imperil prospects for nuclear disarmament by pressing ahead with the "Disneyland delusion" of Star Wars, Mr John Cartwright, Alliance defence spokesman, said in the Commons.

He told Mrs Thatcher that she appeared to be renegeing on the Government's original position in favour of narrow interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Mrs THATCHER: "We are not talking at the moment about deployment, but how far research can go under the terms of the treaty."

"For that there are two interpretations, but in terms of commonsense there is no point talking about deployment until you know something is feasible."

Mr KINNOCK referred to the "welcome statement" by Mr Younger, Defence Secretary, that he did not believe the case was made for any deployment of Star Wars and that a narrow interpretation of the ABM treaty was the wise one to stick to.

"Is that also your own precise view, and do you agree that a narrow interpretation the treaty forbids testing, development and deployment of Star Wars technology?"

British interest

Mrs THATCHER told him interpretation of the treaty was a matter for the two signatories because they alone had the full notes of the negotiating record which would say what the words were intended to mean.

But she stressed the need for consultations with the United States if there was any change in what had hitherto been understood to be the interpretation because of the effects on the arms control negotiations taking place in Geneva, in which Britain had a considerable interest.

Thatcher-U.S. Talks

London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1316 GMT 25 Feb 87

[Article by Tom McMullan]

[Text]

Mrs Thatcher was said today to be "satisfied" after talks at Downing Street with top U.S. officials on plans for the Star Wars strategic defence project. Aides said the prime minister, who was accompanied by Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe, had a "good discussion" with Ambassador Paul Nitze, the special arms control adviser to the President, and Assistant Defence Secretary Mr Richard Perle.

The Americans are on a tour of major European capitals, in response to a demand from their allies for consultation on U.S. plans for Star Wars. Concern has grown in Europe following reports that the U.S. is ready to deploy the Star Wars technology if necessary by adopting a broad definition of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the Soviet Union. Such a development it is felt would destroy any prospect of a worthwhile arms control agreement with the Soviet Union.

Officials said that Mr Nitze in the 90-minute meeting explained the administration's plans for SDI and said that early deployment was not under consideration. He confirmed that deployment was a matter for negotiation as agreed by Mrs Thatcher and President Reagan when they met at Camp David in 1984.

Mrs Thatcher was said to have confirmed Britain's support for the SDI research programme. Interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was a matter for the superpowers who were the signatories. Mrs Thatcher was said to have expressed the view that research on SDI should be conducted to the point of feasibility.

/9317

CSO: 5240/048

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

JAPANESE, U.S. OFFICIALS CONCLUDE SDI TALKS

OW240221 Tokyo KYODO in English 0210 GMT 24 Jan 87

[Text] Washington, Jan. 23 KYODO -- Japanese and U.S. Government officials concluded Friday the third round of official working-level talks on Japan's participation in Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research with an agreement to continue the negotiations after spring. Makoto Watanabe, deputy director general of the Foreign Ministry's North American Affairs Bureau, told a news conference that both sides agreed during the three-day session that further negotiations were necessary concerning the "formula" of Japanese participation in the "Star Wars" research program.

The Japanese will revisit Washington after April — around the time when the crucial phase of parliamentary deliberation of the fiscal 1987 budget is over — for a new round of discussions. Officials of the two nations held talks in October and December last year.

Watanabe refused to disclose details of the just-ended meeting, but it was believed that the two sides discussed protection of secrecy involving the results of SDI research and procedural matters related to the participation in the research program.

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CSO: 5260/064

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

JAPANESE KOMEITO PARTY HEAD, WEINBERGER DISCUSS SDI, DEFENSE

OW250338 Tokyo KYODO in English 0321 GMT 25 Feb 87

[Text] Washington, Feb. 24 KYODO — Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said Tuesday the controversial SDI antimissile defense system is not likely to be deployed before the mid-1990s, even if it wins budgetary support from Congress. He previously said it is desirable to implement the first phase of the space-based defense system around 1993.

In a meeting with Japanese opposition leader Junya Yano, Weinberger said the Defense Department is considering deploying SDI — Strategic Defense Initiative which is better known as the "Star Wars" program — in three phases.

In the first stage, the United States will have some degree of capability of destroying missiles in space though the system itself will still be incomplete, Weinberger said, adding that, even this first phase will not be implemented before the mid-1990s. He did not elaborate on why SDI deployment will be delayed.

But sources close to Yano, chairman of Japan's No 2 opposition party Komeito, said Weinberger's remarks may be an indication that the Reagan administration is considering the Japanese Government position which is urging it to consult first with its allies on SDI development as well as deployment. Japan also suggests that the United States hold negotiations with the Soviet Union on the antimissile defense system, seen by Moscow as an expansion of the U.S.-Soviet arms race into space. Weinberger and Yano also discussed Japan's defense spending for fiscal 1987 beginning in April.

While Yano accused the Japanese Government of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of increasing Japan's defense spending over 1 percent of its gross national product (GNP), Weinberger underlined the importance for Japan to build up its defense capabilities in response to the Soviet military threat, according to the sources.

Weinberger said whether or not Japan's defense spending exceeds the GNP 1 percent ceiling does not really matter, adding there should not be any restrictions on a defense budget.

The Nakasone administration is proposing a 5.2 percent boost in Japan's defense expenditures for fiscal 1987 to 3.52 trillion yen. This accounts for 1.004 percent of the country's GNP projected for the year, exceeding the decade-old ceiling which has held Japan's defense spending below 1 percent of the GNP.

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CSO: 5260/073

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

JAPAN'S KURANARI, U.S. ADVISER ROWNY DISCUSS ABM TREATY

OW270505 Tokyo KYODO in English 0453 GMT 27 Feb 87

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 27 (KYODO) — A U.S. adviser on arms control said Friday the United States is still considering whether or not it "broadly" interprets the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to help facilitate the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) project, an official said.

Edward Rowny, U.S. presidential adviser on arms control, expressed the view when he met with Tadashi Kuranari. Rowny is here to explain about the development in the U.S. relating to SDI, known as the "Star Wars" project.

He said the U.S. Government's decision in 1985 that the "broad interpretation" of the 1972 ABM Treaty with the Soviet Union is legally right remains unchanged. But the U.S. is still considering whether it will adopt a practical application of the broad interpretation, the official who briefed reporters said. The U.S. Government is studying the process of how the treaty was ratified and examining developments between the United States and the Soviet Union following the ratification before making a final decision on the interpretation, he said.

Rowny added that the deployment of SDI will not take place "in the near future," although technically it will be partially possible by 1993 or 1994 at the earliest.

The deployment must also be considered from the view that it will enhance deterrence and strengthen world stability, Rowny was quoted as saying. He said he would like to listen to opinions of U.S. allies on SDI development, the official said.

Kuranari asked the U.S. to consider the possible influence of the "interpretation" of the ABM Treaty on the arms control talks and to make efforts not to produce discord among U.S. allies.

Kuranari reaffirmed Japan's stance that his nation be informed by the U.S. when it develops or deploys SDI.

Rowny said the U.S. will take a zero option, globally, on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in the final stage, according to the official.

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CSO: 5260/074

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

BRIEFS

CD SPACE WEAPONS COMMITTEE REVIVED--Geneva, 27 February--At the Disarmament Conference, agreement was reached on reestablishing the special committee on the question of preventing an arms race in space. This decision is the result of persistent efforts by the group of socialist countries and the "Group of 21," which unites neutral and nonaligned states. The conference can now embark on concrete talks with the ultimate aim of preventing the deployment of arms in space. [TASS report: "Agreement Reached"] [Text] [Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Feb 87 Morning Edition p 4 PM] /12858

TASS: U.S. LASER TEST SITE--Washington, 4 March (TASS)--The U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative organization which is in charge of "Star Wars" preparations has announced the choice of place for testing a so-called free-electron laser. According to the Department of Defence, preparatory work would shortly be started in the village of Oro Grande on the territory of the White Sands nuclear test range in New Mexico. The Pentagon report attests to the U.S. Administration's intention to go ahead with the space militarization programme which is the main obstacle in the way of drastic cuts in strategic nuclear arsenals. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0846 GMT 4 Mar 86 LD] /12858

CSO: 5200/1314

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S CHERVOV ON U.S. 'FEVERISH' NUCLEAR BUILDUP

AU031037 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 27 Feb 87 p 6

[USSR Colonel General Nikolay Chervov interviewed by NOVOSTI military commentator Vladimir Morozov: "The Soviet Program of the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; Unity Between Words and Deeds" — place and date not given; initial paragraph is paper's introduction]

[Text] In accordance with the program for ridding the world of nuclear weapons, proclaimed on 15 January 1986, the USSR proposes bold and at the same time concretely realistic approaches to limiting all aspects of the feverish arms buildup: whether by eliminating nuclear arsenals, not permitting the development of space weapons, banning chemical weapons in Europe. [paragraph continues]

NOVOSTI military commentator Vladimir Morozov spoke about this with Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, chief of the administration of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

[Morozov] Western propaganda continues spreading doubts about the feasibility of the realization of the Soviet program for the elimination [likvidacia] of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. What can be said in this regard?

[Chervov] As it is known, the U.S. and NATO representatives very much like to flirt in words with the problem of a total elimination of nuclear weapons. Well, when it came to the practical aspect of that issue, they went into "reverse gear" and openly proclaimed that they do not wish to eliminate nuclear weapons, and that they cannot even imagine a world without nuclear weapons. Just as before, they defend the NATO concept aimed at "intimidation," the essence of which is the conviction that the more weapons there are, the greater, allegedly, the security is. From this also arises their activity — arming, arming, and more arming.

Against this U.S. and NATO concept, the USSR counterposes the program for the total elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000. Our program is not an appeal, not merely words, but practical deeds. I will give examples.

In Reykjavik, the Soviet side — thanks to the vigor and the flexibility with which the talks were conducted — almost brought the U.S. side to an historic decision. After all, President R. Reagan agreed with the elimination of the two sides' nuclear potentials. "I would like to ask," R. Reagan said to Mikhail Gorbachev, "whether we keep in mind, and I am convinced that it would be a good thing, the elimination by the

end of two 5-year periods, of all nuclear explosion installations [zariadenia], including bombs, battlefield devices, cruise missiles, submarines' weapons, intermediate range missiles, and so forth? If we agree that by the end of a 10-year period all nuclear weapons will be eliminated, we can present this agreement to our delegations in Geneva to prepare an agreement which you will be able to sign during your visit in the United States." Is this not true?

The Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions lasted 1 and 1/2 years. Had the United States joined in the moratorium, it would have been a huge step on the road toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Or, let us have a look at the USSR's pledge not to be the first to use the nuclear weapon. From the military viewpoint, it was not easy to take such a step, but we have taken the step. Had the United States pledged not to be the first to use the nuclear weapon, the situation would be much better now.

Also our other measures follow the same course: We have dismantled all intermediate range missiles at the Kola Peninsula, we have withdrawn from battle alert a part of the SS-20 missiles in Europe, and since 1983 we have frozen the SS-20 missiles in the European part of the USSR. The Soviet Union has been observing the moratorium on antisatellite tests for 3 years now.

All these unilateral practical deeds are the integral part of the Soviet program. If the United States and NATO would respond with the same deeds, people would breathe more easily and the situation in the world would markedly improve.

Our program is realistic also because it is concrete: Stages have been determined, and also the time and the volume of reduction. Verification of all kinds is envisaged -- international and national, including on-site inspections.

Soviet representatives understand the complexity of resolving the problem of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. They also understand very well the situation in the world is -- as the result of the feverish arms buildup -- increasingly more complicated and more dangerous. When necessary measures are not adopted, this threat will get ever bigger and the arms buildup could get out of control. The nuclear threat can be eliminated in one way only -- one has to eliminate the nuclear weapons and at the same time totally ban offensive space weapons.

[Morozov] What could the technology for the elimination of nuclear weapons be? [as published] Can they be used for peaceful purposes?

[Chervov] The technology for the elimination of nuclear devices [strelly] has been planned for in the Soviet program. The proclamation by Mikhail Gorbachev states that special procedures for the elimination of nuclear weapons will be worked out, including the elimination of nuclear devices, as well as dismantling, conversion or destruction of carriers. In the case of nuclear devices, these procedures would concern their nuclear as well as nonnuclear components.

In all stages of the elimination of nuclear weapons, the volumes of destroyed weapons must be coordinated, as well as the locations where these weapons will be destroyed. The verification of the destruction or the conversion of weapons would be carried out by national technical means as well as by an on-site inspection. The details of the technology for the destruction of nuclear weapons would be worked out at talks between the increased parties.

In this connection one cannot exclude handing a certain part of the nuclear materials over free to the peace branches of the economy (after appropriate processing, of course).

[Morozov] How does the Soviet Union's decision to rescind the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions harmonize with its program for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000?

[Chervov] The program for the elimination of nuclear weapons by stages remains fully valid. On this program rests the Soviet package of balanced, extensive measures aimed at the elimination of strategic offensive weapons and intermediate range missiles in Europe, at consolidating the regimen of the agreement on antimissile defense and halting nuclear tests, submitted in Reykjavik.

Our political and military choice is to do everything in our power to halt the feverish arms buildup and enter the 21st century without nuclear weapons.

The USSR has underpinned this choice by the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions. For a year and a half the Soviet Union has not taken part in the feverish arms buildup, which is being foisted upon the world by the United States. The United States, which in that period carried out 26 explosions, has actually overtaken itself.

Should the United States halt its nuclear explosions, the Soviet moratorium could continue to be in effect. The feverish arms buildup would be halted, and a huge step would be taken toward nuclear disarmament. The USSR does not want to relent in its endeavor or in the issue of fully halting nuclear weapons by the end of this century.

[Morozov] How would you comment on the daily assurances of the U.S. Administration about its alleged dedication to "restraint" in feverish arms buildup?

[Chervov] The statements, for example, by C. Weinberger and other representatives of the U.S. Administration are very hypocritical when they begin talking about peace and asserting that the United States maintains some sort of "restraint" in the issue of increasing its military potential. Such assertions are at variance with reality. I will present the facts.

In 1986 alone, the number of members of the U.S. Armed Forces (regular troops and reserves) increased by 58,000 persons. More than half the divisions' weaponry was upgraded [prezbojene] and received new Abrams tanks; weapons and equipment were stockpiled on the FRG territory for 2 more divisions (altogether, the material stockpiled there is for 6 divisions).

A total of 10 MX intercontinental ballistic missiles were incorporated in the system of strategic offensive weapons. Today these are the most destabilizing first strike missiles, the strength of each of its warheads equaling the strength of all the devices [strelly] which were exploded during World War II. Incorporated in the equipment also was 1 Ohio class submarine with Trident-1 missiles aboard; 23 heavy B1-B Bombers; 30 heavy B-52 bombers were converted into long-range cruise missiles carriers; an additional 112 intermediate range missiles were deployed in Europe (altogether there are 364 intermediate range missiles, of which 108 are the Pershing-2 missiles, presently deployed in Europe).

The naval forces received a new nuclear aircraft carrier, two cruisers, and other vessels; and another battleship was converted into a cruise missiles' carrier and put into operation.

Also in 1986, the United States "buried" ["urobili kris" nad dohodou] the SALT II treaty and is working on the SDI program, by which it violates the agreement on antimissiles defense; the military budget for the next fiscal year has reached an astronomical sum of \$312 billion. This constitutes almost \$1 billion a day.

No, these facts which I have enumerated have nothing at all in common with "restraint." What is involved is kindling a dangerous and feverish arms buildup, Washington's attempt to achieve military superiority.

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CSO: 5200/1316

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S VORONTSOV, OTHERS ON RESULTS OF SEVENTH ROUND

Vorontsov: Agreement in '3-4 months'

LD082021 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 8 Mar 87

[Text] The seventh round of Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons has ended in Geneva. Here is what the head of the Soviet delegation to the talks, Yuliy Mikhaylovich Vorontsov, told our correspondent:

[Begin recording] [Vorontsov] The most important thing that has taken place during this round is the important statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on medium-range missiles which opened up for the possibility of working with the U.S. delegation on the concrete text of an agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe and their significant reduction in Asia. Work of this kind has started. The U.S. delegation has agreed to the elaboration of an agreement of that kind. Of course, the work that lies ahead will be complicated, as this will be the first agreement of an international nature, the first agreement between the USSR and the United States of America on actual destruction of nuclear and missile weapons, a destruction that will apply to the entire continent of Europe and a significant part of Asia. We consider the separate solution of the issue of medium-range missiles will provide a stimulus for a search, the speediest search for a solution to two other interrelated questions -- space and offensive strategic weapons.

[Correspondent] Of course, it is difficult to make forecasts, but when might that agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe be concluded? In a month, in 2, in 3, in a year's time?

[Vorontsov] No, in a year's time would be far too long, and there is no need for that, I repeat, an agreement in principle was reached in Reykjavik. We have all the main provisions of an agreement on intermediate missiles ready. What we have not got is a detailed breakdown -- what specific missiles, where does their elimination take place? It is these various, numerous questions to which we have to find answers with the U.S. delegation, and they have to be answers in the form of language of agreements. This is complicated, but it is possible, and it goes without saying, necessary. I think the working time here should be measured in months, presumably no more than 3-4 months. I can see no reason for working on this issue any longer than that. [end recording]

Vorontsov Sees 'Important Milestone'

LD061519 Moscow International Service in Russian 1530 GMT 6 Mar 87

[Text] Geneva March 6 TASS — The seventh round of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms ended today. It is time to sum up certain results of the work done, to describe the specific features of the round. In an interview with a TASS correspondent, the head of the USSR delegation, first USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Yuli Vorontsov said this:

"It should be noted that the most important event at the present stage of the talks on nuclear and space arms between the USSR and the U.S. was the statement of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev of February 28 in which the Soviet leader set out an initiative of an exceptional scope: The proposal to single out the question of the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe from the range of problems discussed at the talks and to conclude a separate agreement on it without delay.

The Soviet side has taken a new major step in the spirit of Reykjavik. Those forces in the West which oppose the lowering of the level of nuclear confrontation in Europe will no longer have the ground to assert that the solution of the problem of medium-range missiles is hampered by its linkage to questions of space or strategic arms. The road to an arrangement which can become an important milestone in peoples' struggle for nuclear disarmament is open and it is necessary to do everything so as not to let an historic chance slip.

This initiative was met with huge satisfaction by the entire world public. Responsible statesmen and public figures, parties and organizations in Western Europe and outside it declare support for it, justly viewing it as an evidence of the Soviet Union's sincere striving for the consolidation of security and the assertion of new approaches to the solution of ripe international problems, approaches free from old stereotypes and patterns.

"The step taken by the Soviet leadership is very timely. The matter is that stagnation at the Geneva talks started manifesting itself ever clearer by the end of the round. After the talks picked up somewhat in January, the U.S. side, as if getting frightened with prospects for advance, started applying the brake. This was manifested most patently in the U.S. stand on outer space. In that key area, the U.S. officially tabled a proposal aimed at trying to impose the so-called "broader interpretation" of the ABM Treaty and thus legalizing its efforts to spread the arms race also to space. That action was taken to suit the Pentagon which, contrary to the operating ABM Treaty of unlimited duration is pressing for the holding of large-scale tests of new means of anti-missile defense in space, jeopardizes achievement of an arrangement not only on space arms but also on strategic offensive arms. There exists a firm organic relationship between these matters.

"The Soviet proposal about undelayed development and conclusion of a treaty on the elimination of medium-range missiles of the USSR and the U.S. in Europe, the proposal put on the negotiating table, cuts the Gordian knot of problems not only in the sphere of "Euromissiles." It is also aimed at giving a positive impetus to work in other areas of the talks, namely on outer space and on strategic offensive armaments.

"The USSR consistently comes out for taking effective measures aimed at consolidating the regime of the ABM Treaty and, in these conditions, for agreement with the U.S. on radical reductions of strategic offensive armaments, up to their eventual elimination. In short, we are true to the Reykjavik platform. We have every reason to expect a positive response from the U.S. to our constructive proposals on these major aspects of the talks as well. The Reykjavik process should be advanced, and the positive processes that were started during the USSR - U.S. summit meeting in Iceland should not be hampered. It is necessary to work for effective agreements on the basis of understandings reached, agreements which would guarantee the non-deployment of weapons in space and would bring about the ridding of humanity of the threat of nuclear destruction. So, the regular round of talks on nuclear and space armaments came to a close but the work within the framework of the talks is going on. This is an unusual, but undoubtedly positive phenomenon which is closely connected with the new Soviet initiative in the sphere of medium-range missiles. It is necessary to take action in this sphere at once, without deliberate delays. It was decided by mutual agreement that the group studying the problems of medium-range missiles would remain for several more weeks in Geneva to study the problems of medium-range missiles and would start working out a joint draft text of the treaty.

"Much is being written in the press these days about the draft treaty presented by the U.S. at the very end of the round. At this moment I would not like to give a final opinion of its quality. However, the very fact of the presentation of the draft treaty is the direct result of the influence of the initiatives put forward by the Soviet side at the talks. The U.S. draft treaty which is a very complicated text overburdened with technical details on several dozens of pages will be closely analyzed. All that is in line with the letter and spirit of Reykjavik decisions will be received by us in a businesslike and positive manner. A lot of intensive work is lying ahead. The Soviet side is ready for it.

"I should like to state that we were coming out for the continuation of the work in two other areas as well, those of space and strategic offensive weapons. Key problems remain to be resolved in these spheres. However, the U.S. side did not support us and agreed only to a formal prolongation of the round by only two days. One can only hope the working break would be useful for the heads of the U.S. delegation who leave for Washington for consultations and that they would return to Geneva with constructive positions.

The exact date of the resumption of the talks has not been set so far. It will be coordinated by diplomatic channels. However, I can state that the very much approximate time of the beginning of the next round is the middle or the end of April."

Chernyshev: Lack of Reciprocity

LD091416 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1200 GMT 9 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow, 9 Mar (TASS) -- TASS observer on military affairs Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

All fruitful talks mean a two-way street. I think such a truth is known to everyone particularly as it has frequently been confirmed in practice. Is that how they behave in Washington? This is by no means an idle question, and it arises in connection with the response of the U.S. side to the new major initiative from the Soviet Union on the problem of medium-range missiles. Now our partners in the Geneva talks cannot impede matters, pleading that a solution to this problem is being hampered by its linkage with

matters relating to strategic and other armaments. The problem has been separated from the Reykjavik package and there is a realistic possibility of a separate agreement being concluded without delay and Europe being freed from a significant share of the nuclear burden.

One would think that in Washington they would have appreciated the full extent of the USSR's constructiveness and not complicated the matter with certain additional conditions. However, something else is happening in fact. As K. Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has just confirmed, in reply the United States is putting forward a demand that certain categories of reduced range missiles systems, in particular, SS-12 and SS-23, be included in a future agreement on medium-range missiles, having imposed alongside this a ceiling for Soviet systems and having secured the possibility for the United States, for its part, to reach this level, that is to say the possibility of building up the U.S. arsenal.

Consequently, while "welcoming" the separating of the question of medium range missiles from Reykjavik package the U.S. Administration is putting forward its own "package" which has nothing to do with Reykjavik.

Washington is "forgetting" about a whole series of extremely important points. First that the USSR has stated clearly: As soon as an agreement is signed on eliminating medium range missiles in Europe it will withdraw from the GDR and the CSSR the enhanced range operational and tactical missiles deployed there in response to the introduction into West Europe of the U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles. Secondly, regarding other operational and tactical missiles, the USSR has expressed its readiness to immediately begin talks aimed at reducing and completely eliminating them. Is there, generally speaking, any positive sense in talking about fixing the possibility one side or the other has to increase these missiles? Evidently, for those who really intend to move toward reducing and completely eliminating both medium range missiles and operational and tactical missiles there is no point in doing this.

Trying to provide some "foundation" for the proposed "linkage" they talk about in Washington, their desire "for equal rights", for the USSR supposedly has superiority in missiles whose range is shorter than that of medium-range ones. That kind of "explanation", however, lacks elementary honesty. For it was the Soviet Union, guided by the recognition of its high level of responsibility to the world and by its sincere desire to ensure the possibility of a joint first step toward a nuclear-free Europe, which made major concessions: It agreed, in settling the question of medium range missiles, not to take into consideration the U.S. forward-based forces and the nuclear arsenals of Great Britain and France. These two above-mentioned countries alone, for example, now have 178 missiles with 530 warheads targeted at the USSR and its allies. Both countries are planning to build up their nuclear means. The U.S. experts who have drawn up the United States' reply to the Soviet initiative know this perfectly well but they ignore it.

Are there currently grounds for talking about Washington's desire to move along a road with two-way traffic, covering its own share of the way and taking into account the interests of the partner in the talks? Frankly speaking, in spite of the many statements by representatives of the U.S. Administration about the nearness of the first agreement at Geneva, so far there are no grounds for a positive conclusion. True, I would like to point out the fact that the draft agreement on medium range missiles which has been presented by the United States in Geneva and which links the solution of this problem with "certain categories" of systems of lesser range was prepared before the Soviet initiative. Washington still has an opportunity to look at it with due consideration for the new situation at the talks.

Obukhov on 'Historic Step'

PA062230 Havana International Service in Spanish 0000 GMT 6 Mar 87

[Text] As we have reported earlier, the latest round of arms talks between the Soviet Union and the United States has concluded with positive results. Aleksey Obukhov, deputy head of the Soviet delegation, has said that the USSR's determination to consider separately the medium-range missiles in Europe and strategic arms and ballistic missiles certainly constitute a step forward in these talks. These are Obukhov's remarks for this newscast:

[Begin Obukhov recording in English fading into Spanish translation] This Soviet initiative is a new and important step in the negotiations. The way has now been opened for a better agreement, the groundwork for which was laid at the Reykjavik summit meeting.

The signing of this agreement can become an historic step in the people's struggle for a world free from nuclear threat. Of course, this would be an important contribution to the European Continent's security, but it is also important for other parts of the world as well. Should the level of nuclear confrontation be reduced in Europe, where it is extremely high at present, the positive results of this achievement would be felt everywhere. This would be a great step forward toward nuclear disarmament and the establishment of truly civilized relations between the states.

The new Soviet initiative proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev opens the door, not only for an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe, but for positive results in the Geneva talks in a general sense. This is why we can expect reciprocal U.S. moves in other areas. [end recording]

In addition, the arms talks were marked by the U.S. insistence on continuing its large-scale ABM tests in space. Obukhov said the following regarding this:

[Begin Obukhov recording] During the talks, the U.S. representative presented a proposal dealing with the use of these arms in space. This proposal is equivalent, not to the strengthening of the ABM Treaty, but to its destruction, because this proposal can be equated to a broad interpretation of the treaty. With this interpretation, the United States attempts to continue testing new ABM's in space during the next 10 years. [end recording]

The talks are expected to be resumed next week.

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CSO: 5200/1340

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S GERASIMOV WEEKLY NEWS CONFERENCE ON INF, SDI

Positive Response to Proposals

LD051550 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1510 GMT 5 Feb 87

[**"A Representative of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the New Soviet Proposals"--TASS headline]**

[Text] Moscow, 5 Mar (TASS) -- The statement made by Mikhail Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, on 28 February has aroused a positive response everywhere in the world, Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, said at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists in the press center of the USSR Foreign Ministry today. As it is a bold step and a concession to the West, the West simply cannot criticize it without criticizing itself. For the same reason, this step cannot be dismissed as propaganda, Gennadiy Gerasimov pointed out, and many people consider the West has fallen into its own trap.

Recalling that U.S. President Ronald Reagan had welcomed Mikhail Gorbachev's statement as a step in keeping with the understanding reached at the meeting in Reykjavik, the representative of the USSR Foreign Ministry reported that the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks had put forward its own draft of a treaty on medium range missiles which in a number of basic parameters was in keeping with the Reykjavik understandings. The Soviet proposals are based on these understandings. The Soviet delegation, G. Gerasimov said, has begun studying this document. Discussions are presently under way in Geneva on the problem of medium range missiles. Three groups are at work at the negotiations on nuclear and space weapons: Two groups finish their work tomorrow and the group on questions of medium range missiles will continue the current round until 19 March. If the U.S. side displays readiness for constructive negotiations, it can be considered that the work in Geneva will make rapid progress.

At the same time, some commentators voice doubts: Will the monitoring [kontrol] difficulties be overcome; is there not a wedge being driven into the U.S.-Western European solidarity; will the balance of forces in Europe not be disturbed? It is also said that a long road is ahead and it will take many, many months to cover. Caspar Weinberger, the head of the U.S. military department, while joining in the positive appraisal of the proposals, insists on the importance of a careful analysis of these proposals, above all from the point of view of verification [proverka].

The USSR's proposals on the medium range missiles have given rise to special interest in Western European countries and here it is also possible to state that responses there are positive. Both in the FRG, and in Italy, and in Britain and in a number of other Western European countries. [sentence as received] Even though attempts have been made here and there to detract from the importance of the Soviet proposals and to portray them in the guise of an attempt to split the West European ranks and to put the United States at loggerheads with Western Europe.

All in all, in our view a good start has been made, concluded the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman.

Gorbachev Proposals, SDI

LD051840 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 5 Mar 87

[Text] A briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists devoted to current international problems was held at the press center of the USSR Foreign Ministry in Moscow today. It was conducted by Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry. Replying to a question from an ABC Television correspondent on reactions in Europe to the new proposal by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev about reducing medium-range missiles, he said, in part:

[Begin Gerasimov recording] If you go by what they were saying to us previously in proposing a zero option, then Western Europe should now be dancing in the streets, because this option has been accepted. Now that what they wanted is entering the realm of attainability we can hear objections that if the missiles are removed from Europe, Moscow will be the winner because, so the theory goes, the Warsaw Pact has an advantage in conventional weapons. Evidently, an extreme expression of this point of view was the statement by General Rogers that it would be madness, it would be mad [previous word in English] to agree to a zero option.

As you will remember, just a few days ago Marshal Akhromeyev stressed once again at a news conference here that there is no superiority on the part of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact over the NATO countries in Europe. Nevertheless, I am certain this argument that Europe will end up unarmed will unquestionably be used. So this argument still lies ahead. [end recording]

[Announcer] A question from a CBS correspondent: There was an article in the Journal of the United States and Canada Institute, USA ECONOMY, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY, on possible countermeasures to SDI. Does this mean the USSR has officially announced to the United States that it is adopting countermeasures in this area?

[Begin Gerasimov recording] We have long been saying, and research was done by Soviet scientists which prove this, that the Strategic Defense Initiative will not meet one of the criteria of Paul Nitze, who is a supporter of it and who said -- and I think this could almost be considered the official position of the U.S. Administration -- that it is not worth creating [sozdavat] an antimissile defense system if the gap can easily be filled by additional, and less, capital investment in systems of attack. That was a cost-effective analysis. Our scientists showed that the expenditure on additional missiles or additional surmounting systems. [sredstva preodoleniya] of various kinds

would not exceed something like 5 percent of the expenditure on the creation of an antimissile defense system itself. That, I think, is a very good argument showing the fantastical nature, the airy-fairy nature of this whole scheme of antimissile defense.

For it to be effective, it has to be 100 percent because one single missile is sufficient to destroy a whole target. Not only is it technically impossible; it is also economically impossible, because if, for example, America today creates a 100 percent-effective antimissile defense system against the existing Soviet nuclear arsenal, our scientists in this argument show that it would be enough to spend additional money on penetration systems — considerably less than that spent by the Americans — to reduce this whole scheme once again to nothing. [end recording]

[Announcer] Replies were also given to other journalists' questions.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S ARBATOV VIEWS POST-REAGAN POLICY PROSPECTS

PM091552 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Mar 87 First Edition p 7

[Academician G. Arbatov article: "A Matter of Life and Death"]

[Text] The nuclear era has placed on the world political agenda the most important question in the history of mankind -- the question of survival. overshadowing many urgent tasks, it demands serious consideration of the fundamental long-term problems of political strategy.

The Soviet Union has done much in this area recently. The objective situation demands a reevaluation of values by the United States too. America needs a serious, honest debate on questions of military policy and disarmament. It is not only America that needs such a debate, but its need is, perhaps, especially great.

The present U.S. course has led the military-political situation, including the disarmament problem, into a complete impasse. The arms race is intensifying. Talks have not only been hopelessly dragged out, but because of the U.S. rejection of the SALT agreement and machinations over the ABM Treaty, they have been left hanging by a thread. Washington's position on military-strategic questions is more unproductive, contradictory, and confused than ever before. Most dangerously, it is damaging stability and increasing the threat of war.

The candidates who will be struggling for the presidency in 1988 will hardly be able to shrug aside these problems. According to the political calendar, the various factions of the U.S. political elite should be on the point of publicly indicating at least the main points of the debate and outlining its framework.

A lengthy article by three prominent military experts in THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE of 25 January can be regarded as the "first shot" in preparation for this debate. One of the authors is B. Scowcroft, former national security adviser to the U.S. President (under the Republican Ford) and now appointed chairman or member of various presidential commissions (including the commission that investigated the "Irangate" scandal). The other two held prominent posts in President Carter's Democratic administration: J. Deutch was assistant energy secretary (in the United States this ministry is also responsible for the production of nuclear munitions), and J. Woolsey was under secretary of the Navy. It is not only a question of who the authors are. The article is also ambitious in its intention, setting forth a bipartite platform for U.S. military policy which, the authors write, should unite the entire "political center."

That is where I would like to start. The "political center" is the center because some people are positioned to the right of it and some to the left. Nobody has so far had any doubt as to where President Reagan and his military-political retinue (Weinberger, Perle, and others) stand on military matters — on the right, if not the extreme right, flank.

Now we come to the first surprise. The authors, ardently claiming adherence to centrist, moderate positions, attack the Reagan administration from an unexpected direction. They criticize it — and, moreover, savagely and bitingly — for its "antinuclear illusions," for giving "short measure" on defense, practically for pacifism.

The President is blamed for Reykjavik (the article is headed "The Way Out of Reykjavik"). Not because an historic opportunity to reach agreement was lost there, but because Reagan "all but" signed such an accord. Realizing how hard it is to believe in Reagan the pacifist, the authors offer their own version of his fall from grace. It began, apparently, with the attempt to "steal the clothes of the antinuclear movement" which was made at a time when the antiwar movement was developing in the United States (1983). The authors see nothing reprehensible in this. The trouble was that the administration, in its zeal, went too far and, I quote, "in trying to steal all the clothes of the antinuclear movement, was to become equally antinuclear itself." Here "the administration began to borrow the antinuclear movement's ideas that the main obstacle to peace throughout the world is not the existence of an ambitious totalitarian state, but the existence of nuclear weapons." Nuclear weapons, the authors write with horror, began to be spoken of "as a kind of lethal virus, the common enemy of man." Thus the "image" of Reagan the pacifist is supplemented by the image of Reagan the appeaser of communists.

I never thought I would ever find myself defending President Reagan against attacks — as unfounded as they are dishonest. Because nonexistent sins are attributed to the President, and because a false version of Reykjavik is presented.

It causes me some pain to say there is much in the article that is dishonest: I have known one of the authors, General Scowcroft, for many years as a man of conservative convictions, but distinguished by his personal honesty. Here either the devil or his smart coauthors have led him astray.

In principle, of course, I will not be hypocritical about it, I am not particularly worried what these three Americans think and say about their President. The question arises: Why were the proposals for a military-political platform for the post-Reagan period prefaced with various fables? The answer is supplied by the program proposed by the authors. Its essence is the continuation of the arms race "in all salients." Or more specifically, in the strategic sphere — the construction of MX, Trident-2, and Midgetman missiles; in medium-range missiles in Europe — the abandonment of the zero option which was virtually agreed on in Reykjavik (some of these missiles, the authors say, must remain).

After M.S. Gorbachev's 28 February Statement, that last question takes on practical significance. How do the authors justify the departure from Reykjavik? By the fact that supposedly "the zero option will leave Western Europe 'naked' in the face of approximately 600 shorter-range Soviet missiles...." Again, untrue. The authors keep quiet about the existence of the U.S. forward-based forces. Moreover, in the "naked" Western Europe there are also the nuclear weapons of the NATO allies. In terms of

medium-range missiles alone, Britain and France have around 200, many of which carry several warheads each. Both countries plan to increase their nuclear means. The U.S. experts are well aware of that. They ignore it. Is that an honest approach?

Let us go back to the proposed "moderate center" program. Another point is the buildup of chemical arms and, of course, intensive efforts in the conventional arms sphere. It all culminates in a "more realistic" version of SDI, also including defense against tactical weapons and cruise missiles.

As for arms control, this, the authors graciously declared, is permissible, but must necessarily be "modest" and only "step by step." A familiar tune! These "step by step" talks went on for many years. Meanwhile, to use M.S. Gorbachev's expression, mountains of "trash smelling of mothballs" grew up, agreements were approached at tortoise pace, and the arms race sped on by giant strides.

Dissatisfaction with the profanation of the idea of arms control grew. The fundamental significance of Reykjavik was precisely that it opened up an alternative -- the possibility of bold steps really leading to the resolution of the problem. This clearly frightened the three U.S. experts.

So for the the post-Reagan period, under the label of a "centrist," "moderate" program, the same old program of the arms race is proposed as under the Reagan administration. You cannot help coming to the conclusion that the intention of the article's authors is to "overturn" in order to strengthen, to criticize in order to deflect the threat from the present U.S. military policy and maintain both the level of military preparations and the military programs. The authors are clearly worried that the fall in Reagan's popularity, he has become the symbol of militarist policy, will lead to that policy being discredited. Surely that is why they are now trying to send the public along a false trail by "exposing" Reagan as an antinuclear "pacifist." And, fearing an undesirable turn of events, in good time, before the election campaign gathers speed, they are insinuating a pseudoplatform designed to divert the debate and prevent true discussion of the true problems.

Only one thing can lie behind these tricks -- fear of the changes which are taking place in the world and which could influence the political situation in the United States itself.

The first such change is that in recent years it has become clear both to the public and to statesmen who are in their right mind that you cannot win a nuclear war and must not wage one. The new ideas about nuclear war -- like it or not -- demand certain conclusions about strategy and military doctrines, military programs and weapons systems. The old, "traditional" military and political thinking loses its foundations and is robbed of its customary anchors. Like, for instance, the almost religious faith in nuclear "deterrence" as the only, eternal instrument of ensuring security.

The erosion of these foundations cannot be prevented by the most refined sophistry, of which the authors of the article provide examples. Most likely, as time goes on the irrationality not only of nuclear war, but of everything connected with it will become increasingly obvious. Nuclear weapons -- here their apologists are right -- cannot be "disinvented." Now it is equally impossible to restore faith in those weapons as a rational instrument of policy.

The task is not to learn to live with the nuclear bomb, but for people to learn to live without nuclear weapons, even though they have been invented. Just as they live without cannibalism, slavery, and colonialism, although these institutions were once invented and had a long history.

The second change which makes it difficult to continue the Reaganite policy after Reagan is connected with the fact that the myth of the "Soviet threat" -- the main argument in favor of military preparations and the arms race -- has become very threadbare. It becomes especially difficult to revive it against the background of the changes taking place in our country. [paragraph continues]

This factor will also have a growing influence on sentiments in Western countries, including the United States. The authors are seriously disturbed by this prospect. So they not only sprinkled the article lavishly with references to the "Soviet threat," but also tried to minimize and belittle the significance of the changes in the Soviet Union. They say: Nothing major is happening there -- and promptly give themselves away by concluding their reasoning with this sentence: "We must be careful."

That means they themselves do not believe they will be able to convince the reader by means of these grins and smirks about the changes taking place in the USSR and the new Soviet policy initiatives. Of what is the reader supposed to be afraid? That the reforms in the Soviet Union could supposedly be accompanied by an "aggressive foreign policy." This unlikely assertion is followed by something quite unseemly -- the argument that there could be forces in the USSR which will reject the present course and reverse policy. What will the "disarmed" Americans do then?

Here the authors give themselves away -- more than the "Soviet threat," they fear the loss of this threat or the myth of its existence. Among many other differences, there is a fundamental political asymmetry between the USSR and the United States. We in the Soviet Union would like to see America as a partner, for all the differences and despite all the things we do not like about it. We certainly do not need the United States as an enemy. But the United States, those who make policy there, need the USSR, on the contrary, as an enemy. Without an "enemy," without an "evil force," militarism would not have survived and the present U.S. foreign policy would be bankrupt. Of course, the political platform proposed by the authors of the article would be left hanging in the air.

The third change is that the public, like, incidentally, many politicians in various countries, is beginning to have a more realistic understanding of its own interests and priorities. Nuclear catastrophe, nuclear weapons, to the U.S. experts' dismay, are regarded by them as a far greater danger than the "Soviet threat." Debts and other international economic problems, environmental pollution, and the exacerbation of regional conflicts are regarded as more urgent. And, very importantly, difficulties at home attract more attention. Americans, in particular, are beginning to be increasingly worried about the budget deficit, the state debt, and the undermining of U.S. positions in competition on the world market. They are asking themselves: Can America go on spending as much on military needs as in the last 6 years, does it, or the other states which lend the United States money to cover the deficit, physically have enough resources?

The authors can see this concern. They also try to utilize it very unscrupulously -- as an apologia for nuclear arms. Nuclear weapons, they claim, remain preferable, because they are cheaper. At first glance, that is true. In the United States 20 percent of military appropriations go on nuclear weapons, the rest on conventional arms. As an argument in favor of nuclear weapons, these figures do not stand up to criticism.

One wonders: Why, having accumulated a vast quantity of nuclear weapons in excess of any conceivable need, does the United States consider itself obliged to spend four times more resources on conventional arms, in addition? Why, in the nuclear age, has military spending not fallen, but reached a fantastic scale? It has been calculated that in the last 40 years this spending in the United States alone (at unchanged 1982 prices) totaled the staggering sum of \$7 trillion 620 billion!

In fact the appearance of nuclear weapons led to the unprecedented militarization of the economy, politics, and international relations, spurred on the race for all types of arms, and therefore led to an unprecedented growth in military spending. The whole world, including the United States, faces a choice: either continue the senseless military rivalry, or resolve your real problems. This truth too is becoming ever more apparent.

Whatever aspect of the problem you take, the facts indicate the need for a new political thinking and new approaches to the problem of security and disarmament. They are trying to prevent the new way of thinking from establishing itself. It is invincible not because things will be better with the new way of thinking, but because with the old way they will be far worse than ever before. Nor merely worse. The old ways lead to inevitable catastrophe.

It is stupid to console yourself with the thought that we have lived "in peace" with the nuclear arms race for the first 40 years of the nuclear age by turning each other, and at the same time the entire world, into nuclear hostages. First, happy chance played a considerable role in this. Second, the dangers are constantly growing. Just as an old man of 80 cannot behave like a youth of 20, so given the present level — and still more the future level — of perfection of means of mass destruction and the complexity of international relations, we cannot permit ourselves what we got away with in the last decades of the nuclear era.

True realism lies in understanding the demands of the time and going forward, not pulling stubbornly backward. For that reason, and also because I believe in the Americans' common sense, it seems to me to be far from indisputable that the recommendations proposed by THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE article will form the basis of U.S. policy in the post-Reagan era. The world and, it is to be hoped, the United States will all the same move forward, not backward. Where the prevention of the nuclear threat is concerned, that is a matter of life and death.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR GENERAL TRETYAK ON SDI, ICBMs

PM051117 Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 9, Feb 87 (signed to press 19 Feb 87) p 9

[Article by Army General I. Tretyak, USSR deputy defense minister and chief inspector: "For the Sake of Peaceful Creation; 23 February Is Soviet Army and Navy Day"]

[Excerpts] The fraternal armies of socialist states stand shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Armed Forces. Their combat collaboration, born out of the struggle against fascism, has turned into the mighty combat alliance of the Warsaw Pact Organization, a reliable shield across the path of aggressive aspirations by the reaction.

The establishment of military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO is socialism's most important historic gain in the last few decades.

But the equilibrium which was achieved at the cost of tremendous efforts and material expenditure is in jeopardy at present. Unwilling to grasp the realities of the nuclear and space age, the United States and its NATO allies have launched an unprecedented arms race, eager to gain military superiority at any cost and to acquire an opportunity to deliver a nuclear first strike with impunity.

They rely mainly on the militarization of space and the creation [sоздание] of new and even more destructive weapon systems, primarily high-power laser weapons, neutron bombs, and spacecraft of the "Columbia" type. [paragraph continues]

Particular hopes are placed on the deployment of the so-called ABM system with space-based elements, whose basic component, as is well known, are strike space means based on new principles of physics.

An important role is being assigned to the improvement and buildup of already existing systems which, in the opinion of Western specialists themselves, will make it possible to create [создать] one more strategic offensive potential within a decade. Here one has to list the Pershing-2 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles of all modes, the MX and Midgetman ICBM's, the Trident-2 SLBM, and the B-1B and the Stealth ATB [Advanced Technology Bomber] strategic aircraft.

The bringing of the 131st B-52 bomber fitted with cruise missiles into service with operational strategic forces is yet another proof of the U.S. attempts to break the strategic parity. By means of this step the U.S. Administration deliberately torpedoed the SALT II Treaty in its desire to free its hands for the implementation of its planned programs.

It is perfectly obvious that the arms race which is being forced upon us, in addition to pursuing the imperialism's aggressive intentions, sets the goal of economically exhausting the Soviet Union and the socialist community countries, because the rapid growth of technical complexity leads to a sharp rise in the cost of the means for armed struggle.

It is well known, however, that similar attempts were made before, and they invariably ended in failure. This is what awaits Washington and its allies in the future. "...We will never allow nuclear missile superiority by the United States," M.S. Gorbachev pointed out at the CPSU Central Committee June (1986) Plenum. "Here our Leninist foreign policy course and our defense might are founded on the reliable base of the strategy of accelerated socioeconomic development...."

The Land of the Soviets is confidently marching along the path mapped by the 27th CPSU Congress. We have the people to defend and the means with which to protect the peaceful and creative labor and freedom of Soviet people and of our friends and allies.

The Soviet Armed Forces have been guarding peace and socialism for 69 years now, threatening no one but always ready to repulse any aggression, no matter where it may originate.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SOVIET PRESS COMMENTS ON U.S. WARHEAD 'GAP' CLAIM

SELSKAYA ZHIZN: 'Absurd'

PM061611 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 28 Feb 87 p 5

[TASS report: "Absurd Claims"]

[Text] New York, 27 Feb — "The Pentagon has clearly gone over the top" — this is how THE NEW YORK TIMES observer Michael Gordon described the latest forgery created by the Pentagon and released to reinforce the myth about "Soviet military threat."

The observer's sharp response was caused by the latest report on "the U.S. Military Position in the World" by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which presents yet another dubious "discovery" — the U.S. "lag" behind the USSR in the field of the creation [sozdaniye] of new nuclear warheads. It is backed by absolutely no facts at all. Very simply, the compilers of the report, comparing the two sides' potential in 20 of the most important military-strategic spheres with the help of tables, took one of them — "creation [sozdaniye] of new nuclear warheads" — and put next to it an upward red arrow, symbolizing a U.S. "lag."

The observer points out the absurdity of this claim. "Critics say that the Pentagon at times exaggerates Soviet military potential in its public reports to justify U.S. military programs. The latest conclusion in the report by the Chiefs of Staff evidently goes beyond everything that has appeared at any time in the past," Gordon notes. "It follows from the report that the Soviet Union has significantly overtaken the United States in the technology used for the creation [sozdaniye] of nuclear warheads. This is nothing new: After all, only last year the very same committee registered 'equality' of the sides in this sphere. Such a shift in the U.S. stance is particularly puzzling, bearing in mind that for 18 months the Russians have not conducted a single nuclear test, while the United States carried out 26 tests in the same period."

PRAVDA: 'Disinformation'

PM051523 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Mar 87 First Edition p 5

[A. Tolkunov "Rejoinder": "Test Ranges on Mars?"]

[Text] it is well known how Pentagon reports and research on the Soviet military threat put the fear of God into the ordinary man in the street. What methods are not used to frighten people...

Nevertheless, as THE NEW YORK TIMES acknowledges, the latest report from the Joint Chiefs of Staff exceeds all its predecessors. If Pentagon officials are to be believed, the Soviet Union is now outstripping the United States in... the technology of producing and developing nuclear warheads. This dangerous "gap" was only discovered recently since in last year's report the committee stated that the two sides were "equal" in this sphere.

So there you have it! Moscow did not carry out an explosion for 18 months, or, more precisely, 569 days, during which time Washington conducted 26 nuclear tests, and yet we are ahead! Perhaps an evil spirit helped us or perhaps our warheads were modernized on some Martian test range? For some reason the Pentagon report is silent on this. A lack of imagination, clearly.

Official Washington continues to resort to such base methods to try to justify its nuclear space course. They try so hard across the ocean to slander the Soviet peace initiatives aimed at the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union's continuing insistent appeal for a complete end to tests.

However, it is not hard to tell black from white -- the disinformation from a concrete, honest program of peace and nuclear disarmament.

Bragin on Pentagon Plan

PM051240 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Mar 87 First Edition p 5

[Nikolay Bragin "Commentator's Column": "You Cannot Prove the Unprovable"]

[Text] In Washington the Pentagon has announced its intention in the next 3 years to take another leap forward in the buildup of the U.S. strategic offensive potential, bringing it up to 20,000 nuclear charges by the beginning of the nineties.

Clearly the supporters of the nuclear arms race, who hold key posts in the U.S. Administration, have no intention of heeding the voice of reason and embarking on a path of real evaluation of the irreparable consequences that could result from heaping up countless stockpiles of lethal weapons of mass destruction on earth. On the contrary, judging from THE NEW YORK TIMES report, new efforts are now being made there to prove the unprovable: that the buildup of nuclear arsenals helps to "strengthen security." A far-fetched, absurd argument.

Indeed, surely it is clear that any attempt by one side to increase its own nuclear arsenals will speedily lead to countermeasures by the other side? The more weapons there are, the more likely it is that they will be used. That is axiomatic to all those who are concerned about the future of the world. The arms race, and above all the race for sophisticated types of arms, only kindles aggressive, adventurist ambitions, as can be seen from the White House and Pentagon gamble on the SDI program.

Added to this is the possibility that nuclear weapons could get out of control through some accident — a technical error by a computer or irresponsibility on the part of someone with access to nuclear arsenals. The U.S. press has already reported many instances of a false "alarm," when the command to repel a "missile attack" was issued at U.S. military bases. Fortunately these errors were rectified. Where is the guarantee that something irremediable will not happen?

The propaganda machine maintained by the U.S. military-industrial complex claims that U.S. hardware excludes the possibility of "accidental errors and incidents" involving nuclear energy in any of its forms. The reality indicates otherwise. According to confidential figures from the U.S. Congress, many of the 151 accidents at the world's nuclear power stations which took place between 1971 and 1984 were in the United States. Computer errors constantly occur at military facilities. Cases of the "loss" of atom bombs by U.S. planes and collisions involving ships carrying nuclear weapons are known. In the last 20 years there have been more than 600 incidents involving U.S. nuclear weapons. Washington has so far managed to keep secret the majority of such "incidents." [paragraph continues]

This cannot for a moment alleviate the concern of the U.S. and world public, which resolutely demands an end to the sinister shadow of the nuclear threat to the planet.

That is why there has been such broad support for the USSR's proposal to conclude without delay an agreement on the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe. Everyone who is concerned not just in words but in practice about the future of the world thinks that the Soviet initiative set forth in M.S. Gorbachev's statement opens the way to the practical resolution of the most urgent problem of our day -- that of reducing nuclear arms, followed by the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA SEES WEINBURGER AS 'CONVINCED MILITARIST'

PM051623 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Feb 87 First Edition p 5

[A. Lyutyy "Pamphlet": "A Convinced Militarist"]

[Text] It has become a kind of rule now: As soon as prospects begin to take shape somewhere for movement toward a nuclear-free world, a world without wars and international strife, the U.S. defense secretary immediately appears on the scene. He pulls from his official document case papers containing the latest "deadly" anti-Soviet thesis and he pours forth a list of intimidatory data, masquerading as information about the USSR's military potential and our defense expenditure. The adjutants of the militarist in civilian clothes obligingly display all manner of diagrams with red and blue arrows in which the red arrows -- data about the USSR, of course -- soar at the very top end of the tables and the blues just about crawl in somewhere at the bottom. The secretary would seem to be on the point of hollering: "The Russians are coming!"

The secretary's work schedule is hectic. Having basically transferred all administrative and technical functions to his deputies, he daily travels about America and the world preaching on the theme of the "rapid growth of the Soviet threat." The Soviets are so far ahead in the military sphere, he says, that it is going to take a titanic effort to catch them.

Last October in Anchorage Weinberger flabbergasted his audience with the following "arithmetic." The USSR has developed the kind of production capacities that will enable it to produce three times as many ballistic missiles, nearly three times as many submarines, and several times as many bombers as the United States! Earlier Weinberger stated that the Warsaw Pact has the advantage in tanks, in a ratio of 2 to 1.

On 15 January this year, on the anniversary of the USSR's presentation of its program for the elimination of nuclear weapons, Weinberger made a speech at the National Press Club in Washington. There was no room in the speech for a sober assessment of the Soviet Union's peace initiatives. Instead there was the stern warning that the USSR is on the point of deploying around 100 brand-new ICBM launchers.

In some cases you find Weinberger panicking about the "Soviet threat," in others he is extolling U.S. military strength. It was that, apparently, that lead to the Soviet-U.S. meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik. "Our emphasis on restoring our military strength and the President's wise decision to set about creating a strategic defense system," he claimed, "not only did not lead to confrontation but contributed to the holding of the two meetings between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev." Although it must be said that the U.S. defense secretary's attitude to the meetings was

sharply negative from the very beginning. During the Soviet-U.S. summit in Geneva in 1985 there was a cunningly orchestrated "leak" of information in the United States about a letter sent by the defense secretary to the President demanding that in no circumstances should he agree to the strict observance of the SALT II treaty and the ABM Treaty. The purpose of the "leak" was obvious -- to call the U.S. delegation, including the President himself, to order, to wreck the talks, and to prevent major accords being reached at them. It is easy to guess who was behind this act of political sabotage -- the military-industrial complex.

The Pentagon leader gave a sigh of relief when last year the U.S. side wrecked the accord in Reykjavik. Brazenly -- there is no other word for it -- it blamed the Soviet Union for this. [paragraph continues]

In an interview for the French television company TF-1, Weinberger said: "I do not know whether the Russians ever had even the slightest intention of agreeing to any of the proposals they were talking about..." This pronouncement is irresponsible in itself. From a leading figure in the government of the leading Western power it sounds like a mockery of the well-known facts.

It is unnecessary to argue with such people. In fact, as far as Weinberger is concerned, the truth is merely the small change in the political game. We did not start talking about the U.S. secretary just for argument's sake. The point is that his name has again appeared on the front pages of U.S. newspapers. Again Weinberger is acting as a saboteur of efforts to eliminate the nuclear threat. According to the press, he was the initiator of the early deployment [ranneye razvertyvaniye] of certain elements of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" in space and on earth. Weinberger would like to have in operation [vvesti v stroy] by early 1990 the first space weapons systems which will be components of SDI. The intention is clear -- to give the SDI program now the kind of momentum and invest in it the kind of funds and potential which would make the venture effectively irreversible, irrespective of the wishes of any future administration. So the intention is to completely bury the ABM Treaty, destroy the opportunity which took shape in Reykjavik of reaching Soviet-U.S. accords, and, most important, take the arms race into space. Weinberger has again come to the fore to veto the cessation of the arms race.

What is he like, this 60-year-old U.S. secretary, whom I saw several times when I was a correspondent in Washington? Appearances are often deceptive, and that is obviously true in this case. He is civil and courteous and dresses in severe, dark suits. He is on the short side and looks more like a financial official than the head of the military department. At the end of the sixties he headed the financial department of the state of California. At that time our hero was an advocate of strict budgetary economy, zealously protecting his department's interests.

It must be said that he remains an advocate of economy, but with one exception. That exception is the Pentagon. Weinberger is prepared to sacrifice everything -- appropriations for schools' needs and for the development of science and art, aid programs for underprivileged families, and, finally, all the social programs on which the position of millions of American depends -- but not the Pentagon budget.

What is the cause of this behavior? Perhaps there are two. Gene Larocque, the retired rear admiral who is director of the Washington Defense Information Center, once observed: "Weinberger is one of the few cold war knights in Washington." It is well known that the secretary is an inveterate anglophile who reads English literature and studies the history of the English aristocracy. It is less well known that his ideal statesman is Winston Churchill, one of the originators of the cold war against the USSR.

The impression is that Weinberger is beginning to believe his own anti-Soviet cock-and-bull stories. The cloak of prejudice and enmity toward the USSR is too thick for him to be able to distinguish truth from lies. Nor does Weinberger want to do that.

There is a second cause of the secretary's extreme bellicosity. Like some of his colleagues in the administration, Weinberger was "recruited" from the giant Bechtel corporation, where he had been vice president and a director. This construction firm is one of the Pentagon's biggest contractors. Bechtel is constructing a variety of facilities, military included, in dozens of countries. It is perfectly natural that in sending its man to the government the firm should expect in return new, ever larger military contracts. [paragraph continues]

Indeed, Weinberger himself has a stake in them since he has invested a considerable amount of his capital in the company. The "feedback" between the government and military corporations is efficiently organized. People like Weinberger are trying hard to convince their fellow citizens that what is good for the military-industrial complex is good for America today. Even if this "good" thing places the world on the brink of a nuclear catastrophe.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS COMMENTATOR CRITICIZES KISSINGER NEWSWEEK ARTICLE

LD262046 Moscow TASS in English 2024 GMT 26 Feb 87

[Text] Moscow February 26 TASS -- By Tass military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

At a reception in Moscow three weeks ago former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger promised to give me some time later an interview on Soviet-American relations and talks on disarmament. In the days that have passed since then he talked so much about his personal view of the aforementioned problems that, frankly speaking, I lost any wish to meet him and debate these problems with him. Yet I would like to make some remarks about his article that was just published in the NEWSWEEK magazine.

First of all, Mr. Kissinger turned out to be fundamentally against a nuclear-free world. The Soviet proposals submitted in Reykjavik, the proposals which kindled hopes everywhere in the world for a radical turn toward universal security and which, should they be accepted, would lead to a breakthrough on all the directions of the struggle for the limitation and elimination of nuclear weapons, are not to his liking. "It is too late to pursue the mirage of eliminating nuclear weapons", the former secretary of state writes. He believes this is simply impossible, either by agreement among statesmen or by technological expedients such as a leak-proof space shield, the space shield, which, as President Reagan asserts, is aimed at making nuclear weapons "obsolete and impotent". Hence, according to Kissinger, there is no way out of a nuclear trap and humanity is doomed to live constantly under the threat of nuclear destruction.

If Mr. Kissinger had his way, then, out of the "Reykjavik framework", only the 50-per cent reduction of strategic forces would stand. But even such a step, according to his classification, can be described only as "symbolic". As to the zero option on medium-range missiles, it should go, since the removal of U.S. missiles from Western Europe would eliminate the American ability to deal a nuclear strike (certainly, at the USSR) from Europe. Meanwhile, the former U.S. secretary of state considers SDI "a major contribution to Western strategy." He believes that any restrictions on SDI would make it senseless and a long moratorium on its deployment would be a trap.

In order to take the bearing in these "subtleties" one should address oneself to Dr. Kissinger's writings of the pre-Reykjavik period. In his memoirs Kissinger described strategic parity between the USSR and the USA as a strategic nightmare for the United States. Meanwhile he actually glorified the arms race, regarding it as extremely advantageous for the United States. He wrote that a war of attrition is a war which the Soviet Bloc cannot win.

To prevent the implementation of the plans of transformations in the USSR, to frustrate them by the arms race — this is what prompts Mr. Kissinger's present deliberations about a "mirage" of a nuclear-free world. This is what is behind his assertions that the Reykjavik framework is "extremely disadvantageous," and that SDI supplementing the U.S. nuclear arsenal is a means of breaking away from a "nuclear nightmare" through space.

It could be reminded to Kissinger that Ronald Reagan himself in his "stellar speech" of March 1983 admitted that defensive systems combined with offensive ones could be viewed as a factor suiting an aggressive policy.

I think there was hardly a need for Mr. Kissinger coming to Moscow to see enthusiasm of the Soviet people which is building its state and which dreams of peace and exerts efforts to ensure it. He has not learned any useful lessons from his trip. And the former U.S. secretary of state could come out with the recommendations contained in the NEWSWEEK magazine without leaving home.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

YUGOSLAV PAPER QUOTES USSR'S KARPOV ON NUCLEAR FORCES FIGURES

LD061733 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1533 GMT 6 Mar 87

[Text] Belgrade, March 6 (TANJUG) — The Soviet disarmament proposals are essentially realistic, said department head at the Soviet Foreign Ministry and long-standing negotiator Viktor Karpov in an article published in the March issue of the Yugoslav journal Review Of International Affairs. He queried, however, whether the United States was ready to go half-way on the line opened at Reykjavik, the line which the Soviet Union continually proposes as leading to the common goal — nuclear disarmament.

Karpov said that the nuclear disarmament program until the end of the century which was formulated by Mikhail Gorbachev a year ago, had demonstrated realistic prospects for the earliest possible and comprehensive reduction of nuclear weapons in the world. In Karpov's view, the Soviet proposals have maximum scope in the direction of the elimination of nuclear weapons, particularly offensive.

Karpov's article in the Review Of International Affairs also contains a chart with the exact numbers of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons on October 11, 1986, a copy of which Mikhail Gorbachev handed to Reagan in Reykjavik on October 12, 1986. The chart is now being published for the first time: The number of U.S. and Soviet offensive weapons on October 11, 1986 [all figures as received]:

| | Soviet | U.S. |
|--|--------|-------|
| Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers | 1398 | 1018 |
| Including: | | |
| Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) | 820 | 550 |
| Submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) | 922 | 672 |
| Including: | | |
| MIRV and SLBM launchers | 352 | 640 |
| Total number of ICBM and SLBM launchers | 2320 | 1630 |
| Including: | | |
| ICBM and SLBM with MIRV | 1172 | 1190 |
| Strategic bombers (SB) | 160 | 518 |
| Including cruise missiles (CM) equipment | 53 | 127 |
| Total number of ICBM, SLBM, SB launchers | 2418 | 2203 |
| Including: | | |
| ICBM, SLBM and SB launchers equipped with MIRV and CM | 1225 | 1317 |
| Total charges on strategic vehicles | 10000 | 14800 |

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CSO: 5200/1340

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

BRIEFS

SOVIET ARMS ACCORDS 'VIOLATIONS'—Washington March 11 TASS—President Reagan has sent to Congress on Tuesday a report accusing the Soviet Union of violating virtually all the Soviet-American arms control accords. Exposing these far-fetched accusations, an authoritative public organization, the Centre for Defense Information, has stated that the Soviet Union is faithfully respecting all the treaties and agreements. These far-fetched accusations are needed by the administration to hold back progress at the arms control talks and to distract attention from the fact that the United States has actually buried the SALT-2 treaty and would not stop nuclear testing. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0641 GMT 11 Mar 87 LD]

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CSO: 5200/1340

SALT/START ISSUES

SOVIET MILITARY JOURNAL ON STEALTH AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT

Moscow TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE in Russian No 12, Dec 86 (signed to press 18 Nov 86) pp 8-9

[Article by Maj Gen Avn (Res) I. Lebedev: "The Development of Combat Airplanes"; from materials in the foreign press]

[Text] Many materials on ways for the development of military aviation have appeared recently in the foreign press. Versions of various airframe designs, aerodynamic questions, problems of the airplanes' power supply, and possibilities for the employment of new structural materials are discussed. On the basis of results of advanced investigations and studies which are obtained in laboratories and design offices, the forecasting of promising aircraft of the next two decades is being attempted. Specialists, in particular, have come to the conclusion that during this period the development of aviation will proceed along the following basic directions.

Manned and unmanned hypersonic airplanes intended for use as interceptors in the air defense [AD] system as well as supersonic and subsonic airplanes--so-called Stealth aircraft which, it is assumed, will be extremely difficult for electronic means to detect--will be developed. As regards the field of engine construction, here the appearance of new engines is expected, in particular with ceramic elements which permit increasing thrust and reducing substantially fuel consumption, as well as basic improvements (first of all, to increase economy) in existing engines, in particular, turbofan engines.

It is planned to introduce into construction type alloys and composite materials so as to reduce the weight and increase the strength of airframe elements. Studies are continuing in the field of control of a laminar layer. It is asserted that with the same energy expenditures this will permit increasing lift and, consequently, increasing significantly flight range and duration.

Work will be continued on the so-called integration of onboard systems as well as on finding new methods which permit increasing the maneuverability of combat aircraft--through a reduction in static stability and the introduction of its automatic control, the use of engine thrust for the direct control of lift and lateral forces, and so forth. To realize the measures which have been listed, consideration is being given to the possibility of using design schemes of the "canard" and "tailless" types and an aircraft with an asymmetrical wing or a forward-swept wing. It is expected that the "canard"-type scheme will permit

increasing maneuverability and providing the aircraft with two additional degrees of freedom. Recently, the possibility of the direct use of the thrust of jet engines in the process of aircraft control has been studied abroad. In the opinion of some specialists, the employment of a propulsive jet nozzle with variable geometry will permit increasing the overall lift at takeoff or in horizontal flight at great speeds and will provide reverse thrust during landing as well as the optimum engine operating mode during supersonic flight.

They are seeking design solutions which further the more efficient use of special zones of the air flow to suck in the laminar (boundary) layer and direct it to the streamlined surfaces.

As is known, with a laminar flow around aerodynamic surfaces the effect of a reduction of drag is created, which is equivalent to a reduction in fuel consumption. One of the possible methods for the formation of a laminar flow-around is believed to be the creation, on the streamlined surface, of special zones for sucking in the boundary layer (slots, pores). Other specialists suppose that the optimum shape of the wing or active control of the air flow prove to be more acceptable to ensure the laminarity of the boundary layer. For a reduction of the drag and a further improvement in the aerodynamics of the aircraft, which is necessary to increase its maneuverability during supersonic flight in the future, they are counting on completely abandoning the external suspensions of armament.

It is expected that by the end of this century information processing systems will be widely employed for flight control and fire control as well as systems for the detection of airplanes which are flying at low altitudes. By means of the integration of basic onboard systems it is planned to introduce into the piloting of aircraft the principle of control by voice.

To reduce the probability of aircraft detection by electronic means, it is considered expedient to use special coatings with low reflectivity and designs of special shapes. It is hoped that the capability of detecting airplanes with infrared equipment will be reduced by employing special orientation of the rotating nozzles of the jet engines.

Important research work is being conducted on the discovery of more power-intensive fuels than kerosene. In particular, the question of the use of liquid hydrogen--the efficiency of which is three times greater than that of hydrocarbon fuels--is being examined. However, the density of liquid hydrogen is less than that of kerosene; therefore, it is necessary to increase the volume of the fuel tanks. In addition, effective thermal insulation will be required since liquid hydrogen should be stored at a temperature no higher than -253°C . Another obstacle to the introduction of hydrogen fuel is considered to be its high cost (now it is obtained basically by the chemical processing of hydrocarbon compounds). In this connection, as was reported in the foreign press, plans are being developed for mastering the commercial production of hydrogen by the electrolysis of sea water.

In the opinion of foreign military specialists the advanced strategic bomber externally most likely will be a "flying wing" with the uniform distribution of weight. In this case, the fuselage of the aircraft will possess lift. Also

being examined are schemes with wing panels which are retracted into the fuselage. The engines of such an aircraft will be located in the central part of the fuselage (it is planned to install turbofan engines for flights at low speeds and ramjet engines for flights at supersonic speeds). Here, static stability will be substantially less which, as is expected, will provide the capability to control the aircraft for yaw angle using flaps mounted on the trailing edge of the wing, and for pitch angle--using small vertical control surfaces. It is proposed that an active control system be employed with automata for stability and damping to prevent the appearance of flutter in a certain range of speeds. The basis of such a system should be an analog computer. Instructions issued by the control stick and sensor signals are converted to electrical signals which control the main drives of the control surfaces. It is intended to integrate such a system with a remote drive control system in which there will be no mechanical connections between the control stick and the control drives.

It is believed that new composite materials which contain carbon, boron, beryllium, and fiber glass will find wide employment on the strategic bomber. The physical and mechanical properties of these materials are determined basically by the characteristics of the strengthening fibers.

In the opinion of specialists, the most probable fuel for the bomber will be liquid hydrogen whose weight will comprise 30-50 percent of the aircraft's take-off weight. It is intended to use the onboard system intended for the storage of the liquid hydrogen also for cooling the aerodynamic surfaces which heat up during supersonic flight.

Foreign designers of strategic bombers are striving to reduce to the minimum their give-away signs and thereby increase the survivability of the airplanes when overcoming the zones of action of air defense weapons. In order to reduce the number of radio contrast places on the aircraft surfaces, it is planned to cover its skin with such radio ablation materials as polytetrafluoroethylene, epoxy resins, and special paints which absorb or attenuate the radio signal which has arrived (a significant portion of the energy of this signal is transformed into thermal energy).

According to the calculations of specialists, the nozzles of the engines of special configuration and new insulation materials will provide the capability to reduce the heat radiation of the engines and thereby complicate the detection of the aircraft by IR [infrared] means. In addition, it is intended to equip the airplane with more effective ECM [electronic countermeasures] and equipment which permits executing a maneuver to bypass ground radars and with special equipment which warns the crew of the aircraft's irradiation from the direction of the rear hemisphere.

Along with the creation of new aircraft, the existing fleet of strategic bombers is being modernized. Designers are working on an increase in the power of the power plants and reinforcing the structural elements of the fuselage and wings. The aircraft are being equipped with additional onboard equipment. One of the modernization tasks is the creation of airplanes which are capable of carrying cruise missiles on board.

Foreign military specialists believe that it is virtually an unrealistic matter to create a multipurpose fighter of the year 2000 model which could combat the

aerial enemy at various radii of action and also accomplish reconnaissance missions. Therefore, they consider it expedient to have three types of combat aircraft: a heavy air-superiority fighter, a long-range intercept fighter and an aerial combat fighter.

The heavy fighter should have high maneuverability at speeds of Mach 0.6-1.2 and develop a maximum speed on the order of Mach 2.2-2.5, a ceiling of 18 kilometers, and a radius of action of up to 1200 kilometers. It is thought that the airplane will be equipped with an onboard increased-range radar. The design weight of such an aircraft is 19-26 tons.

It is planned to create a long-range intercept fighter on the basis of the heavy fighter. By suspending additional fuel tanks, it is planned to increase its radius of action to 1500-2000 kilometers.

According to the estimates of foreign specialists, the aerial combat fighter will be an aircraft weighing 10-15 tons. Its maximum speed will be Mach 1.8-2, radius of action 900 kilometers, and service ceiling—15 kilometers.

It is planned to increase the duration and range of flight of prospective fighters at supersonic speeds up to 60-80 percent of the total time of flight (on contemporary foreign fighters this indicator equals 20 percent). It is intended to realize such parameters through the development of new TRDD's [turbojet bypass engine/double shaft turbojet engine] which would permit accomplishing supersonic flight in the nonafterburner mode and would have a specific fuel consumption which is 25 percent less in comparison with contemporary engines.

It is intended to attain great flight speeds in combination with the necessary maneuverability of the fighters by employing the "canard" and "tailless" aerodynamic schemes. The design should have a thin triangular wing with small elongation and high sweep and a spindle-shaped lifting fuselage with a pointed nose section. It is hoped that high maneuverability will be attained, in particular, thanks to the employment of a system of direct and, possibly, automated control of the lift and lateral forces and the engine's thrust vectors. It is planned to bring the lift-to-drag ratio of such aircraft to 6-8 (it is now about 4). The g-loads in flight will be increased to 9 (6.7-7.3 on contemporary fighters). The introduction of such systems, as foreign specialists believe, will lead to the appearance of new procedures, methods, and tactics of aerial combat.

In order to obtain high speeds and simultaneously ensure the required maneuverability in subsonic flight and acceptable takeoff and landing characteristics of the airplane, along with the introduction of a system to control lift and lateral forces it is planned to use a wing with in-flight variable camber and jet flaps installed on it.

The attack aircraft which are now in the inventory of the armies of capitalist countries are intended for the close support of troops on the battlefield. According to statements in the foreign press, beginning with the 1990's they will be replaced by a new generation of aircraft. The appearance of heavy attack aircraft with a weight of 19-22 tons and of light aircraft with a weight of 6-8 tons with a crew, as a rule, of two men placed in tandem is expected.

Plans for prospective attack aircraft envision the use of a regular aerodynamic scheme with a straight or swept wing which has developed mechanization (slats, flaps, air brakes). In their development, they are striving to ensure the optimum relationship of the main characteristics of the aircraft: speed, flight duration, maneuverability, possibility for operation from unprepared runways, bomb weight, missile weight, and other armament.

Foreign specialists believe that for the next generation of attack aircraft to possess the required maneuverability at high speed they should be equipped with a system for direct control of the lift and lateral forces and should have a small static margin. The capability to control the thrust vector, according to the estimates of specialists, will provide the aircraft with shortened takeoff and landing. It is expected that the system for control of the attack airplane will be automated and electroremote with repeated redundancy of the main systems and a considerable separation of channels to ensure the survivability of the airplane. It is expected that the accuracy of conduct of fire in all flight modes will increase with the introduction of automated systems, which will permit changing the tactics for the combat employment of the next generation of attack aircraft.

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SALT/START ISSUES

USSR: COMPARATIVE FIGURES ON SSBN'S, SLBM'S

PM021051 [Editorial report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 February 1987 First Edition carries on page 3 under the headline "The Truth Will Out" a 1,500-word article by own observer Manki Ponomarev in response to a reader's letter from Captain N. Biryukov asking about the source of the military threat in the world. Ponomarev claims that "approximate equilibrium and military-strategic parity" exists between the USSR and the United States, and that "this is an objective reality which cannot be refuted by any fabrications." In support of his claim he publishes the following table -- entitled "Who is the Instigator of the Arms Race" -- taken from the fourth edition of the book "Whence the Threat to Peace" [Otkuda Iskhodit Ugroza Mиру]

| YEAR | UNITED STATES | | | USSR | | |
|------|---------------|--------|-------------|--------|--------|-------------|
| | SSBN's | SLBM's | Charges | SSBN's | SLBM's | Charges |
| 1960 | 3 | 48 | 48 | None | None | None |
| 1967 | 41 | 656 | 1552 | 2 | 32 | 32 |
| 1970 | 41 | 656 | 2048 | 20 | 316 | 316 |
| 1975 | 41 | 656 | 4536 | 55 | 724 | 724 |
| 1981 | 40 | 648 | 5280 | 62 | 950 | 2000 |
| 1984 | 39 | 656 | 6000 approx | 62 | 940 | 2500 approx |
| 1986 | 38 | 672 | 7000 approx | 61 | 922 | 3000 approx |

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CSO: 5200/1318

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW REPORTS, COMMENTS ON U.S. CRUISE MISSILE TEST IN CANADA

Canadian Protests

LD231143 Moscow TASS in English 1135 GMT 23 Feb 87

[Text] Ottawa February 23 TASS — The Pentagon is to carry out on Tuesday [24 February] a fresh test of a cruise missile over Canada's northern areas, a spokesman for Canada's National Defence Ministry informed. A cruise missile to be launched from an American strategic bomber over the Beaufort Sea will fly at a low altitude to the proving range near the Cold Lake military base, on the border between Alberta and Saskatchewan provinces.

Canada's coalition of trade union, anti-war and church organizations said that a demonstration of protest would be held outside the legislative assembly building in Edmonton on the day of the test. Early last year two U.S. cruise missile tests ended in a flop. One of the main demands of broad sections of the country's public is that for an end to the testing of U.S. missiles.

U.S. Seeks 'Superiority'

LD260020 Moscow World Service in English 1410 GMT 25 Feb 87

[Text] The United States has carried out another test of a long-range cruise missile over Canadian territory. The missile is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Aleksandr Druzhinin has these details:

Even a laymen knows that cruise missiles are first strike weapons. As the press reports, the testing in Canada was carried out in the conditions simulating the attack on the Soviet Union. Washington officials seem to have nothing against discussing their readiness to reduce strategic weapons but they limit this readiness to intercontinental ballistic missiles alone. As for long-range cruise missiles, they prefer not to count them, to leave the opportunity for building up such weapons open. And this, in fact, amounts to the desire to bypass the existing restraints on strategic weapons.

The United States has already broken the ceiling set for the heavy B-52 bombers capable of carrying cruise missiles. By so doing, it has breached the SALT II treaty. It plans to deploy long-range cruise missiles tipped with nuclear warheads (fat) its submarines and surface vessels.

Even if intercontinental ballistic missiles are reduced, the United States will still have thousands of cruise missiles unspecified in agreements. In the opinion of Washington strategists, this should ensure military superiority to the United States. The Washington Administration keeps striving for an illusory aim, to change the strategic balance in its favor. This explains why the United States is stepping up the testing of cruise missiles and is seeking to enlarge their arsenals in every possible way.

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CSO: 5200/1305

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS: U.S. CONDUCTS CRUISE MISSILE TEST OVER CANADA

LD011853 Moscow TASS in English 1843 GMT 1 Mar 87

[Text] Washington March 1 TASS -- The Pentagon today carried out a new cruise missile flight test over Canada's northern areas. The cruise missile launched from the B-52 bomber over the Beaufort Sea flew 2,400 kilometers over Canadian territory and parachuted 240 kilometers east of Edmonton, UPI news agency reports.

The missile flight lasted almost four hours. This test was similar to the one conducted on February 24 and, according to statements by officials, the concluding test this year.

A total of eight tests of U.S. cruise missiles were carried out since 1983 when an agreement was concluded converting Canadian territory into a vast Pentagon test range.

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CSO: 5200/1339

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW: 'TOP PRIORITY' PROGRAM ON GORBACHEV PROPOSAL

LD071525 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 7 Mar 87

["Top Priority" program with Dr Radomir Bogdanov and Dr Sergey Plekhanov of the United States of America and Canada Institute, Moscow; (Robert Scheer) of THE LOS ANGELES TIMES; presented by Vladimir Pozner]

[Excerpts] [Pozner] The topic today I think is evident, and that is the Soviet proposal on INF, or medium-range missiles in Europe, that is to say the dismantling, I would call it, of the package proposal that was made at Reykjavik, taking out the medium-range missiles as a separate issue and proposing to deal with that; to take out all Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, all American medium-range missiles also, not to take into account the British and the French nuclear potential. And also there is something that has to do with medium-range missiles in Asia, that is bringing the Soviet number down to 100 warheads, which is the equivalent of 33 missiles, I believe. Let's look at this.

Some people are saying it's a major breakthrough. There seems to have been some very positive reaction to this. President Reagan has said some good words about it, which was on the air and on Soviet television. How do you feel about this thing? Is it, is it really something important that's happened? Can it lead somewhere? And let's look a little bit back; is there something behind it? Is it a continuation of Reykjavik in a way? Dr Bogdanov, you want to start?

[Bogdanov] Yes, Vladimir. Yes, I would like to start with two comments. I would prefer to talk a little bit on the new political thinking, because to my mind what is important in that INF business is just the expression of the new political thinking, because I feel that is a very close link between what we call a new political thinking and our decision to pick up INF out of the package and to go ahead with that.

[Pozner] Now why do you say that? Why do you call that new political thinking?

[Bogdanov] That's the point I would like to call your attention to.

[Pozner] Yes.

[Bogdanov] Because if we ask our friend from THE LOS ANGELES TIMES how he does understand the new...[Bogdanov changes thought] He spent in the Soviet Union almost 2 weeks now, isn't it?

[(Scheer)] Three weeks.

[Bogdanov] Three weeks now, and I believe that he has some, you know, feeling on what is the new political thinking. Will he agree with my point that the very substantial major part of the new political thinking is flexibility, flexibility? If you feel that the environment has been changing, or you feel that you should take dramatic, unconventional, unusual, you know steps to move the whole thing, then you take a decision to do it very quickly, very fast, (?yet) you just adjust to the new (?in a way) what we have done (?by this). Do you agree with me?

[Pozner] (Robert Scheer), do you agree with this?

[Sheer] First of all I'm hoping that the new thinking is even more exciting than you suggest, which is not just flexibility but...

[Bogdanov interrupts] That's one of the parts of it, you know.

[Scheer] But rather a recognition that missiles do not bring security. And if I were to look at the old thinking I personally believe it was stupid to put the missiles into Europe in the first place. They didn't add to anybody's security, and now you have not only flexibility but a recognition that Soviet security is really not enhanced by having these missiles and by having Pershings on the other side. And hopefully on the West there'll be a recognition that the security of the West is not enhanced by these missiles.

The key element of the new thinking -- aside from flexibility and pragmatism which I do recognize is there -- I think it was bold to break up the package. It was a good idea. But it seems to me the really important idea is to get away from the idea that strength and security rests on bean-counting of missiles and having one or 200 or 300 more of this SS this or MX that or so forth, and that's what's bold about this.

[Pozner] Do you think that new thinking also means the ability to acknowledge past mistakes?

[Scheer] You know, I am obviously not the one to speak for the Soviet Government, but I've interviewed a number of high officials now in the last 3 weeks, and I must say they do exhibit a refreshing tendency to admit past mistakes. And I would say without exception they've all conceded that they really did not gain any measure of security by putting those missiles in in the first place, and that the world will be safer with fewer missiles in Europe. So yes, I would say the new thinking reflects a spirit of self-criticism which is admirable, and I hope it continues in this (?vein).

[Pozner] Dr Plekhanov, did you want to jump in here? And I still would like some answer to my initial question, and that is besides its being a reflection of new thinking and beside its being laudable, commendable and what have you, what I would also like to know is: Do you really believe this is going, this is an important step that could be the first major step along the way to what Reykjavik was initially all about?

[Plekhanov] Yes, certainly. I'm afraid that many Americans do not really fully understand how important this issue of medium-range missiles is. There is a tendency to think of them as something rather small, existing in Europe and really outside of the major concerns, as far as most Americans are concerned. So I would like to emphasize two things which make INF very important. Number one, they are highly accurate missiles located within in very, well, relatively short distances from their targets. Their flying time from the launch pad to the target is from 5-10 minutes. And in this current situation if there is an increase of tensions the likelihood of an unwanted nuclear war, something along the line of that Soviet movie which I think some

Americans saw on their television screen -- I mean "Letters from a Dead Man" -- the likelihood of such a conflagration tremendously increases. So we were actually on a very, very slim hair-trigger with those missiles. So it is important to pull those missiles out of Europe and turn Europe into a safer place, and that would make the whole world a safer place. And the second point is if that package is successful, if we are able to reach agreement between the United States...

[Pozner interrupts] But that's not a package, that's a straightforward proposal. There are no other things attached to it, as far as I can judge.

[Plekhanov] That's right, that's right. But, well, I mean package because there are several elements in that proposal concerning the detail, the tactical missiles, (?the provision) is also there, so the important thing is that this is a real reduction. This would be a real reduction of weapons, some of the most dangerous weapons, first-strike weapons, the very edge of this, you know, this line of danger which has been growing recently. So I think that the issue is very important for Americans just as it is for the Soviets, not to mention the Western Europeans. [passage omitted]

[Bogdanov] Do you believe that this President at his present shape, or rather this Presidency, will be able to bring together all the factions within this administration really to reach an agreement on INF in Geneva? What is your feeling? I have my answer to this, but, of course, you are more expert-like.

[(Scheer)] This President can push through any arms control measure that he wants. He has certainly not to worry about his rightwing critics. He certainly has the credibility with the American public as far as not being soft on the Russians. And if he has the will he could make as far-reaching a compromise agreement with the Soviets as he desires. And I think there is enough time to get congressional support, because I think the support is there for arms control.

What I'm concerned about is I don't think that progress on intermediate-range forces will lead to the rest of the package because the stumbling block in the rest of the package is Star Wars, SDI. And I see no indication that President Reagan wants to compromise on Star Wars, or use it as a bargaining chip. If he's willing to use it as a bargaining chip it seems to me he could get quite a bargain at this time. But from my conversations here with Soviet officials they indicate no desire at all to compromise on offensive weapons if there will not be progress on Star Wars. So I think this is the stumbling block, and we ought not to be deluded that progress on the intermediate-range forces will lead to progress on major strategic weapons.

[Pozner] Let me pass this thought by all of you. I take your point, Mr (Scheer), but I'd like to ask you to look at this. If we take the Soviet-American relationship I think we would have to admit that never before -- even in 1972 when we signed some very important agreements -- never before has there actually been any physical cutback, real serious physical cutback in the sense of weapons. That has not happened. Now if this particular proposal on medium-range missiles is accepted, if both sides can work out an agreement, and if as a result of that the weapons that have been deployed are not only taken out of where they are now but are dismantled under international supervision, don't you think that as a kind of psychological setting, as a kind of atmosphere, that this has actually happened? It could lead to some very important steps, and I don't want you to say, or try to guess which, but that simply the fact of this happening could trigger a change in attitudes, of a very major importance. Does that sound logical, or does that sound like pie in the sky?

[(Scheer)] There is no question that you are right. I mean we need some successes here in the arms control area. And you're quite right also that the actual destruction of weapons instead of putting new limits and new ceilings which give you higher weapons would be a major achievement, so I'm not down-playing that. I think, however, to move to this second stage, which is to get rid of your strategic, or cut back your strategic forces, will require compromise on the whole question of defensive as well as offensive weapons, and I suspect that's going to wait for the next American Administration. I see no signs that President Reagan thinks Star Wars is a bargaining chip. I may be wrong.

But I think, barring such a shift in his position, I don't suspect that the Soviets are going to go for cuts in their offensive weapons, because what they've been saying over and over again is that they think more offensive weapons is the only way and the cheapest way to deal with the potential of Star Wars.

[Bogdanov] I tend to agree with Mr (Scheer). I do not believe that this administration and this President has [as heard] some other views than that they should go ahead with the Star Wars, and what worries me really, that they may use, you know, that one element of the package just to kill the other elements.

[Pozner] What other elements?

[Bogdanov] I mean strategic offensive and space and testing. And I'm afraid that they may impress so much the Congress by that deal that the Congress will stay idle, the Congress might get satisfied with that deal. So what worries me really, that what worries me.

[Plekhanov] In other words by yielding an inch you then are able to gain a foot.

[Bogdanov] Yes, I mean that.

[Pozner] I'd like you to clarify what you are saying here. I'm not quite clear on what you mean.

[Plekhanov] No, no, no, what I mean. But, as I understand Bogdanov, he's saying there is a possibility that the administration may think that by yielding on INF -- OK let's sign an agreement on INF, let's eliminate those missiles -- they will make their position even harder as far as the other weapons are concerned, strategic offensive weapons....

[Pozner interrupts] But we have to say, I mean we have to admit that the U.S. administration has said many times that it is prepared to deal on the INF situation, that in fact were the INF situation presented as a separate thing there would be no problem. I don't think we can talk about yielding in that sense. It would seem that this answers what the U.S. Government has been saying. Now maybe they weren't saying honestly, maybe they were, but the fact of the matter that they didn't ever. It's not a question of yielding at this point. I don't think so. What do you think?

[(Scheer)] No, no, yah. Let's back off from all of this excessive complexity. I mean it would be a good thing to get rid of these missiles, since I said they shouldn't have been put in in the first place by the Russians; they shouldn't have been put in by the Americans.

They don't make the world safer, they make it more dangerous. So it's good for humanity to get rid of these missiles. If nothing else is accomplished in what remains of the Reagan administration, that will be a significant accomplishment.

[Plekhanov] I agree.

[(Scheer)] It would be better yet if one could move from that confidence-building measure to broader agreement on strategic weapons. I'm pessimistic about that happening, but I suspect that success in this area of intermediate-range missiles will make it easier for a future administration to look for deep cuts in offensive weapons and to cut back on defensive programs. So I don't see this as a question of, as I understand, the original point, I don't see this as deluding the American public. I don't see it as a way of slipping out of arms control, because I think any confidence building, any success stories will be all to the good and will make it easier for a future administration to move in an even more serious way.

[Bogdanov] Basically I am in agreement with you, but as a student of American political life, as a scientist, you know, I'm trying to look a little bit deeper, trying to, you know, weigh all the elements of the equation, you know. But basically, I'm in agreement with you.

[Pozner] (With) time running out, I'd like to have your final views on the following question. I'd like it to be a yes or no answer. Most people don't like that, especially scientists, but I'm still going to have to ask you to do that. Do you think that this proposal from the Soviet Union is going to get, is going to be embodied, is going to be achieved within a relatively short period of time? Do you see this as something that is going to be a factual advance in the area of arms reduction or not?

[Bogdanov] No doubt, yes.

[Pozner] Yes. What about you, Dr Plekhanov?

[Plekhanov] Sixty to forty, yes.

[Pozner] All right. Mr (Scheer)?

[(Scheer)] I was told last night by a high Soviet official that there could be agreement in 2-3 months, and I think if the spirit is willing on the other side it should be concluded in such a time.

[Pozner] What I'm asking you is: Do you think it will be concluded?

[(Scheer)] I do think it will be concluded, because this is after all what the U.S. Government has been asking for. The Soviets have now basically conceded the position of the U.S. Government on this issue. Why shouldn't there be an agreement? Even the French seem to be coming along, and they love these weapons more than anyone for some obscure reason that I can't fathom.

[Pozner] Thank you very much. On that we end this issue of "Top Priority." Be with us a week from today at the same time for our next issue. Vladimir Pozner wishing you all goodbye and good listening.

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CSO: 5200/1347

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR ON U.S. REACTION TO INF PROPOSAL

'Feeling of Suspicion'

LD052055 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1540 GMT 5 Mar 87

[From "The World Today" program presented by Igor Pesunenko]

[Text] Hello comrades, a very interesting situation is now developing within the Moscow-Washington-Geneva triangle. The latest statement of Comrade Gorbachev regarding medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe caused a stream of positive emotions, so to speak, in the whole world. Washington was then forced to react. Reagan's speech on Tuesday, saying he welcomed the statement of the Soviet leader, is already known to you. It has been discussed. The U.S. delegation to Geneva yesterday submitted its draft treaty on medium-range nuclear weapons and now, the leadership of the U.S. delegation is to obtain in Washington additional instructions from the President so that — so to speak, as Reagan him-self said — on its return to Geneva, the U.S. delegation will be able to commence detailed talks on the working out of an agreement on reducing of medium-range nuclear weapons.

It might be possible to consider all this as good signals at the end of a black tunnel, in which at long last can be seen a ray of light, and world is once again indebted to our country for this new gleam of hope. I would talk about all this with the feeling of absolute satisfaction; however, I do not consider that the time to shout hurray and bang the drums has arrived. Still, a certain feeling of suspicion, you know, will not vanish. It has been caused, let us say, by the fact, that following the support for the Soviet initiative, voices reminding then and there about the necessity for strict monitoring [kontroll] and verification [proverka] were heard in the United States and also in Western Europe. This used to happen on more than one occasion when our opponents wanted to pretract the talks or to evade answering clear questions.

Concern is caused also by the fact that an old thesis is heard in some places: If U.S. medium-range missiles are removed from Western Europe, then this continent will remain, so to speak, defenseless in the face of Soviet supremacy — a mythical one, which exists only in the falsified calculations of NATO headquarters, as well as the Soviet supremacy in conventional weapons. In particular, General Rogers, who is finishing his tour as the general commander of the NATO forces, rushed to speak on this topic. [video shows a brief clip of General Rogers speaking]

In a word there appeared to be positive changes in the recent days, but the Cold War warriors have not calmed down and this still gives rise to some anxiety. We shall await further development of events.

Varied Stances

LD051549 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1445 GMT 5 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow, 5 Mar (TASS) — TASS military affairs observer Vladimir Bogachev writes:

U.S. President Ronald Reagan has publicly welcomed the proposal by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on medium-range missiles, saying that Washington is preparing a detailed draft of an appropriate treaty, to be based on a specific formula agreed last October during the summit meeting in Reykjavik.

At the same time and despite the White House statements about the U.S. Administration's desire to follow undeviatingly the formula adopted in Reykjavik, Kenneth Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, points out that a "bitter pill" is being prepared for the USSR. Pentagon chief Caspar Weinberger demands that the U.S. side should depart from the Reykjavik accords, and that it should prevent even a minimal number of Soviet missiles being in Asia.

Reports have appeared in the press to the effect that the U.S. Administration is inclined toward the insertion into the U.S. draft of a clause on "the stiffest demands ever put forward by the United States." The newspaper reports that the United States intends to propose patently unacceptable harsh measures for "verifying compliance with the agreement," which were secretly approved a month ago by Frank Carlucci, the President's national security adviser. A central part of the proposals is to be the inspection of Soviet factories and, as THE WASHINGTON POST puts it, "unprecedented access to secret military bases." The U.S. press has been intensively inflating the issue of allegedly "insuperable complications" regarding the verification of compliance with a future agreement. Richard Perle, Weinberger's assistant and a fierce opponent of any accords with the USSR, has been stating that "verification is not difficult or even not very difficult. It is simply impossible."

While verbally expressing satisfaction at the fact that the Soviet Union is now proposing that the problem of medium-range missiles be separated from the block of questions at the negotiations, Washington officials have straightaway been submitting a demand for a new "NATO package," which would include the problems of conventional arms and armed forces, chemical weapons and so forth. Meanwhile they are well aware that appropriate USSR proposals on these very issues are lying on the negotiating table. These issues can be resolved given the goodwill of NATO leaders, without harming the security of any country.

Any serious talks represent a constant search for mutually acceptable solutions. Arms control negotiations are a search for compromises which would lower the level of military confrontation and would not impinge on the interests of security of the participating countries. The current Washington debates on the Soviet proposals bring to mind the thought that some people within the U.S. Administration are certainly not concerned with finding solutions during the talks but, on the contrary, are striving to erect artificial barriers which would render impossible the implementation of the medium-range missiles accord agreed in Reykjavik.

The U.S. press notes the differences within the U.S. Administration. Thus prominent observer James Reston in an article entitled "Reagan's Last Chance", expresses the opinion that "it would be useful if Ronald Reagan settled the disputes within his cabinet surrounding the issue of control over nuclear arms. He has made the first steps, welcoming Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal. A new approach to the Congress is needed; it is to ratify the agreement that will be concluded."

Using Verification as 'Excuse'

PH091421 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 87 First Edition pp 1, 4

[TASS military observer V. Bogachev article: "Observing the Reykjavik Accords"]

[Text] U.S. President Ronald Reagan has publicly welcomed the proposal by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on medium-range missiles and has announced that Washington has prepared a detailed draft of a corresponding treaty, which would be based on the specific formula agreed upon last October during the Reykjavik summit.

At the same time, U.S. representatives told NATO envoys at a Brussels briefing that Washington will not show any "undue haste" in concluding an agreement. A State Department spokesman officially confirmed the draft presented by the U.S. side at the Geneva talks does not yet contain any U.S. proposals on verifying [proverka] the observance of the agreement. Yet Kenneth Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, claims it is precisely in the sphere of verification [proverka] that the Soviet Union is preparing a "bitter pill."

Reports have appeared in the press that, despite the White House's assurances about its desire to unswervingly follow the formula adopted in Reykjavik, the U.S. Administration is inclined toward including the "toughest demands ever advanced by the United States" in the U.S. draft. The newspapers are claiming that the United States intends to propose deliberately unacceptable measures for verifying [proverka] observance of the agreement — measures which were secretly approved a month ago by Carlucci, the President's new national security adviser. [paragraph continues]

The core of the proposals will be inspection [inspektirovaniye] of Soviet military plants and, as THE WASHINGTON POST put it, "unprecedented access to secret military bases." The U.S. press is earnestly whipping up the question of the alleged "insuperable complexity" of verifying [proverka] observance of a future agreement. Quite recently Richard Perle, a Weinberger aide and an unmitigated opponent of any accords with the USSR, stated: "Verification [proverka] is not even very difficult. It is simply impossible." Such a cynical formulation of the issue is clearly aimed at calling into question the very possibility of reaching any accord.

In this regard it is apposite to recall the United States has repeatedly used the verification [proverka] problem as an excuse to abandon agreements with the Soviet Union. Washington has rejected Soviet proposals on verification [kontrol], including those on on-site inspection [proverka na mestakh], and initiatives on the use of international inspection [inspeksiya] in the past too.

The Soviet Union is more, not less, interested than the United States in establishing reliable verification [kontrol] of the observance of agreements. The USSR has always fulfilled its international commitments. Soviet leaders have officially announced that verification [kontrol] of the observance of agreements is not a problem for the USSR. The Soviet side is prepared to embark on the most far-reaching verification [proverka] measures, including on-site inspection [inspeksiya] whenever necessary. However, verification [kontrol] is not an end in itself, much less should it be used as an obstacle to reaching agreement. Verification [kontrol] should promote the strengthening of the sides' confidence rather than the creation of undue suspicion.

While voicing satisfaction that the Soviet Union is now proposing to separate the problem of medium-range missiles from the rest of the issues at the talks, Washington officials have immediately demanded a new "NATO package" which, apart from medium-range missiles, would include the problems of shorter-range missiles, conventional arms and armed forces, chemical weapons, and so forth. Yet they are well aware that corresponding Soviet proposals on these very questions -- which, given good will on the part of the NATO leaders, could be resolved without harming the security of any country -- are on the negotiating table.

Any serious talks are an untiring quest for mutually acceptable solutions. Arms control talks are a quest for compromises which would reduce the level of military confrontation without violating the national security interests of the participating countries. The present debate in Washington on the Soviet proposals leads one to conclude that some people in the U.S. Administration are by no means concerned to find solutions at the talks but, on the contrary, are striving to erect artificial barriers which would make it impossible to implement the accord reached at Reykjavik on medium-range missiles.

The disagreements within the U.S. Administration are also being noted by the U.S. press. Thus, in an article entitled "Reagan's Last Chance" the prominent observer James Reston expresses the opinion that "it would be useful if Ronald Reagan settled the disputes in his cabinet on nuclear arms control. He has taken the first few steps in welcoming M.S. Gorbachev's proposal. A new approach needs to be made to Congress, which will have to ratify any agreement that is reached."

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CSO: 5200/1347

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR COMMENTS TO FOREIGN PRESS ON INF

Delegation to UK

LD051746 Moscow, TASS in English 1734 GMT 5 Mar 87

[Text] London March 5 TASS -- The Soviet delegation led by Academician Yevgeniy Primakov, director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, who had arrived here at the invitation of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London to attend a "round-table" meeting, today gave a press conference.

Questions from journalists about the statement of Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, bespoke a positive attitude to the Soviet initiative for the immediate conclusion of a separate agreement on medium-range missiles. The Soviet delegation noted that there existed for such a step not merely a basis but a ready-to-sign agreement: It had been agreed in Reykjavik that the USSR and the U.S. would abolish all their medium-range missiles in Europe within five years.

The members of the delegation also drew attention to the fact that as soon as an agreement on the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe was signed, the USSR would withdraw from the GDR and Czechoslovakia, by agreement with the governments of those countries, the long-range theatre missiles deployed there as a countermeasure to the stationing of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe. The USSR, contrary to the allegations made by some quarters in the West, is also prepared to enter talks on the reduction and total elimination of other theatre missiles, as Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, noted in his statement. At the same time the USSR is by no means avoiding the issue of conventional arms.

One of the journalists attempted to link the timing of the Soviet statement to the U.S. domestic political situation.

The Soviet Union has no intention of influencing that situation or exploiting it in any way for its own purposes, the members of the delegation stressed.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR'S VORONTSOV PARIS NEWS CONFERENCE ON INF PROPOSAL.

Vremya Report

LDC71928 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 7 Mar 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A news conference took place in Paris dedicated to the new Soviet peace initiatives:

[A. Potapov, identified by screen caption] This news conference in the Soviet Embassy in Paris has drawn the most intent attention from the press, that of French journalists and of foreign correspondent - credited in the French capital. This interest is understandable: Comrade Vorontsov, leader of the Soviet delegation at the talks with the United States in Geneva, SR first deputy foreign affairs minister, is meeting journalists. The subject is the new Soviet initiative to liquidate within the next 5 years U.S. and USSR medium-range missiles in Europe. Cameras of two French television programs, three major U.S. television companies and television teams from other countries are covering it. Comrade Vorontsov has just arrived in Paris from Geneva where another round of the Soviet-American talks has ended. [video shows journalists and cameramen in a hall]

[Begin recording] [Vorontsov] The United States has responded to our proposals by submitting its own draft treaty on medium-range missiles based completely on the accord reached in Reykjavik. No doubt, we have a lot of work to do, the work for developing [vyrabotka] the text of a treaty that could be signed in the near future. There has been no such treaty or agreement so far, that is a treaty on a cardinal reduction in the most important nuclear arms -- medium-range arms. These all are very powerful types of arms and their liquidation in Europe will be a historical step; a historical one, I repeat, for as we envisage it, the liquidation of so many and such complex and terrible arms in front of the whole world will be the first event of this level in the world. This event will change by itself, we think, the psychology of people of the world. This will become a proof of the fact that nuclear disarmament is possible. I personally think the act of signing such a treaty will become an extraordinary event in the world, and not in Europe alone. [video shows Vorontsov speaking] [end recording]

[Potapov] Journalists asked Comrade Vorontsov many questions concerning the new Soviet initiative. What about official Paris? It is well known the French Foreign Ministry and the minister himself opposed sharply, at first, the idea of liquidating medium-range missiles in Europe, alleging that this threatens the security of the West. When it transpired that many Western governments are taking positive stands and after President Reagan spoke, France found itself isolated so to speak among its own allies and a kind of correction from French ruling circles became necessary, and statements from President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Chirac followed. Journalists were interested in the Soviet response to the French position. [video shows journalists and Potapov]

[Begin recording] [Vorontsov] The French president and prime minister have supported the idea of concluding a treaty on the liquidation of medium-range missiles in Europe. Therefore, I do not see any complications with France on this issue between the United States and Soviet Union negotiating and France, from the other side [as heard] [mezhdu peregovarivayushchimisya soedinenymi shtatami i sovetskimi Soyuzami Frantsiей a drugoy storony]. [video shows Vorontsov]

[Potapov] But there are nuclear missiles in both France and England, what about them? [Video shows a journalist asking a question]

[Vorontsov] When we are talking about the complete liquidation of nuclear arms in Europe, then there will be, to an extent, a question of the nuclear arms that both France and Great Britain possess. I would like to remind you that both France and Great Britain have not only strategic arms but also arms of a shorter range than strategic ones. Of course, from the point of view of the opposition of the two military blocs -- France is not a member of a military bloc, while England is -- this will have a considerable importance, [video shows Vorontsov answering] [end recording]

[Potapov] The Paris news conference has highlighted for Western media the clear, lucid and consistent policy of the Soviet side in the area of nuclear disarmament.

Reciprocal Verification Emphasized

LD062251 Moscow World Service in English 2200 GMT 6 Mar 87

[Text] The chief Soviet negotiator at the Geneva talks with the United States on nuclear and space weapons, Yuli Vorontsov, has said the USSR is ready to accept any system of verification of the future agreement with the United States on medium-range missiles in Europe. At a press conference in Paris Yuli Vorontsov also pointed out that verification should be strictly reciprocal.

'Exuded Optimism'

PM091610 Paris LE MONDE in French 8-9 Mar 87 p 3

[Alain Jacob report: "A Treaty Should Be Signed This Summer"]

[Text] Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov arrived in Paris on Friday 6 March where he immediately gave a news conference at the embassy. He is due to return to Moscow in the middle of next week after his talks with the French leaders.

Mr Vorontsov exuded optimism. The head of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva negotiations, who had come to Paris for consultations -- he is due to meet with Foreign Minister Raimond, Prime Minister Chirac, and perhaps with President Mitterrand -- said that an agreement on the total withdrawal of the intermediate nuclear forces (INF) -- the USSR SS-20 missiles and the U.S. Pershing and Cruise missiles -- was virtually certain. The experts still have work to do because the "technical work" is particularly complex given that there has never before been agreement on "the liquidation of such a quantity of such powerful weapons."

It is the "destruction" of the missiles concerned -- starting with the nuclear warheads -- which is being discussed. Where will the missiles retained by both sides be retained? On the Soviet side, they will be east of the Urals; and on the U.S. side the location still has to be discussed. What about verification problems? The USSR is more demanding on this subject; the United States will have to adopt legislation authorizing the inspection of any sites situated on private property. There is no such problem in the Soviet Union. At all events, rapid progress must be made. The final details must not take "more than 3 or 4 months" so an agreement in due form is ready to be signed "in the summer."

When did the USSR accept the principle of such an agreement on the i ?? "In Reykjavik of course...." That is not entirely true because, after Reykjavik, the Soviets refused to agree to anything but a "package" including the strategic nuclear forces and, more especially, severe restrictions on U.S. research in the "Star Wars" sphere. What has changed since then? Mr Vorontsov disputed the fact that there has been any "change." However, he consented there was a "danger of allowing things to drag on." An agreement on the INF might prove to be "a stimulus to negotiations in other spheres." It is necessary to "start at one end."

The French and British Forces [subhead]

Things look less favorable in these "other spheres": short-range nuclear missiles, central systems (strategic forces), chemical and conventional weapons, and, of course, space weapons, the main problem in this sphere being a "consolidation of the ABM Treaty." The Soviet negotiator has the feeling that his U.S. interlocutors" do not really know what they want," but he hopes that it will be possible to make progress "in Geneva in early April." He stressed "we are prepared for serious negotiations, it all depends on the United States."

Questioned several times on the inclusion of the French and British nuclear forces, Mr Vorontsov gave several new details:

1 -- These forces are completely separate from the draft agreement on the INF. The Soviet diplomat noted with satisfaction that this is the interpretation made by the French president and prime minister. He preferred to "refrain from criticizing" the viewpoint expressed by Defense Minister Andre Giraud, who spoke of a "Munich." "It is time we realized," he simply said, "that we must live without the bomb, we must overcome the bomb mentality."

2 -- With regard to the French and British tactical nuclear weapons, it will be difficult not to take them into account in the framework of negotiations on the reduction -- and possible elimination -- of Soviet and American short-range nuclear missiles (with a range of less than 1,000km) in Europe.

3 -- Finally the French and British strategic forces, although included in the "zero system," would not form part of the negotiations on a 50-percent reduction in the Soviet and U.S. strategic forces (envisioned by Mr Gorbachev in January 1986 and to be achieved within 5 years). On the other hand, they could not be left out of the second phase of these negotiations aimed at the total elimination of all nuclear forces in Europe.

Mr Vorontsov, who was perfectly "calm and collected" to cite his own description, reaffirmed that Mr Gorbachev's objective is a completely nuclear-free world by the year 2000. He admitted it is necessary to take the "psychological factor" into account. In his view, this 13-year period is "amply long enough to change people's attitudes."

'Agreement Before Summer'

PM100844 Paris LE FIGARO in French 7-8 Mar 87 p 2

[Stephane Marchand report: "Yuliy Vorontsov: An Agreement Before Summer"]

[Text] Yuliy Vorontsov, head of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva nuclear disarmament negotiations, yesterday reported on progress toward the signing of an agreement on the dismantling of the Euromissiles. In a news conference which he gave in Paris, he also said that his country was prepared for full reciprocal verification of such an agreement.

Mr Vorontsov said that an agreement could be reached before next summer. He justified this delay by the extreme technical complexity of the treaty's terms. He said he is very optimistic about the future of the negotiations and expressed the view that "this agreement will change the attitude of men on the planet; it will prove that nuclear disarmament is possible."

The Soviet negotiator devoted a significant part of his speech to the verification problem: "Hitherto this question has been the result of a Western initiative against the Soviet Union. This will change. We are very interested in this question and the West will have to get used to that fact."

"With regard to verification, the USSR will take the "offensive" Mr Vorontsov said, because "we want to be sure that the United States keeps its pledges." [quotation marks as published] "We demand access to all bases, all depots, and all places where these missiles are located," in Europe and the United States, he said, including "private manufacturing enterprises," if necessary asking the U.S. Administration to pass "special legislation" to guarantee this right.

Coversely, the United States will have the same rights to inspect Soviet SS-20 sites and installations, he explained.

A Residual Arsenal [subhead]

In the chemical weapons sphere, he asked the Western countries to authorize checks in all enterprises -- public or private -- involved in producing them.

While specifying that the current discussion on the Euromissiles do not relate to the French and British nuclear arsenals, he did not rule out the possibility of them being included in later talks with the Americans on strategic arms.

Regarding the Soviet short-range missiles (less than 1,000km) deployed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, Mr Vorontsov repeated that they will be withdrawn as soon as agreement is reached on the Euromissiles.

Under the terms of the draft agreement on the Euromissiles, each of the two superpowers could keep 100 nuclear warheads mounted on intermediate-range missiles on its own territory. The USSR would deploy its missiles in Asia, and this has already caused concern in the PRC.

The United States, which would like to impose the existence of a single base for this residual arsenal, and which would be willing to construct such a base in Alaska, did not receive Mr Vorontsov's approval: "We will find a place for their Pershing missiles which interests us." On the other hand, he said it was up to each side to decide the nature of this residual arsenal. The Americans will, therefore, be able to maintain a mixture of Pershing-2 missiles (with a range of 1,800km) and cruise missiles (with a range of 2,500km).

Is the USSR taking advantage of President Reagan's weaker position as a result of "Irangate" to "force" the pace of the negotiations? Yuliy Vorontsov swore that "Washington's domestic affairs do not interest it" and his country is not motivated by the desire to sign at all costs before the U.S. President's term ends.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR REPORTS FOREIGN REACTION TO INF PROPOSAL

Nakasone, Gotoda on Plan

LD020946 Moscow TASS in English 0807 GMT 2 Mar 87

[Text] Tokyo March 2 TASS -- The Japanese Government has assessed Mikhail Gorbachev's recent statement as a step towards nuclear disarmament and peace around the world, Masaharu Gotoda, general secretary of the cabinet of ministers, said today.

He told Japanese newsmen that the reduction of medium-range missiles in Asia was a positive element in the Soviet proposals.

Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone today once again stressed the great importance of the initiative, telling journalists that these proposals would facilitate dialogue. The Soviet stance was positive, Nakasone said.

Reagan on 'Breakthrough'

LD052158 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2125 GMT [no date given]
Mar 87

[Text] Washington, 6 March (TASS) -- Addressing members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors on Thursday, President Reagan described the Soviet proposal to examine the issue of an agreement on intermediate-range missiles separately from the other spheres of arms control [kontrol nad vooruzhennyami] as "a huge breakthrough." He stated that he will be meeting the leaders of the U.S. delegation at the USSR-U.S. negotiations in Geneva, Kampelman, Leman and Glitman, as early as Friday and will discuss with them "the U.S. response to the Soviet statement." At the same time, Reagan again proclaimed the United States determination to continue implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Yugoslavia: 'Timely,' 'Correct'

LD051909 Moscow TASS in English 1816 GMT 5 Mar 87

[Text] Belgrade March 5 TASS -- The proposal of Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, for the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe is a timely and correct move, Aleksandr Stanic, an official spokesman for the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, said at a press conference here.

Answering a question from TASS correspondent Anatoliy Bocharov, he said that the conclusion of a separate agreement on this problem would be a major contribution to the relaxation of tension, the improvement of the international situation and the strengthening of security in Europe and all over the world. It would mark a turning point towards the adoption of other agreements on the limitation of strategic armaments, the elimination of all the other weapons of mass annihilation and the prevention of the militarisation of space. Yugoslavia believes that the Soviet Union and the United States will show goodwill and use the opportunity to conclude an accord proposed by the Soviet Union. It would be a good response to the appeal of the 8th conference of the heads of state and government of nonaligned countries in Harare to the leaders of the two great powers to make efforts to achieve disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, Aleksandr Stanic said.

PZPR Approval

LD051152 Moscow TASS in English 1100 GMT 5 Mar 87

[Text] Warsaw March 5 TASS -- The Politburo of the Polish United Workers' Party has welcomed Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal for concluding an agreement on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe, says a report on the Politburo's meeting, out today:

The latest Soviet peace initiative fully corresponded with Poland's foreign policy activity toward defusing international tension.

The Polish communists approve of the USSR's large-scale plans to limit and cut armaments with a view to reducing as low as possible the level of the rough balance of forces in Europe.

Praise From Zhivkov

LD042135 Moscow TASS in English 1921 GMT 4 Mar 87

[Text] Sofia March 4 TASS -- The latest Soviet peace initiative spelled out in the statement by Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev is part and parcel of the history-making programme of the USSR and its allies for the creation of a comprehensive international security system. This was stressed by Todor Zhivkov, general secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee, chairman of the Bulgarian Council of State, in answer to the request of the editorial board of the newspaper RABOTNICHESKO DELO to comment on the statement by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee on the elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

There is no doubt that in advancing the fresh noble initiative, the Soviet Union was guided by the wish to revive the spirit of Reykjavik, to give a fresh powerful impetus to the Soviet-American talks on curbing the weapons race, ultimate and irrevocable elimination of mass destruction weapons in the name of the loftiest and most humane aim -- saving civilisation and life on Earth. The people and government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria ardently welcome and support the proposal put forward by general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee as fresh proof of the sincerity, far-sightedness and dynamism of Soviet foreign policy, as an example of new political thinking and a new approach, Todor Zhivkov emphasized.

Shishlin on Reaction

LD100650 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1745 CMT 9 Mar 87

[Commentary by International Affairs journalist Nikolay Shishlin from the "International Diary" program, presented by Nikolay Agayants]

[Text] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement and the new position adopted by the Soviet Union regarding medium-range missiles has evoked lively comment in political and public circles. Although the reaction has been varied on the whole, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of politicians and public figures welcome the bold Soviet initiative. They can see in this initiative a real opportunity to come, fairly quickly, to mutually acceptable decisions and to free Europe of nuclear medium-range missiles. (It is difficult) to surmise how quickly the Geneva talks can progress and how quickly mutually acceptable solutions can be found. In this connection, one cannot but draw attention to individual statements by politicians, both European and American, in which even now all kinds of provisos are being made regarding the absolutely clear concept upon which, incidentally, an accord has already been reached at Reykjavik.

What sort of provisos are they? Well, they are provisos which maintain that, say, the Soviet Union has an advantage in Europe in conventional weapons; then before tackling the problem of medium-range weapons one should solve the question of conventional weapons. Then there is another proviso, that the question of monitoring the implementation of this concept and a possible Soviet-U.S. agreement will be very complex. Here again the Soviet position is well known -- that is, that we are in favor of the strictest monitoring if we are talking about radical solutions.

I do not think, of course, that the road ahead is an easy one, and our diplomats face difficult enough work at the negotiating table. Yet, the overall political atmosphere promises a real breakthrough in one of the key issues of international life: the issue of restricting and curtailing the arms race. It is not only the scrapping of medium-range missiles in Europe that will be valuable, but also the introduction of the missing elements of trust in international relations and the opening up of new horizons on the way to a nuclear-free world without violence.

/8309
CSO: 5200/1347

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

LE SOIR ASSESSES GORBACHEV ARMS PROPOSAL

PH051220 Brussels LE SOIR in French 3 Mar 87 p 4

[Pierre Lefevre article: "Satisfaction and Fears in Europe"]

[Text] Mr Gorbachev's proposal touches one of the most sensitive chords of defense policy in Western Europe. When the Soviet leader once again linked the reduction of intermediate-range missiles on the continent to a broader agreement including space defense at the Reykjavik meeting, the European capitals made no secret of their disappointment. They thought that meant an end to the only realistic prospect of disarmament for which they could hope in the short term and above all the reason which would have enabled them to go no further with the unpopular deployment of the American Euromissiles.

This hope has now been restored to them and it is easy to understand the satisfaction with which the Kremlin's new offer was received. This is particularly true because this offer comes just at the right time to boost the desperate efforts being made by the European leaders to bring about a change of course in Washington and restore the initiative to the diplomats as opposed to the Pentagon "hawks" who are anxious to get the strategic defense initiative into orbit at the expense of the ABM Treaty.

However, the prospect of a forthcoming agreement on the elimination of the Euromissiles is not without danger for Western Europe. First, in the strategic sphere, it could bring us back to the situation which prevailed before the deployment of the cruise and Pershing-2 missiles and which worried Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. The Soviet SS-20 missiles would certainly have disappeared from the European scene. However, there would still be around 100 of them in Asia, which would be easier to move in our direction than the equivalent U.S. warheads deployed in Alaska. But the main problem lies in Soviet conventional superiority which would no longer be countered by any form of nuclear deterrent on the European theater.

It is particularly important to establish how willing the Soviets would be to dismantle their shorter-range missiles — the SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 missiles — which, given their range which covers the FRG and the Benelux countries in particular, can destroy most of NATO's strategic sites in Europe. These missiles, which can be armed with nuclear or conventional warheads and which are very accurate, would even be particularly effective in a future war which Moscow would like to limit to the Old Continent.

Of course, Mr Gorbachev has offered to withdraw some missiles deployed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia in response to the deployment of the cruise and Pershing-2 missiles. But the existing imbalance in this sphere is, according to NATO experts, one to nine in the USSR's favor and it would take more than the Kremlin's goodwill to restore some balance.

Since last weekend, London and Paris must also have been wondering whether, with a "zero option" in the Euromissile sphere, the USSR will still agree to exclude the French and British nuclear forces when calculating the two superpowers' nuclear arsenals or whether the relative autonomy of the two medium-sized powers will be sacrificed to a Soviet-American agreement.

Whatever happens — and this is another possible effect of the Soviet offer — Atlantic unity might suffer. Not only has Mr Gorbachev succeeded in making a favorable impression on European public opinion at a time when his U.S. rival is caught between the shadows of Irangate and the lightning of "Star Wars."

But, above all, the withdrawal of the Euromissiles would remove one of the links between the two sides of the Atlantic. Indeed the presence of the cruise and Pershing-2 missiles, in addition to the 350,000 U.S. soldiers stationed in Europe, provide our countries with an assurance that the United States would stand by us in case of a Soviet attack. Washington has been thinking a great deal recently about reducing the number of U.S. troops based in Europe. The elimination of the American Euromissiles would leave us even more alone.

The prospect of an armed conflict with the USSR is scarcely uppermost in people's minds today. But although we cannot rule out a real desire by the Soviet leader to reduce tension between the two sides of the Old Continent, we cannot rule out the hypothesis that they are trying to divide the Western world a little more, and that would not be a new development.

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CSO: 5200/2505

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

YUGOSLAV COMMENTATOR ON USSR'S EUROMISSTILES PROPOSAL

LD021642 Zagreb Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1400 CNT 2 Mar 87

[Milika Sundic commentary]

[Text] Our foreign political commentary today deals with relations between the big powers following new Soviet arms limitation efforts. Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal to remove medium-range missiles from Europe could mean a renewal of the dialogue with Reagan. Here is a commentary on this by Milika Sundic:

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's latest proposal, which relates to the liquidation of medium-range missiles in Europe, has justifiably been assessed as a basic step forward. The significance of Gorbachev's proposal lies in the fact that it separates the problem of medium-range missiles from those posed by other types of weapons, such as intercontinental missiles and Star Wars. Moscow is proposing that the USSR and the United States liquidate all medium-range weapons in Europe. This, in turn, implies the withdrawal of Soviet operational tactical weapons -- which have a great range -- from the GDR and the CSSR. Remember that the USSR deployed operational tactical weapons in the GDR and the CSSR in response to the siting of U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles in several Western European countries. The bulk of these weapons are in the FRG.

While Washington's final attitude toward Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal is not yet reliably known, and although initial reactions have been positive the general view in the world is that the Soviet initiative represents a rare opportunity to break the deadlock at the Soviet-U.S. negotiations in Geneva on the reduction and limitation of nuclear missiles and the demilitarization of space. On the other hand, the Soviet initiative could lead to significant changes in superpower relations, and possibly to a resumption of dialogue at the highest level. The news that U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, who is on an official visit to China, could soon visit Moscow for talks with his Soviet counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze, on relations between the two powers and by implication, on the renewal of dialogue at the highest level, leads one to the same conclusion. It should be recalled that as early as their first meeting in Geneva, Reagan and Gorbachev agreed in principle that Gorbachev would visit the United States and that President Reagan would visit Moscow. However, these trips could not take place, as there were a series of disagreements in the interim affecting superpowers relations on the question of disarmament. These problems were expressed most strongly at the Reykjavik meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan.

Naturally, the fate of the latest Soviet initiative depends most of all on America's reaction. Should the reactions from Western Europe be positive, the United States could come up with counterproposals which, in essence, do not reject the latest Soviet

approach to the problem of medium-range missiles, as it is very positive on the whole. The chances of a guaranteed improvement in the climate of Soviet-U.S. relations could be helped by British Prime Minister Thatcher's upcoming visit to Moscow. As is known, her views on East-West relations have a significant impact on President Reagan's overall international policy, on his policy toward the USSR most of all.

Moscow's latest proposals will surely end the impasse over disarmament -- no small matter once one realizes what the world would face should the unbridled arms race continue.

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CSO: 5200/3004

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TOKYO PRESS WELCOMES GORBACHEV EUROPEAN NUCLEAR LIMIT PROPOSAL

Nakasone Welcomes Proposal

0W020339 Tokyo KYODO in English 0334 GMT 2 Mar 87

[Text] Tokyo, March 2 KYODO — Prime Minister Yashuhiro Nakasone welcomed Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's new proposal on missile reductions Monday morning and said it gave added impetus to the government's wish for Gorbachev to make an official visit to Japan.

Nakasone said he welcomed the Moscow proposal, announced Saturday night, because it showed a positive attitude and would help promote dialogue.

He made the remarks when asked by reporters to comment on the new Soviet proposal, which singled out the problem of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe from a package of arms control issues and suggested that a separate agreement be concluded on it. Nakasone had welcomed Gorbachev's proposal Sunday in his first comment on the Soviet leader's move.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotoda also told reporters Monday morning that the government regards Gorbachev's proposal as a step forward toward world nuclear disarmament and peace.

While Japan welcomes the Soviet proposal, which also calls for reduction of intermediate range nuclear missiles in Asia, it will continue to demand the early removal of all INF [Intermediate Nuclear Force] missiles from Asia, chief government spokesman Gotoda said.

Asked about the impact of the Soviet proposals on the long-standing invitation for Gorbachev to visit Japan, Gotoda said it was difficult to make an immediate assessment, but he said Japan would welcome it if Moscow made a positive reply on the schedule for such a visit.

Ministry Official Comments

0W021145 Tokyo KYODO in English 1135 GMT 2 Mar 87

[Text] Tokyo, March 2 KYODO — A senior Foreign Ministry official said Monday that a recent fresh arms control proposal made by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev can be a step forward toward disarmament, but he said he does not regard the proposal as a big Soviet "policy change" or "concession." He also said the new attitude will provide a favorable effect on Gorbachev's pending visit to Japan.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union are certain to want no expansion of the arms race and they are trying to seek a solution for the reduction of nuclear arms rather than becoming further opposed on the matter, the official, who refused to be identified by name, said. Soviet's proposal to an agreement on intermediate nuclear force (INF) apart from SDI meant a Soviet return to the issue before the Reykjavik meeting between Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan, and the INF was one of the agenda items in arms control talks on which both countries could reach an agreement, he said.

Observing the overall trend, the Soviet proposal is a positive step but could not be regarded as "a big policy change" or "concession" on the part of the Soviets, the official said.

INF is only an agenda item in the U.S.-Soviet talks which also discuss reduction in strategic nuclear arms, SDI and nuclear tests, the official said, showing also concern for the existence of European worry over conventional weapons in Europe and the leftover of INF in Asia.

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CSO: 5260/076

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

NIGERIAN PAPERS REACT TO SOVIET DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL

VANGUARD, NIGERIAN TIDE Urge U.S. Cooperation

AB040741 Lagos Domestic Service in English 0600 GMT 4 Mar 87

[From the press review]

[Text] The VANGUARD is alarmed over the renewed intensification of the nuclear race between the United States and the Soviet Union and among the world's established nuclear powers. The paper says the enormous human, financial, and technical resources expended on the acquisition of the weapons could be better used to fight hunger, ignorance, and disease in developing countries. This, according to the VANGUARD, would make the international community a safer place to live in.

In a related editorial, the NIGERIAN TIDE welcomes the latest disarmament proposal by the Soviet Union as the way to reach accords with the United States on mutual reduction in the number of medium-range missiles stationed in Europe. The paper believes that the proposal offers yet another opportunity for the United States and her NATO allies to turn around and face the issue of disarmament with a cautious approach.

STATESMAN Hails Arms Reduction Proposal

AB051113 Lagos Domestic Service in English 0600 GMT 5 Mar 87

[From the press review]

[Text] The STATESMAN welcomes the latest arms proposal by the Soviet Union aimed at securing an arms reduction treaty with the United States. The paper sees the proposal as one that every peace-loving nation should give a favorable consideration. It therefore calls on the United States, Britain, and their allies to make something positive out of the Soviet gesture. The STATESMAN concludes by saying that the future of mankind depends on how well the super-powers cooperate in this regard.

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CSO: 5200/2

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BRIEFS

MOSCOW: REPRESENTATIVES CONTINUE TALKS Soviet and U.S. representatives are continuing talks in Geneva today on the recent USSR proposal for concluding without delay an agreement on eliminating Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. Last week both sides expressed optimism regarding the possibility of success in the dialogue. [Text] [Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 10 Mar 87] /8309

GORBACHEV PROPOSAL RELEASED AT UN—New York March 5 TASS—The United Nations has released the text of a statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, as an official document of the General Assembly and the U.N. Security Council. The statement, made on February 28 this year, concerns medium-range missiles in Europe. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1650 GMT 5 Mar 87] /8309

CSO: 5200/1347

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR, U.S. CW TALKS 16 FEBRUARY-5 MARCH

Talks in General

LD052150 Moscow TASS in English 2143 GMT 5 Mar 87

[Text] Geneva TASS -- Soviet-American consultations on all the aspects of the problem of concluding an effective and controllable convention on the universal and complete banning of chemical weapons were held here from February 16 to March 5.

The Soviet side was represented at the consultations by Yuriy Nazarkin, head of the Soviet delegation at the disarmament conference. The American side was represented by Lyn Hansen, acting head of the U.S. delegation at the disarmament conference.

Nazarkin: U.S. Hindering Talks

LD051903 Moscow TASS in English 1848 GMT 5 Mar 87

[Text] Geneva March 5 TASS -- TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Korzhev reports:

The issue of prohibition of chemical weapons occupies a special place at the current session of the conference on disarmament. Many delegations believe that agreement on a relevant international convention can be reached as early as this year. This idea was expressed by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Kenya, Nigeria and Yugoslavia at the recent meetings.

Also Pugliese, head of the delegation of Italy, said today that the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction was an important task in eyes of all countries.

As to verification difficulties, they should be surmounted in the spirit of cooperation and goodwill. In this respect the Italian delegation considers the Soviet proposals tabled in mid-February to be useful, he said.

Yuriy Nazarkin, head of the delegation of the U.S.S.R., today made a number of additional remarks on individual aspects of the proposed convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The purpose of this move is to ensure an early agreement of its text.

At the same time the Soviet representative noted that the U.S. delegation was making efforts to hinder the talks and to evade the search for mutually beneficial agreements, while the Soviet Union demonstrated a constructive approach and was making efforts to bring the positions closer together and find solutions to various complicated issues.

Nazarkin said that the Soviet Union was a principled advocate of an early and complete elimination of chemical weapons and the industrial base for their manufacture and for that reason called upon other parties to the talks to make necessary steps to contribute to their successful completion.

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CSO: 5200/1337

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR'S MIKHAYLOV ADDRESSES MBFR PLENARY MEETING

LD051147 Moscow TASS in English 1058 GMT 5 Mar 87

[Text] Vienna March 5 TASS -- V.V. Mikhaylov, head of the Soviet delegation to the talks on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, addressed a plenary meeting of the talks here today.

He drew the attention of the parties to the talks to the statement made by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on February 28, 1987 in which the Soviet Union proposed to single out the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe from the package of issues discussed in Reykjavik and to conclude a separate agreement on that problem without delay.

The Soviet representative emphasized the importance of the new major Soviet initiative going in the direction of the practical implementation of the Soviet program for the stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. He also noted that an agreement on medium-range missiles would mean such a change in the international situation which would give an impetus to the talks and to the search for mutually acceptable solutions in other areas of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament, including the domain of conventional weapons.

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CSO: 5200/1349

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

MOSCOW COMMENTS ON MBFR TALKS

LD201834 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1540 GMT 19 Feb 87

[Commentary by Boris Dmitriyevich Pyadishev, doctor of history and first deputy chief of the information administration of the USSR Foreign Ministry: "Who Benefits From Ignoring the Soviet Peace Initiatives in the Sphere of Conventional and Chemical Weapons?"]

[Text] The Moscow forum for a nuclear-free world and the survival of humanity clearly showed the depth of understanding in the world of the need for energetic and coordinated efforts aimed at averting the threat of war, and the depth of understanding of the need for joint urgent actions aimed at reducing and limiting armaments including conventional weapons.

And so, the problem of conventional weapons: The conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee which took place in Budapest last summer put forward a program for a large-scale reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. But how did the NATO states reply to this joint proposal from the socialist states? One must say straight out that the Brussels Declaration adopted at the recent session of the NATO Council produces a rather grave impression. The NATO documents do not provide any solutions to the problems of limiting armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe.

While the Warsaw Pact countries are proposing that a specific and earnest start should be made on reductions, which would be considerable with precisely defined timetables, in ground forces and tactical aviation on the European continent and also on reducing operational-tactical nuclear weapons, the Atlantic states--if one reads their documents attentively--are proposing a different path. They are inclined toward the path of mutual complaints and accusations, the path of fruitless polemics.

Of course, Moscow and the capitals of the other allied socialist states have carefully studied the documents of the Brussels session of the NATO Council. Consultations are being held between the allies in the Warsaw Pact. However, it is already clear that an improvement in resolving the problem of conventional weapons in Europe requires the genuine readiness of the NATO countries to

adopt a serious approach to this. We have grounds to doubt the sincerity of NATO's intentions. So far there is no indication that the NATO supreme commander is prepared to meet his counterpart in the Warsaw Pact. NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington is also refusing to hold discussions with a plenipotentiary representative of the Warsaw Pact organization.

True, in the past few days things seem to have started to change. At France's suggestion, meetings are to be held on this question in the next few days between representatives of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic bloc in Vienna. But it is noteworthy that in Washington and other NATO capitals fabrications have again been dragged out concerning the imaginary superiority of the Warsaw Pact over NATO in conventional weapons.

This time this multipurpose argument is being used to justify the West's unwillingness to resolve the problems of reducing weapons in Europe, both conventional and nuclear ones.

To speak about the essence of the question, about the correlation of armed forces and conventional weapons between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, it must be said that there exists an approximate balance. Of course, this does not mean total equality in the number of troop formations and weapons. The armed forces of each of the sides have their own structure and organization whose particular qualities must be taken into consideration in calculating the correlation of forces. A purely arithmetical approach leads only to a distortion of the real picture. But the real picture is this: The NATO bloc exceeds the Warsaw Pact organization in the total number of personnel, in the number of combat-ready divisions, in antitank weapons; it has approximately equal amounts of artillery and armored equipment. The North Atlantic alliance has superiority in fighter-bombers which the Warsaw Pact compensates for with a slightly larger number of air-defense interceptor fighters.

Reference is made, for example, to the fact that the USSR has a greater number of ground forces divisions than the United States. This is so. But this is natural because of the geographical position of the USSR. We have to secure our defense not only from NATO in Europe but also along the whole length of the border which totals 67,000 km including about 20,000 km of land borders. If one computes an objective total, then we have an approximately equal balance of forces. This is admitted by the authoritative London Institute of Strategic Research. In its latest publication it writes: The military balance in conventional forces remains such that it makes general military aggression extremely risky for either of the sides. The U.S. secretary of state also admitted this in his speech to the National Press Club. He said: When they say that if our world becomes nuclear-free and only conventional forces remain, we will be outstripped I simply do not believe this. Well, Mr Shultz is quite correct not to believe this because the USSR does not intend to outstrip the United States either in nuclear or in conventional weapons. We have a different aim: disarmament.

Those who oppose moving on to specific talks try to present matters as if the uncompleted nature of the talks now being conducted in Vienna on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe does not allow discussions to be started on an all-European scale. What can one say in this connection? The socialist countries have frequently reaffirmed their interest in achieving a positive result at the Vienna talks. There are no objective obstacles to this. The positions of the sides in Vienna have come considerably closer together in particular as far as the size of reductions and the freezing of the remaining armed forces is concerned. Now only one thing is lacking: the political will to reach accord on the part of the representatives of NATO who persist in making absurdly increased demands for monitoring [kontrol]. If one adopts an approach based on reason and responsibility, then it is possible to reach an agreement in Vienna without delay and to move on to resolving large-scale tasks of reducing armaments and armed forces in Europe as a whole as proposed by the socialist countries.

The question is asked: At what forum should the discussions on the problem of conventional disarmament in Europe be conducted? The Warsaw Pact states are not insisting on the adoption of only one forum of their preference. In coming out in favor of discussing these problems at the Stockholm conference, at its second stage, they proceed not only from the fact that there already exists a negotiating body which is functioning successfully and at which all European states, the United States, and Canada are represented. The very mandate of the conference which was agreed in 1983 in Madrid envisions the discussion of European disarmament problems at it. Therefore, Stockholm-2 is the most suitable forum to resolve the tasks of reducing armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe.

Now, at the meeting of representatives of member states of the all-European process conducted in Vienna, Poland put forward a concrete proposal in connection with this on behalf of the allied socialist states. It envisages an addition to the mandate of the Stockholm conference, in the sense that measures connected with disarmament will be discussed at the second stage of the Stockholm conference, parallel with measures for strengthening trust and security. Thereby, all the continental states will be participating in deciding the whole complex of questions for reinforcing security in Europe.

Of course, we are naturally ready to listen to constructive opinions and proposals of other participants of the all-European process. Our proposal about conducting active contacts and consultations with the NATO countries which can add to the discussion of the questions on disarmament, within the framework of the all-European process is still valid.

And now, a couple of words about such an important sphere in the problem of disarmament as the task of banning and completely liquidating chemical weapons. The Soviet Union speaks out for it firmly, in a determined and systematic way. We believe that already this year, 1987, basic accords can be reached which would allow the signing of a convention on the banning and complete liquidation of chemical weapons. However, the thing is that talks

about chemical weapons, which take place within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, have been intolerably protracted despite the burst of vitality given to them last year as a result of important initiatives taken by the Soviet Union. The drafting of the conference resolution is still not completed. And the reason is the same—the position of the United States, which is nurturing plans for chemical rearmament. According to Washington's schemes, the wide-scale manufacture of the new, binary chemical weapons must become a composite part of an extensive program for the creation of the latest weapons, which are intended to guarantee military superiority for the United States in competition with the Soviet Union. Along with this, it sets itself the aim to station [razmestit] the new types of weapons of mass annihilation outside the territory of the United States—first of all in the West European countries, nearer the borders of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states.

At the Geneva disarmament conference energetic work is taking place on the part of the Soviet Union and the allied socialist countries so that a basis for compromise may be created at these talks. The Soviet Union introduced a whole series of concrete and constructive proposals which provide a way out of this complicated problem. It must be said that the fraternal socialist states are acting energetically in this direction. For example, the initiative of the GDR Government and of Czechoslovakia regarding the creation of a chemical weapons free zone in Central Europe, and the joint proposal of Bulgaria and Romania regarding the creation of a similar zone in the Balkans, are in accord with the joint proposal of the War Pact countries for ridding Europe of chemical weapons. Implementation of these measures could become the first step in reaching an international accord regarding the nonproliferation of chemical weapons.

A decisive period is approaching for the question of conventional weapons, for the fate of chemical weapons, and for all other directions of the struggle to reduce and limit weapons and first of all, nuclear weapons. It is time for energetic, united, joint action from all states, from the most diverse political and social movements. One would not like to think that the present U.S. Administration has already made its final choice, and is ready to sacrifice all the prospects for agreement with the Soviet Union, to waste the last 2 years of its stay in power on the same dangerous chase for the chimera of military superiority. It will not bring laurels either to the United States to its allies, but it will undoubtedly create an additional threat to universal peace. Their responsibility to their own people, to the international public dictates another solution. We are in favor of conducting the dialogue constructively, to do everything necessary so that the historical window of opportunity which opened a little in Reykjavik does not slam shut.

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CSO: 5200/1349

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR'S KASHLEV RECEIVES INTERNATIONAL CSCE COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Hits Western Stance on Security

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 26 Feb 87 FY 87 pp 1-2

[TASS item: "At the Vienna Follow-up Meeting"]

[Text] Vienna, 25 February (TASS)--"The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are ready for a search for new forms of negotiations if such negotiations are conducive to a solution to the issues under discussion," stated Yuri Kashlev, leader of the Soviet delegation at the Vienna follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

He spoke at a meeting with representatives of the International Committee for Security and Cooperation in Europe, who are visiting in the Austrian capital.

"In this connection," the Soviet representative pointed out, "socialist countries have got in touch with NATO countries with a view to exchanging views on talks between the Warsaw Treaty member states and NATO countries on a reduction in the armed forces and conventional arms in Europe."

"At the same time one cannot fail to notice," Yuri Kashlev went on to say, "that attempts on the part of many Western countries at evading discussion on a number of important issues do not cease. Suffice it to say that NATO countries have not submitted a single proposal up to now on such a topical issues as disarmament."

Moreover, increasingly manifest is a desire of NATO countries and, first of all, of the United States to remove disarmament issues from the agenda of the Vienna meeting altogether, thereby changing the nature and the main content of the Helsinki process."

At the meeting, there was an exchange of views on the question of participation of the public of large in the Helsinki process and on the role of public and non-governmental organisations, including the international committee for security and cooperation in Europe, in this cause.

'Great Impact' by USSR

LD270035 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 26 Feb 87

[Text] In the Austrian capital a meeting has taken place between members of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna meeting of representatives of the CSCE participant states and representatives of the International Committee for European Security and Cooperation. Ambassador Kashlev, leader of the Soviet delegation, noted that a great impact has been made on the course of the Vienna forum both by the Soviet Union's foreign policy initiatives and by the broad process of democratization under way in the USSR.

Pointing out that the constructive businesslike proposals submitted during the Vienna meeting by the socialist countries, aimed at achieving practical accords on the most important problems of disarmament, security, confidence measures and cooperation in the economic and humanitarian spheres, Kashlev stated that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are willing to seek new forms of negotiations if these negotiations result in the solution of the problems under discussion. In this connection they have made contact with the NATO countries with the aim of holding an exchange of views concerning negotiations between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO on reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe.

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CSO: 5200/1319

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR'S KASHLEV INTERVIEWED ON CSCE ISSUES

PM041637 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 5

[V. Matveyev, N. Novikov interview with Yu.B. Kashlev, head of the Soviet delegation at the Vienna CSCE talks, under the "IZVESTIYA Interview" rubric: "Vienna: No Time to Lose" — first graf is editorial introduction]

[Text] The CSCE meeting in Vienna has been in progress for almost 3 months, if one counts the recess. The USSR delegation is active at this forum. It is headed by Yu.B. Kashlev, a diplomat with considerable experience in this field (he has been involved in the all-European process at various stages, including in Geneva and Belgrade), a professor, and author of a number of books on problems of international relations.

[Correspondents] How would you compare the atmosphere of the Vienna meeting with the atmosphere at similar forums — in Belgrade and Madrid?

[Kashlev] When our meeting began at foreign minister level last November, many speeches pointed to the more favorable international climate in comparison with the past. It was noted that the mechanism of the European process — and the mechanism of political consultations particular — was running more or less smoothly. Reykjavik was an important landmark. The real possibility of achieving substantial results at the Vienna meeting was discussed.

How have things turned out? At this point I should talk about the line taken by the delegations of three NATO countries — the United States, Britain, and Canada. Unfortunately, the old confrontational themes still predominate. Hiding behind the slogan of "defending human rights" in socialist countries, they evade discussion of other sections of the Helsinki accords. The situation has become more complicated....

[Correspondents] But surely some Western delegations tried to do the same thing in Belgrade and Madrid?

[Kashlev] This is true, although the climate for this kind of exercise by NATO members is less appropriate at the Vienna meeting. This is explained by a general change in the present world situation. Confrontational policies are failing to find support. The constructive side showed its strength when participants in the Vienna meeting reached the stage of submitting specific proposals and recommendations.

[Correspondents] In which areas, in your opinion, has the Vienna meeting made the most progress and where has it made the least?

[Kashlev] Proposals by various delegations have been submitted in all areas of the European process. A great many proposals, but quantity is not the main indicator. As far as military questions are concerned, there is only really one specific proposal on the table — Poland's — which is supported by other socialist countries. A number of neutral and nonaligned countries have also responded positively to it. It envisages the second stage of the Stockholm Conference studying questions of disarmament on the continent and confidence-building measures in the military sphere. There are virtually no other proposals purely on military subjects and detente. NATO members are deliberately keeping quiet on the subject. What is more, they are trying to pretend that it should not be discussed at our forum but somewhere else.

The situation is better with regard to trade and economic issues. Proposals have been made — by Bulgaria, for example, on an ecological forum; the North European countries, on various aspects of environmental protection; and Austria, on forest protection and the fight against cross-border pollution. At the opening of the meeting FRG Foreign Minister Genscher said the FRG would be willing to hold an economic conference....

[Correspondents] Does this not duplicate Czechoslovakia's proposal?

[Kashlev] No, because the Czechoslovak proposal primarily envisages full-scale, intensive work by experts, whereas the FRG is thinking of an international conference on economic cooperation issues. The two measures could quite possibly be combined.

It would be appropriate to recall the idea put forward by Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti on convening a forum of scientists from 35 countries. The idea of combining the efforts of Europe's scientists — particularly in light of what was shown by the international forum in Moscow — deserves support.

During the discussion of economic issues some Western delegates have expressed the wish that Soviet foreign trade and other organizations improve the information they give to foreign businessmen and the conditions in which they have to work. I think opinions like these should be heeded.

[Correspondents] As far as we know, the so-called "third basket" is fuller than any other. Only with what? Hardly a day goes by without the U.S. delegation and its NATO partners virtually duplicating the vast amount of paperwork on the question of cooperation in the humanitarian sphere.

[Kashlev] I will be frank: It is a question of a policy aimed at distorting the essence of the all-European process and attempts to channel this process into artificially selected areas of such a broad field as the humanitarian sphere. We will say frankly that we condemn this kind of distortion when the broad concept of contacts between people and countries is interpreted in this narrow, shabby way. They are basically trying to reduce the whole problem, to "freedom of emigration" from socialist countries. At the same time, it is a well known fact that the U.S. authorities are opposed to broad social and particularly trade union contacts with socialist countries.

[Correspondents] Does this mean that this kind of distortion is now the most serious impediment to progress at the meeting?

[Kashlev] Yes, and we should bear in mind that there are two aspects to this distortion: ignoring the most important military-political issues and, at the same time, overemphasizing those issues which artificially narrow the sphere of humanitarian problems. If the Western delegations continue to employ these tactics, it will create serious difficulties in the meeting's work. I do not think it is in the interests of the West Europeans to promote these tactics, which are imposed, as everyone can see, from across the water.

[Correspondents] The Western press reads as if there is no particular difference in the stand taken by the USSR and the United States in the question of the framework within which it is proposed to discuss the problem of reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe. Is this really so?

[Kashlev] I can only cite several statements made by U.S. representatives outside the Vienna meeting. It is clear from these statements that Washington has a very cool attitude toward the idea of the complex of issues concerning the problem of conventional arms reduction being discussed within the framework of the all-European process by all 35 states. Whereas the attitude taken by the USSR delegation is that it is inadmissible to ignore the legitimate interests of neutral and nonaligned European countries in the context of European security. It is equally inadmissible to emasculate the all-European process by removing the disarmament problem from it.

[Correspondents] Have the meeting's participants begun compiling the final document?

[Kashlev] The editorial groups are beginning work. This is not technical but political work. The final document must contain organizational and political steps to be taken after Vienna. In the last few days the negotiating table has been inundated with a stream of different proposals, because far from all the Western delegations responded promptly to our appeal not to delay in submitting their proposals. They are predicting that no less than 100 different proposals will be submitted in total. They are not all off equal value, of course, but there are a considerable number meriting serious attention. So there is a great deal of hard work ahead of us.

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SOVIET GENERAL TATARNIKOV ADDRESSES CSCE PLENARY SESSION

LD031240 Moscow TASS in English 1204 GMT 3 Mar 87

[Text] Vienna March 3 TASS -- Maj.-Gen. Viktor Tatarnikov, a member of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna follow-up meeting on security and cooperation in Europe, today addressed a plenary session.

He drew attention to the recent initiative advanced by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his February 28 statement, an initiative that represented a major step towards ridding Europe of nuclear arms.

Agreements on the elimination of American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe within the next five years would undoubtedly stimulate constructive consideration of the reduction of the armed forces and armaments in Europe.

The Soviet representative expressed confidence that the Soviet proposal would have a positive effect on the work of the all-European forum in Vienna.

At the same time, he said, NATO countries had not as yet tabled a single specific proposal in Vienna concerning military aspects of strengthening security and disarmament in Europe. They were avoiding a substantive and businesslike discussion of these key issues.

The Soviet representative said that the issue of reducing the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe should be viewed on the all-European basis with the participation of all 35 nations, including neutral and non-aligned. Agreements on these issues should be recorded in the final document of the Vienna meeting.

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EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

MOSCOW COMMENTS ON ARMS PROPOSALS AT CSCE FORUM

LD201354 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 20 Feb 87

[Text] The Vienna meeting of the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe continues in the Austrian capital. Here is what our correspondent was told by Major-General Viktor Mikhaylovich Tatarnikov, member of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna meeting:

These days the Vienna forum has entered a responsible phase--the discussion of the proposals put forward on the problem of security. Among these proposals I would say the most interest is provoked by the proposals put forward by Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, and Romania; an interesting proposal in this sphere was put forward by Yugoslavia. The Soviet delegation believes that strengthening of security and real disarmament in Europe is one of the central directions of the pan-European process. This problem touches on the interests of all people, whose total population among the member-countries numbers about 1 billion. We can feel this here on the spot at Vienna--people are striving toward peace and disarmament, and they make it understood to us at every step.

At the same time, we see no readiness on the part of the NATO countries. To this day, for example, not a single proposal has been put on the sphere of military detente and the strengthening of security in Europe. We are awaiting to break out of a vicious circle--out of the rift of many years of fruitless talks, and, in our view, it is essential to proceed from the premise of new thinking in matters of military security. Today it is essential to bring mutual relations in Europe to meet the realities of the nuclear age, to renounce building your own security at the expense of others' security. Take the United States concept: its line of defense is to have a passage to Europe. This is an (?example) of the old way of thinking--waging war on the territory of other states, building your security as a result of infringing others' security. This is a stereotype of the thinking in the category of neo-colonialism. This is old thinking and an old approach.

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EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR'S GERASIMOV ON BAHR'S WEAPONS-FREE ZONE

DW160825 Moscow International Service in German 1700 GMT 12 Feb 87

[Unattributed report]

[Text] At the 24th international defense forum in Munich early in February, SPD disarmament expert Egon Bahr submitted an interesting proposal. It is essentially aimed at creating in the center of Europe, along the GDR-FRG border, a 300-kilometer wide corridor from which all heavy weapons, including tanks and helicopters, would have to be withdrawn. According to Bahr's proposal, only units equipped with light weapons would stay in this region. In addition, the warning time for the beginning of maneuvers which at present is 48 hours would be extended to several weeks. Egon Bahr says that Central Europe could become a region whose military structure would prevent attacks. According to initial press reports, reaction in the FRG has been reserved. Some newspapers wrote that they were wondering what Moscow would think about it.

At a briefing in the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center in Moscow today, our correspondent asked the Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov to comment on Egon Bahr's proposals. Gennadiy Gerasimov said this: That is not a bad proposal, but it has not been officially advanced. In October 1986, SPD and SED representatives submitted an important political proposal on the creation of a nuclear-free corridor in the center of Europe. The coordinated proposal includes part of the FRG, GDR, and CSSR territory covering a stretch of land of about 150 kilometers on the [phrase indistinct] each of those states on both sides of the dividing line of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, from which all nuclear weapons would have to be removed. They think that such a corridor could constitute part of an even more comprehensive process of setting up a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.

Gennadiy Gerasimov said that like the other socialist countries, the Soviet Union has expressed its positive stance on that initiative of the SED and SPD. We think that it is clear proof of the efforts to reduce the military threat, decrease military confrontation, and liberate the European continent from nuclear weapons. The first concrete step in that direction, if taken by the GDR, FRG, and CSSR governments, would undoubtedly meet European

security interests and lead to a more peaceful and more stable future for Europe. If officially advanced, Egon Bahr's proposal to remove all heavy conventional weapons like tanks and artillery from both sides of the dividing line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, could be discussed like other proposals.

In that connection, it should also be taken into account that the Budapest appeal of the Warsaw Pact members states for a substantial reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe suggests that troop concentrations along the dividing line of the two military blocs should be reduced at the beginning of the process. Thus the proposals on the reduction of conventional armaments which will be submitted by the other European states could also be discussed in future all-European negotiations.

That is what Gennadiy Gerasimov, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman, said among other things about the proposal of SPD disarmament expert Egon Bahr on the creation of a corridor free of conventional arms in the center of Europe.

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EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

BRIEFS

DOBRYNIN RECEIVES ITALIAN SENATOR--Moscow, 27 Feb (TASS)--Today Anatoliy Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, received a delegation of the Christian Democratic Party of Italy led by Senator Julio Orlando, member of the CDP leadership and head of the party's international department. It is staying in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation. In the talk held in a constructive and goodwill atmosphere, the sides discussed key problems of the international situation, including questions on disarmament, guaranteeing of security in the world, development of the European process and Soviet-Italian relations. The talk was attended by Vadim Zagladin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and first deputy head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1707 GMT 27 Feb 87 LD] /9738

NATO-WARSAW PACT OFFICIALS MEET--Vienna, 2 Mar (TASS)--Representatives of Warsaw-Treaty and NATO countries had a working meeting at the Embassy of Hungary here today within the framework of unofficial consultations on matters concerning cutbacks in the armed forces and conventional arms in Europe. The socialist countries were represented by the leaders and members of delegations at the Vienna follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1528 GMT 2 Mar 87 LD] /9738

TASS: NATO, PACT CONSULTATIONS--Vienna March 9 TASS--Scheduled unofficial consultations of representatives of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO countries on questions of the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe were held here today. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1751 GMT 9 Mar 87] /8309

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR COMMENTS ON RESUMPTION OF TESTING

Defense Ministry Spokesman

LD251228 Moscow TASS in English 1218 GMT 26 Feb 87

[Text] Moscow February 26 TASS -- Major-General Gelyi Batenin, a spokesman for the USSR Defense Ministry, made a statement today at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists at the press centre of the USSR Foreign Ministry. He said:

The Soviet Union today had to explode its first nuclear device after more than 18 months of silence at its testing ranges. The step could not have come as a surprise to anybody because the Soviet Union had declared openly way back on December 18 last year that it would not be able to observe unilateral restraint in that matter for ever.

It is most regrettable that the incumbent U.S. Administration, on which it depended whether the moratorium would be extended and become bilateral, has found it impossible to press on with its nuclear testing programme and already carried out two nuclear blasts this year. [sentence as received] [Moscow TRUD in Russian 27 February p 8 publishes a TASS report headed "Briefing at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center" based on statements made at the 26 January briefing by USSR Defense Ministry spokesman Major General G.V. Batenin and G.I. Gerasimov, USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration Chief. For the sentence above, the TRUD version uses the wording: has found it possible to. Other TRUD variations appear in editorial notations below.] It thus fully ignored world public demands contained in the resolution of the U.S. General Assembly, the call of the Nonaligned Movement, the proposals of the leaders of the Delhi Six, the opinions of parliaments and the world public. Washington's irresponsible policy has placed us before [as received] the need to terminate the unilateral moratorium. A historic chance for ending nuclear tests once and for all has been missed at this stage.

The first nuclear explosion was announced today in a TASS report. It was set off at the testing range in the area of Semipalatinsk. Its yield was under 20 kilotons. The aim was to test results of research in the field of nuclear explosion physics. [The TRUD version omits the preceding two sentences.] I want to stress once more that the termination of the moratorium was a forced measure dictated by security interests only. In its test programme the Soviet Union will proceed exclusively from a minimum which is needed for fundamental research, for the aims of the national economy, for testing technical facilities and armaments for their resistance to hitting factors of a nuclear explosion, including resistance to means which are being developed under the American SDI programme. In doing so the Soviet Union has no intention of copying the nuclear programme of the USA which is aimed at developing new types of armaments, including those within the SDI framework.

Only a minimum number of tests will be held with the purpose of developing munitions for maintaining strategic parity with the USA as regards nuclear armaments. The resumption of nuclear explosions by the Soviet Union does not mean that it has abandoned its resolute struggle for the complete cessation of such tests. Our principled attitude to the task of banning nuclear tests remains unchanged: We continue to regard its solution as a top-priority measure on the way to scaling down nuclear armaments and their subsequent complete elimination, and we shall support the efforts of all states going in this direction. All the Soviet proposals for ending nuclear tests remain in force. To solve the problem of a comprehensive nuclear test ban without delay we suggest beginning full-scale talks which the USSR is ready to conduct in any composition and at any forum but, of course, with the participation of the USA. In the process of such talks it would be possible to reach agreement also on a stage-by-stage solution of this task, having in view ratification of the Soviet-American treaties of 1974 and 1976, the imposition of intermediate limitations on the number and yield of nuclear explosions. [paragraph continues]

We are leaving the door open also on the question of the moratorium. The Soviet Union is ready to get back to it any day and month when the United States announces termination of its nuclear tests. Despite all this we do not lose hope that Washington will heed the calls of the world community and reconsider its destructive attitude to this problem.

The Soviet Union will not miss a single opportunity for stepping up international efforts in the matter of banning nuclear tests. It is convinced that its position on this issue will meet with appropriate understanding and support from all peace forces of our planet. [The TRUD version omits the last sentence in this paragraph. It then publishes the statement by Gerasimov which is identical to the TASS item as published in the Arms Control & Disarmament section of the 26 February Soviet Union DAILY REPORT on pp AA1, AA2 except for omitting the sentence in paragraph four, lines twelve through fifteen: "The U.S. 'broad' interpretation, if employed, would remove all restrictions on the creation [sozdaniye] of space antimissile defense, emasculate the treaty's essence, and wreck the process of nuclear arms limitation."]

Statement by CD Delegation

LD261729 Moscow TASS in English 1726 GMT 26 Feb 87

[Text] Geneva February 26 TASS -- In connection with the underground nuclear explosion in the Soviet Union this morning, the Soviet delegation made a statement at the plenary meeting of the conference in disarmament.

The head of the USSR delegation Yuriy Nazarkin emphasized that the resumption of tests had been an enforced measure resulting from the refusal of the U.S. side to join in the Soviet moratorium, to reach arrangement on banning nuclear weapon tests. The real reason behind this refusal is that the United States openly banks on the achievement of military superiority over the USSR, over socialist countries by creating new kinds of armaments, also in the framework of the SDI programme.

Despite this, the Soviet Union continues viewing complete banning of nuclear weapons tests as a priority measure toward curtailing nuclear armaments and their subsequent elimination. Recalling Mikhail Gorbachev's message to the leaders of the "Delhi Six"

in connection with their declaration at the end of 1986, Yuriy Nazarkin stressed that the USSR as ever declares for the beginning of full scale talks on the problem of ending explosions and proposes to start without delay practical work at the conference on disarmament. The USSR representative said again that if the United States stops nuclear testing the USSR will be prepared, on the basis of reciprocity, to stop the implementation of its programme of such tests any day and any month.

TASS Cites Lehman

LD270332 Moscow TASS in English 2354 GMT 26 Feb 87

[Text] Washington February 27 TASS -- TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyachin reports:

It follows from a statement made by John Lehman, U.S. secretary of the Navy, at a press conference in the Pentagon that the United States has no intention of renouncing nuclear testing and will continue its test program in spite of the demands of the world and American public and the Soviet proposals for a total nuclear test ban.

Our stand on nuclear test explosions has not changed, he stressed as he argued that the U.S. stand was explained by the need to secure the effectiveness of the American nuclear arms arsenals until a defense system not based on nuclear weapons was developed. Flying in the face of facts, Lehman claimed that a moratorium on nuclear testing did not meet U.S. national security interests and posed a threat to U.S. allies. Meanwhile, it is common knowledge that the main goal of U.S. nuclear testing is the development of nuclear weapons of new types and armaments under the "Star Wars" program, specifically, laser weapons.

Soviet 'Restraint,' 'Patience'

PM021429 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Feb 87 Second Edition p 5

[Boris Orehov "Commentator's Column": "We Hold the Door Open"]

[Text] There can be no doubt that the report of our underground nuclear test will elicit many comments and commentaries in the world. Of course, they will not be unequivocal, just as the approach of various circles and various people to the fact that for more than a year and a half -- for 17 [as published] and 1/2 months, of 569 days, to be still more exact -- the Soviet Union had scrupulously adhered to its moratorium on all nuclear explosions was not unequivocal.

Naturally, that could not continue ad infinitum without the U.S. side's joining in the good cause. Moscow repeatedly urged Washington to stop the explosions in Nevada, make the moratorium a joint one, and thereby take a practical step toward ending the arms race.

Displaying restraint and patience in the interests of a lofty goal, the Soviet Union extended its unilateral moratorium five times. All the peoples welcomed that. They rightly saw our country's peace-loving action as a real opportunity to not only effectively put the brakes on the arms race but also change the international atmosphere for the better on a moral and psychological plane.

At the very same time as gophers and jerboas were fearlessly running about Soviet nuclear test sites overgrown with steppe grasses, the land of Nevada was being distended by more and more new blisters from nuclear explosions. Even when the Soviet Union announced its forced decision to resume testing following the first U.S. nuclear explosion in 1987, Washington hastened to conduct two tests at once -- one after the other -- as though displaying its arrogant attitude to the will and aspirations of hundreds of millions of the planet's inhabitants.

Hardly any of the paid Western propagandists will recall that the United States detonated 26 nuclear devices during the time that silence reigned on our test sites. We must not forget this; we do not have the right to do so. There is no way out for our country than to do everything necessary to reliably ensure our own security and that of our friends and allies.

So, some people will ask: Does this mean the world is once again at an impasse? No, this is not so. We are holding and will continue to hold open all doors for any honest steps to limit and reduce arms, to ensure reliable verification [kontrol] of this process, and to strengthen international mutual security. We repeat once again: The ending of nuclear tests is the command of the times. If the United States stops nuclear tests, the USSR will be ready on any day of any month to halt the implementation of its own nuclear test program on a reciprocal basis.

FRG Called Accomplice

LD271951 Moscow TASS in English 1937 GMT 27 Feb 87

[Text] Moscow, 27 Feb (TASS)--By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

The FRG Government which has not exerted the influence on its partner, the USA, shares the responsibility for the situation which has developed now.

This conclusion has been drawn by deputy chairman of the SDPG [Social Democratic Party of Germany] parliamentary group in the Bundestag Horst Ehmk who comments on the explosion of a nuclear device conducted by the USSR after the quiet has been reigning on Soviet proving grounds for over 18 months.

One can fully agree to this conclusion. It is certainly above all Washington's irresponsible policy that has led to the fact that the historic chance to end nuclear testing for ever has been lost at this stage. But those NATO countries which constantly follow in the wake of the United States policy, which echo the U.S. Administration, are undoubtedly, accomplices in dangerous actions. Whether the nuclear arms, chemical weapons, or new types of conventional armaments are concerned, the present FRG Government exerts efforts to speed up the arms race.

None other than Chancellor Helmut Kohl, for instance, described the "Star Wars" program aimed at the creation of space strike arms and the militarization of outer space as "morally and politically justified." And it is precisely this program that has become the main stumbling block in Reykjavik on the road to reaching arrangements on the reduction, and in the long run, complete elimination of nuclear arms. It must certainly be clear in Bonn that ever new nuclear explosions are needed for this program of Washington.

Trying to link the zero option in medium-range missiles with the Soviet Union's alleged superiority in the sphere of conventional arms, and seeking rearming in the sphere of short range missiles, the FRG Government puts obstacles to ridding Europe of nuclear missile weapons. STERN magazine reported that the federal chancellor's associates "heaved a sigh of relief" that "the Reykjavik meeting broke off at the proper moment."

And take the recent fact: It became known in February that Bonn is deploying on the quiet in the West German territory ever new kinds of nuclear ammunition for artillery units. It would seem that with the density of the deployment of nuclear weapons in the West Germany being the highest in the world, the Bonn leadership should have shown special interest in ending nuclear testing and upgrading of nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless representatives of the West German leadership constantly declare about the need to continue "nuclear deterrence", that is the United States and NATO's emphasis on nuclear weapons, are inundating the country with the latest armaments. [sentence as received]

It is high time they in Bonn and other NATO capitals realize that those who support Washington's stand in favour of continued nuclear testing promote the buildup of nuclear arsenals and upgrading of nuclear weapons. The will of peoples who demand that a joint advance to a nuclear-free world should at last be started is thus ignored.

No 'Good' or 'Bad' Explosions

PM021630 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Feb 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Vikentiy Matveyev "Our Commentary" column: "Overcome the Obstacle!"]

[Text] There are no "good" or "bad" nuclear weapons — all types of these armaments create an unparalleled threat to mankind, and therefore should be banned and eliminated. [paragraph continues]

That is the conviction of the Soviet leadership and our people, given practical expression in the 15 January 1986 Statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, which sets forth a plan of action in the direction of nuclear disarmament.

Nor are there "good" or "bad" nuclear explosions. They should all be stopped forever, in the name of our planet's self-preservation. Our country set an example. For 18 months, in the face of more and more new nuclear tests in the United States, we refrained from conducting such explosions.

The underground nuclear explosion carried out 26 February in the Semipalatinsk region with a view to verifying the results of research in the sphere of the physics of such explosions does not mean our country is embarking on the path which Washington, ignoring the voice of the world public and the majority of governments, follows.

Moscow has once again declared most authoritatively what we have done and will continue to do everything necessary to reliably ensure our security and that of our friends and allies. We will not take a single step over and above the needs and requirements of reasonable, adequate defense. We will not thoughtlessly and automatically repeat what imperialism seeks to impose on us in the arms race.

The above also applies entirely to the question of nuclear tests. We do not imitate and have no intention of imitating what the Pentagon does.

It may be recalled that in the fifties the Soviet Union also unilaterally renounced nuclear tests — with no response from the United States or Britain, which continued such tests despite the demands of the world public. We were forced to resume tests. The struggle did not stop. Eventually, convinced of the futility of the course of achieving the desired military superiority over the Soviet Union, Washington and London concluded it was expedient to reach an agreement on stopping nuclear tests in the three environments. So the well known international treaty was signed in Moscow in August 1963.

It is hard to guess which way things will go now. It is clear that however much people across the ocean spur on the arms spiral, this will not give the initiators of that course what they want. Our country will not permit the established military parity to be broken, whatever Washington does. the futility of this course, the associated threat to life on earth — all this has long been obvious to the world community and to many representatives of the ruling class in the United States itself. A small group of people who control Washington's policy have the bit between their teeth.

That is what the world public and all governments seeking a nuclear test ban should bear in mind. In recent days even the governments of the West European countries which are closest to Washington have appealed to it not to break the ABM Treaty, signed by the United States with our country. Their concern is understandable. But does not the problem of nuclear test ban deserve to be the subject of at least equal attention from the U.S. allies?

There can be no doubt that broad strata of the world public, like the majority of the governments of UN countries, will not lose heart, but will raise their voices for reason. The soviet Union will not hold things up. We were prepared to respond to any glimmer of common sense across the ocean, and we are still prepared to do so.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: U.S. NUCLEAR TESTS DETECTED BY TASHKENT SEISMIC STATION

Tashkent SOVET OZBEKISTONI in Uzbek 16 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by UzTAG correspondent Yu. Kruzhilin, "The Signature of Nuclear Holocaust"]

[Text] We met and became friends around a quarter of a century ago at the time of the powerful one-kiloton explosion in the Chimyan Ravine near Tashkent. The explosion consisted of powder not intended for military use. It cleared a road by removing half a million cubic meters of rock all at once. Today thousands of Tashkentians take this road on Sundays for a holiday.

At that time Valentin Ulamov had neither scientific degrees nor titles. While installing the instruments in the mountains the young seismologist recalled with pleasure the words of Academician B. Galitsin who founded the science he loved. The academician has said that earthquakes are like a fascinating light and that these lights would reveal all at once the secrets of the earth's interior.

Having heard on the radio that America had conducted another nuclear test I asked Valentin Ivanovich Ulamov, Professor, Doctor of Mathematical Physics and Corresponding Member of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences, "Well, how are you? Would you comment on this?"

Valentin Ivanovich replies, "In fact most of the underground nuclear tests being conducted by the USA on the other side of the earth leave their trace on seismograms of the Tashkent Seismic Station. Indeed our specialists do not even intend to conduct such monitoring. We're interested in natural seismology and seismic patterns. That's why tests essentially hurt our work. For this reason, when we detect explosions among most earth tremors, we have to discard them from our analysis of the natural seismic process.

"One must also point out," Ulamov continued, "That earth tremors due to the blasting of coal and mineral layers by Almalyk and Angren miners also show up on the tape of our seismic station."

"So why is the American administration now claiming that there are definite difficulties in monitoring nuclear tests and that these days it is possible to explode weapons underground without detection?"

"This is something said by uninformed people. Specialists know well that there is nothing especially difficult in detecting nuclear explosions. When talks on halting underground nuclear tests began in the Sixties Soviet seismologists, as well as various foreign seismologists already spoke about this then. There has been considerable technological advance in the field since those years."

"If detonations are harmful [to your work] why would Golitsin call them 'fascinating lights'?"

"Peaceful detonations are necessary in studying the formation of the earth's crust. I would stress that detonations for peaceful purposes are necessary and you and I met each other at the time of one such peaceful detonation. What is the use of such a detonation? These detonations create tremors in the earth's crust. We detect and record them on tape and, based on changes in them, form an opinion about the structure of the interior of the earth. But, for this purpose, it is absolutely unnecessary to detonate terrible nuclear weapons. The USA constantly conducts such tests in the state of Nevada."

"Thus, it is clear as day to seismologists that the average citizen in the West is being made a fool of in regard to the issue called the control problem and that the doubts expressed by them are nonsense?"

"Today this is obvious to every serious specialist not only in the USSR, but also in the United States of America. The cooperation that has gone on for many years between Soviet and American seismologists corresponds to our interests. This cooperation leads to improved mutual understanding of problems common to all mankind and of seismology. We are hopeful of such rapprochement also in the field of politics. It is clear that the Soviet Union is proceeding boldly along this path."

9439

CSO: 5200/1231

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SHEVARDNADZE MESSAGE TO OPANAL ON TLALELOLCO TREATY

FM271515 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Feb 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Greetings Message"]

[Text] Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze has sent A. Stempel Paris, secretary general of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), a greetings message, which reads as follows:

"Esteemed Mr Secretary General,

"I greet you and, through you, the states party to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America [Tlatelolco Treaty] on its 20th anniversary.

"This was the first international agreement legally enshrining nuclear-free status in an extensive, densely populated region and has served as a serious barrier to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It began the process of turning various regions of the world into nuclear-free zones, a process that is gathering momentum. [paragraph continues]

"The treaty declaring the South Pacific a nuclear-free zone was a graphic example of the vitality of the process. The USSR was the first nuclear power to express its readiness to act as guarantor of the zone's nuclear-free status by signing the relevant treaty protocols.

"As a consistent supporter of the creation of nuclear-free zones, the Soviet Union is deeply convinced that progress in this sphere undoubtedly accords with the task of strengthening the system of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, preventing nuclear war, creating a climate of international trust and detente, and eliminating nuclear weapons.

"Having signed and ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty's supplementary Protocol II, the USSR has strictly abided by its commitments and firmly advocated that Latin America's nuclear-free status be strengthened.

"The activity of states party to the treaty is particularly important in the light of the urgent need to build a nuclear-free world. As is well known, M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, proposed in his statement of 15 January 1986 a detailed action program to completely destroy nuclear weapons and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction everywhere by the end of the century. This program underwent further creative development in the Soviet proposals at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik, whose results are today the common asset of all countries and peoples.

"The growing awareness of the international public and all honest people, irrespective of ideological or political differences, of the urgent need to seek practical ways of removing the nuclear threat and ensuring mankind's survival is reflected today in the activity of the nonaligned countries, the 'Delhi Six' states, and many international organizations and in the growth of mass antiwar movements.

"I would like to express my confidence that the parties to the treaty will continue to actively promote the development of cooperation to rid the world of nuclear weapons and establish an all-embracing international security system."

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CSO: 5200/1338

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BEIJING REVIEW: U.S. OPPOSES NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY

Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English Vol 30 No 8, 23 Feb 87 pp 10-11

[Article by He Shiyun]

[Text]

The Reagan administration has recently decided not to sign three protocols to the South Pacific nuclear free zone treaty as requested by 13 nations in the region. The impact has already begun to be felt. Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden has said that the United States should not take its refusal to sign the protocols for granted. Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs Stephen Solarz told reporters that it was a mistake for the US government to reject the protocols.

US State Department spokesman Charles Redman said on February 5 that the US government has informed Australia, New Zealand and the other countries involved that "in view of our global security interests and responsibilities, we are not in a position to sign the protocols. We view the growing number of proposals for regional nuclear free zones as potentially undermining the policy of deterrence which has been the cornerstone of Western security since World War II."

The South Pacific nuclear free zone treaty was initiated by Australian Prime Minister Robert Hawke in 1983, and the 13 members of the South Pacific

Forum endorsed it in Rarotonga, Cook Islands on August 7, 1985.

The treaty has 16 items and three protocols, requesting the signatories to ban research, manufacture and possession or importation of any nuclear weapons. It also includes a ban on nuclear testing in the South Pacific (land or sea), on deploying nuclear weapons in the signatory territories or under the sea and on dumping nuclear waste in the sea. The question of foreign ships and planes with nuclear arms entering any country's territories is left up to each signatory individually.

The treaty zone stretches north to the equator, south to the demilitarized Antarctic non-nuclear zone, west to the Indian Ocean shore of Australia and east to the Latin American nuclear free zone defined by the treaty of Tlatelolco.

Protocol No. 1 of the treaty demands that France, the United States and Britain pledge to implement the main items of the treaty in Polynesia, Samoa and Pitcairn which are controlled by them. Protocol No. 2 asks the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Great Britain and France not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against the South Pacific nuclear free zone, and Protocol No. 3 calls on

the five states not to conduct nuclear tests in the region. After the treaty came into effect on December 1, 1986, the above countries were asked to sign the protocols.

Serious objections have been frequently registered against French nuclear tests in Mororoa, the dumping of nuclear waste in the South Pacific and the superpowers' nuclear arms race in the region.

The Reagan administration's rejection of the protocols arises from the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union in this region. For years Washington has been strengthening its defence line from Japan and the Philippines to Australia. In recent years Moscow has

answered with a marked increase in its military presence there.

It is reported that the United States is ready to build a missile testing ground for its Strategic Defence Initiative on Marshall Island in the South Pacific. Furthermore, the United States has fears that the anti-nuclear sentiments in this region will strengthen those in Western Europe, eroding its allies' support for "Star Wars" programme and for American nuclear missiles on their soil.

France has also opposed the Rarotonga treaty. To keep its nuclear deterrent credible, France feels it needs constantly to improve its nuclear weapons, and will not renounce nuclear tests in Mororoa.

/13104
CSO: 5200/4058

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW: U.S. USES SDI, TESTING TO DISTRACT FROM 'IRANGATE'

LD072210 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 7 Mar 87

[Text] TASS political Observer Yuriy Kornilov:

For certain circles in Washington it has become a sort of rule: The worse things are going at home, the greater the temptation to distract the public's attention, and gain points through stirring up tension and aggressive foreign policy adventures. It seems this rule is operating now, too, when the murky waves of Irangate are hitting the side of the U.S. ship of state more and more forcefully, lashing both the arms of the navigator and the captain's cabin. This fact, for instance, attracts the attention: Precisely after it had become obvious that the tumors of Irangate had struck all the components, all the levers, wheels and screws of the Washington government mechanism, precisely after that a course was adopted in the United States toward stepping up even more than before the preparations for "Star Wars." The architects of SDI set about zealously looking for loopholes in the USSR-U.S. ABM Treaty of 1972, forcefully giving that document a so-called broad interpretation, and thereby untying the hands of those who wanted to bury it.

Can one regard as a chance coincidence the fact that just at the height of Irangate Washington sanctioned the 25th and then the 26th blast of a nuclear device in the last 18 months in Nevada, although the Soviet Union was warning that if those blasts took place it would consider itself to be free from the unilateral moratorium? The same series of militarist, hegemonic actions includes Washington's stubborn resistance to the process of a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan, which is proven by a statement -- only just brought to light in the U.S. capital -- by Oakley, a representative of the State Department. The same series includes the massed concentration of U.S. naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf region, as well. On that point many observers are asking a disturbing, but entirely logical and well-grounded question: Will not those who are at the helm of the U.S. ship of state attempt to go for broke, as it were, on the international political scene, calculating thereby on patching up, or at least concealing from people's eyes, the breach in the bottom of their own political vessel?

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CSO: 5200/1342

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW 'ROUNDTABLE' ON INF, SDI, NFZ

ID082009 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 8 Mar 87

[*"International Observers Roundtable" program, conducted by Nikolay Agayants, with TASS political observer Yuriy Kornilov, and international affairs journalist and Doctor of Sciences Boris Dmitriyev*]

[Excerpts] [Agatants] Hello, comrades. The 1st week of March has now ended and receded into the past. According to the calendar, spring is already here, but outside it is freezing, with snowstorms and snowdrifts. On no account does winter want to give up its position, although the approach of fine weather is something unavoidable. This is a question of time in nature. As regards politics unfortunately, the approach of a genuine warm spell in international relations is still a long way off. There are forces in the world that would like to turn history back to the infamous times of the Cold War, forces which are piling up all sorts of barriers and obstacles on the path of resolving the most important problems of modern times, on the path of the triumph of the new thinking and new approaches. The past week was rich in events of the most varied scale and significance, events which have literally concentrated the attention of the world's public on the two courses in foreign policy: The course of the USSR and other socialist states aimed at lowering tension, curbing the arms race, and cooperation and trust; and the course that is in many ways contradictory and inconsistent, held by the United States and its allies.

Unquestionably the main theme of the foreign mass information media all this week has been the USSR's new peace initiative set forth in the statement by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee of 28 February. In everyone's appraisal it is a decision of cardinal importance, the aim of which is to undertake in a condensed space of time a real step toward totally liberating Europe from nuclear weapons. I will recall that our proposals envisage the immediate conclusion of a separate agreement on the total elimination of medium-range missiles on the European continent and their sharp reduction down to 100 warheads in the Asian part of the USSR and on U.S. national territory. In other words, we have agreed to isolate the given problem from the block of issues under examination at the Geneva talks.

[Dmitriyev] It would seem that after Reykjavik, everything was tied up in such knots that it was only possible to undo them simultaneously, but the Soviet leadership heeded the anxiety and hopes being uttered in many European countries. Let nobody now say that a great power is going back on its word. On the contrary, it is promoting it beyond the limit that others are unable to overcome because of the stagnation of their political thinking. What is the issue, specifically? If an agreement is concluded on the total elimination of the USSR and U.S. medium-range missiles deployed in Europe,

then on the Soviet side, 243 SS-20 missiles will be dismantled. Insofar as we are advocating that the missiles should be totally dismantled, it means that there will be no other medium-range missiles in Europe, neither from the USSR or from the United States. In Asia the SS-20 missiles will be reduced to such a number that there will be not more than 100 warheads on them.

Now, about the Americans. The agreement will require that all U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles currently deployed in Europe be totally dismantled. According to Western data to date, it is a question of eliminating a total of 316 missiles of this class. I will add that the Soviet SS-20 missiles are equipped with three warheads each, while the Pershing and cruise missiles are single-warhead weapons.

[Kornikov] Since we're describing our new initiative as a whole, I would like to add yet another point -- and a very important one -- that the Soviet proposal relating to the so-called Euromissiles cuts the Gordian knot not only on this issue. It also is aimed at giving a positive impetus to the work of other very important spheres of disarmament talks, namely on space and on strategic offensive arms.

[Agayants] So, as we see, Moscow once again has demonstrated to the whole world an example of the constructive application -- the application not in words, but in effect -- of political thinking that is needed to raise civilization to a qualitatively new level. These are the proposals which the USSR has placed on the table at the Geneva negotiations with the United States. As is known, it is the United States' fault that the draft agreement is, in effect, marking time. The time has come for decisions. This, judging by the numerous comments from abroad, publications by the press, radio and the television commentaries, and speeches by political and public figures and in various countries, is being awaited by the peoples of our planet. There is an historic chance that will make it possible to curb the nuclear arms race and achieve important accords. This chance must not be missed. And what about the West? What was the official reaction there to our initiative?

[Kornilov] Well, here, as an example, is the viewpoint of FRG Foreign Minister Genscher. I quote: Having proposed to resolve the issue of medium-range missiles, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee has removed the main obstacle to achieving an agreement concerning a final withdrawal from Europe of all Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles. The readiness of the USSR, he states, to embark immediately on talks concerning operational-tactical missiles meets both the FRG's requirements and security interests in Europe.

[Agayants] Well now, the position has been set forth, it would seem, with the utmost clarity. It could be regarded as an asset. The word has been spoken, let us now await action. The overall tone of the commentaries to be heard from across the ocean was optimistic. The United States treated the Soviet proposal with increased interest. In my opinion, one should note a point that is particularly symptomatic and important for today: The Americans see in the Soviet initiative a real possibility to shift the process of disarmament talks from its standstill. For the first time in 3 months, President Ronald Reagan appeared, not for long, at the White House press center. He emphasized that he welcomes the proposals put forward by the Soviet leader on achieving an agreement on Euromissiles separately from agreements in other spheres. In order not to miss the given opportunity, I have given instructions to our participants in the Geneva talks to produce as early as 4 March a draft text of a treaty on medium-range nuclear weapons, Ronald Reagan said.

[Dmitriyev] Now, when the possibility of an accord with us has begun to appear in outline, a sharp political struggle has begun in the United States, and evidently it will continue. The right-wing forces are beginning to raise their heads because the

possibility of a breakthrough in talks on disarmament issues does not suit them. There also are those who play up to the right-wingers, like, let's say, Henry Kissinger, who pretends to be concerned for the interests of Western Europe and NATO. They are beginning to sow doubt on the wisdom of the West of accepting in general the Reykjavik formula on medium-range missiles and maintain that the withdrawal of all U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles from Western Europe, under conditions of Soviet superiority in operational-tactical missiles and conventional arms, will, allegedly, lead to the undocking of the allies' security from U.S. security, meaning that it will rock the foundations of the North Atlantic bloc.

In this regard, the U.S. newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST notes that a proper agreement on medium-range weapons will not deprive Europe of its defensive forces. The U.S. nuclear umbrella will remain there as before. NATO will keep for itself the U.S. medium-range nuclear weapons sited on aircraft carriers; I might add that the United States has 15 aircraft carriers. However, one feels in all these commentaries from the right flank of U.S. Politics a little note of hopelessness: How will the United States and NATO be able to reject the zero option on medium-range missiles in Europe, which they themselves proposed? And, under these conditions, the Right is ready, if not to prevent an agreement, at the very least to hamper it, to raise the price for the USSR. The draft agreement now on the Geneva negotiating table contains the requirement for the strictest verification of the observance of the agreement. This is a well-known device with the aid of which the Americans have tried more than once to crystallize their positions on disarmament issues.

[Agayants] A discordant note was struck in the light of the facts set forth earlier by the voice of Paris. In a communique published by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was stated that the government's position on medium-range missiles remains unchanged, that is to say, that taking into account the existing imbalance in conventional and chemical types of weapons in Europe — as it was put, an imbalance not to the advantage of the West — of course, in the opinion of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is essential to avoid removal of nuclear weapons from West German territory. Judging by everything on the Quai d'Orsay, where the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs is situated, they did not consult with the Elysee Palace.

[Dmitriyev] For the sake of accuracy, one has to say that the official French position on this issue underwent a correction. President Mitterrand, after the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been published, stated that the prospect of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe being scrapped and reduced, I quote, is in the interests of France and the world; observers note that the known change for the better in the French position is apparent; it testifies to the presence of a certain realism toward Soviet proposals for nuclear disarmament measures.

[Agayants] But here's what is revealing, Boris Dmitriyevich. Prime Minister Chirac also spoke out in the same vein at a cabinet session. However, despite the fact that the heads of the French state and government made positive assessment of the Soviet initiative after a certain interval, a number of politicians in right-wing parties and some from the ranks of the Socialist Party gave it a hostile reception. That is how hardy their attachment to the stereotypes of the past, their nuclear thinking are.

[Dmitriyev] I should like to stress once again that the Soviet proposal on medium-range missiles does not overshadow, and particularly does not remove from the agenda, the issue of substantially reducing and immediately after that scrapping strategic armaments. An agreement on this score will become possible alongside a decision on not allowing weapons to be sited in space by virtue of the integral interconnection between these matters. If our conversation has gone into issues related to strategic armaments and space, I should like to divert the attention of our radio listeners for a couple of minutes to talk about a rather interesting incident

that happened last week during a respectable, prestigious international conference held in Britain, not far from London. It was a very prestigious conference of Western political scientists in which leading figures from the ministries of foreign affairs of Britain and France, and of the State Department took part. It was the 302d [as heard] such conference, and, for the first time, a Soviet representative also was invited.

After the Soviet participant — and this lot fell to me — had made his report, in which an appropriate assessment of the US plans for the Strategic Defence Initiative was given, the floor was taken by one of the U.S. representatives, the vice-president of a respectable New York institute that performs the role of the U.S. Republican administration's think tank. This American said that our Russian colleague, in talking about the Strategic Defense Initiative, spared no argument in stressing that SDI is an element in the offensive strategy of the United States, which intends siting weapons in space, possibly even nuclear ones. I, the American said, should like to state that there is no intention to site any nuclear weapons in space; moreover, no provision is being made for anything that could be called weaponry in space. In a word, the American representative did not acknowledge any of the arguments that were cited to him on this score. He demanded that sufficiently authoritative evidence, emanating from the leadership of the Strategic Defense Initiative, be given to him. Thus it transpired that on the following morning, just before the routine morning session, in the library of the same building where the conference was being held, my eye was caught by an article in London's THE TIMES that contained an interview with one of those directing the Strategic Defense Initiative, General Eugene (Fox). I took this article along with me to the session, and, at a convenient moment, directed the attention of my U.S. colleague to it, having asked whether he knew Gen Eugene (Fox), and whether this general was authoritative enough to pass judgment on the nature of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The American said he knew this General well and collaborated with him. Then the American was told that this same general stated plainly and precisely in an interview to London's THE TIMES that despite the U.S. statement that SDI would not be of a nuclear nature, development [razrabotka] is continuing within the SDI framework with regard to equipping this system with nuclear warheads.

[Agayants] Boris Dmitriyevich, what was the reaction of your American colleague at the conference?

[Dmitriyev] First he asked to be given this article so that he could have a look at it. He studied Gen Eugene (Fox)'s interview throughout the session. He sat silently, looked out of the window. All the other participants cast glances at him, ranging from sympathy to unconcealed irony. He did not say a word, and when the session was over he came over to the Soviet representative together with the chairman of this conference and said: Well, all right, I shall have to announce my complete capitulation. It is evident that the U.S. general, with whom we in the institute collaborate closely, does not intend to inform us fully of his plans, and I admit that the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative system really does envisage the deployment of nuclear weapons in space.

[Agayants] On 5 March, Comrades, 41 years had passed since Winston Churchill made an anti-Soviet speech in the U.S. town of Fulton. The myth of the Soviet threat to the West drags on from that time. A period that was to become known as the Cold War emanated from the same speech. Over the past 4 decades and even a little longer, imperialism's ideologues have added little to what was said at Fulton. Neither the collection of stock phrases serving as a screen to justify the hegemonist claims of the so-called Free World, nor the anti-Soviet propagandistic cliches have changed. One can follow without much difficulty the dangerous thread that runs like a Bickford [English inventor, 1794-1834] fuse from Churchill's speech in Fulton that has become true gospel for anticommunists, through the Truman and other militarist doctrines to the present preachers of neoglobalism who declare the USSR to be an evil empire.

[Kornilov] Indeed, Nikolay Ivanovich, there are, I would say, anniversaries and would-be anniversaries, and the second category is the place for the 40th anniversary of the 12 March 1947 proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in the United States.

You are right, this data gives cause for thought, and not only about the past, because, the heart of the Truman Doctrine, its core, was intoxicating strength and reliance on the atomic striking force. Although today, 40 years later, the situation in the world is quite different from what it was then — Washington's atomic monopoly has been relegated to the past forever, and military and strategic parity between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO has become a major and indisputable fact in modern-day international life — but the aggressive imperial postulates that guided Truman and company in their time are in full bloom in Washington even today. Here is just one fact: If in 1946 Washington responded to the USSR's proposal to make nuclear weapons unlawful by intensifying the arms race, then today, as we have already said, the United States is responding to our proposal to make the world nuclear-free by the year 2000 by augmenting the Star Wars program. Here is another parallel for you that automatically suggests itself: The Truman Doctrine, which proceeded from the possibility and permissible nature of carrying out atomic bombings on the USSR, literally was permeated with a spirit of confrontation and contempt for the sovereignty of states and their legitimate right to be in charge of their destiny. Over the 40 years that have passed since those days, the planet's political map has changed beyond recognition, but even today it is the United States that is flouting the sacred principle of sovereignty as laid down in the UN Charter and in the Helsinki Final Act.

Well, we sometimes say that historical parallels in politics are, to a certain degree, always relative. Let it be so. However, one recalls such facts as, for example, the occupation of independent Grenada, the U.S. air raids on Libya, or, say, the U.S. attempts to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government, a question arises involuntarily: Could it be that the so-called doctrine of neoglobalism developed by the current administration is an updated version of the old and seemingly long-obsolete Truman Doctrine?

[Dmitriyev] Here is another remark in connection with the event that took place 40 years ago. In my opinion, the Truman Doctrine laid down a milestone from which, through Washington's fault, the splitting of the international political line into two enemy camps began. The Truman Doctrine started a process in the course of which the USSR and the Soviet people were presented as an image of the enemy, an image of the adversary that one has to fight with all one's strength and destroy at any cost. We now have to deal with the consequences of that decision made 40 years ago. The USSR and other realistically thinking forces have to defuse the political and ideological atmosphere in the world; they have to come out for substituting the image of the enemy for that of partner. The latest acts by the Soviet leadership are dedicated to this end, including the Moscow forum "For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity."

[Kornilov] In other words, the point is to throw away the old postulates, to reconfirm the unfounded claims of the ruling circles of any country — the United States in this case — to the world's leadership, and to assert a new political thinking corresponding to the realities of our nuclear age.

[Agayants] Coming back to what we have already said here, to the need to restructure international relations on the basis of a new political thinking, one has to stress the importance of the steps being undertaken by our diplomacy. I mean the trip of Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, USSR foreign minister, to a number of countries in the Asian-Pacific region.

[Dmitriyev] Soviet diplomacy today is on the rise and is vigorously on the move. Routes of active actions and dialogue are stretching from Smolensk Square, where the high-rise building of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs is situated, to the North and South, to the West and East. The addressbook of mankind does not contain any country with which we would not wish to cooperate actively in the interests of peace and security for all. Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze is now on his tour of countries of the Asian-Pacific region. Before that he visited the capital of Thailand, where talks with the country's prime minister and foreign minister took place. The capital of Australia followed. It so happened that this visit to Australia was the first official visit by a Soviet foreign minister in all the 45 years since establishing diplomatic relations between our countries, as well, by the way, as the first official visits by our minister to other countries included in the itinerary of the current tour. First meetings are always a bit difficult. In one Australian capital town, guns are still pointed toward the ocean, allegedly they were installed in the last century to rebuff a Russian invasion. Who could tell now if this really was the initial purpose of the guns; was not the version of a Russian invasion concocted in recent decades when the myth of the Soviet threat started spreading around the world? However that may be, the Soviet guests have been met with more than their share of prejudices. Americans and other Westerners are fuelling fears by spreading inventions about a buildup of the Soviet naval presence in the Pacific and Indian Ocean, about a certain design by Moscow in supporting the nuclear-free status of the southern part of the Pacific, about Soviet military bases in Vietnam.

That is why Soviet diplomacy is working so vigorously to destroy the reefs of mistrust and suspicions on our account. Australia, where 100 municipalities and even an entire state have proclaimed their territories to be nuclear-arms-free, cannot be remote from our country, which has come forward with a project for a nuclear-free world.

Indonesia cannot be remote from us and be simply good memories of the past when our countries were linked by the ties of friendship and cooperation; it remains a travelling companion to this country. And, of course, the three Indochinese countries — Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam — where a visit by Comrade Shevardnadze started today [as heard] in an atmosphere of fraternal efficiency and mutual understanding, are particularly close to us. This is the practical implementation of the appeal to countries of Asia and the Pacific to start a joint search for ways to guarantee security for all in this region, voiced in the Vladivostok speech by the general secretary.

[Agayants] Our program has drawn to a close. But before bringing it to a full close, I would like, on behalf of its participants, to congratulate all women listeners and all women on the beautiful and happy holiday of 8 March and to wish you sound health, successes in your undertakings, full happiness, and high spirits! Thank you, Comrades, for listening. All the best to you.

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CSO: 5200/1342

RELATED ISSUES

TASS ON 'COLD WAR, NEW POLITICAL THINKING'

LD041627 Moscow TASS in English 1602 GMT 4 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 4 TASS — TASS news analyst Leonid Ponomarev writes:

On March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill delivered in the presence of U.S. President Harry Truman a thunderous anti-Soviet speech in the small American town of Fulton, Missouri. That speech launched the policy of the cold war, which was the last for decades.

Since that time American Presidents and politicians have been exercising in anti-Sovietism on their own, without tutors. I mention this speech here only because many Western leaders are still thinking in the cold war categories, whereas our time imperatively demands a new mode of thinking.

Almost two generations have grown up since the Fulton speech and new people have emerged onto the political scene. But what is more important, mankind discovered ways of annihilating both itself and the globe as a whole. It has piled up mountains of nuclear weapons. People are facing the choice between survival and mutual annihilation. The Soviet leaders believe that however immense the threat of nuclear catastrophe, there is no fatal inevitability of war and mankind can be saved from self-annihilation.

This can be achieved through the abolition of nuclear weapons all over the world, which the Soviet Union is suggesting, and as early as the end of the current century. This process is complex and difficult but, as Reykjavik demonstrated, accords for nuclear disarmament are possible and inevitable. A qualitatively new situation has emerged in the world since Reykjavik.

That is why the Soviet Union, guiding itself by a sense of great responsibility to the world, calls for a search for mutually acceptable decisions in the interests of non-nuclear and non-violent world.

It is claimed in the United States and Western Europe that the Soviet Union wants the elimination of nuclear weapons merely to secure superiority in conventional armaments. This is not so because the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty allies put forward last year a proposal for comprehensive and deep cuts in the arms forces and conventional armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. But the NATO countries have not yet responded to that proposal.

The new political thinking, which has supplanted cold war policy, is catching up with people and asserting itself in the practice of international relations. This was forcefully demonstrated by the recent international forum "For Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity" in Moscow. People of different political persuasions, world outlooks and faiths who gathered at the Forum were profoundly convinced that a nuclear-free world could be achieved by joint efforts.

RELATED ISSUES

IZVESTIYA REPORT ON VISIT OF POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER ORZECHOWSKI

PM111011 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Feb 87 Morning Edition p 4

["On a Working Visit"]

[Excerpts] M. Orzechowski, member of the PZPR Central Committee Politburo, and minister of foreign affairs of the Polish People's Republic, was in the Soviet Union 9 February 1987 on a working visit.

A conversation took place between E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and USSR minister of foreign affairs, and M. Orzechowski, which passed in a friendly atmosphere characteristic of Soviet-Polish relations.

It particularly was stressed that the persevering tension in international affairs, caused by the NATO block's and U.S. militarist forces' course of confrontation, the intensification of the nuclear and conventional arms race and Washington's actions to extend it into outer space run counter to the interests of all countries and peoples. In this regard, it was noted that the energetic efforts being made by the socialist states and all peace-loving forces, directed at lowering the level of military confrontation, are having an increasingly beneficial effect on the political climate in Europe and throughout the world. A realistic possibility for realizing a decisive turn for the better in internal affairs and saving mankind from the threat of universal nuclear catastrophe is offered by the program for the total elimination of nuclear and other forms of mass-destruction weapons by the end of the century, as put forward in the statement by M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, on 15 January 1986, and further developed in the Soviet proposals in Reykjavik. [paragraph continues]

At this moment, a sure path toward a nuclear-free world is being blocked by U.S. "Star Wars" plans that aim at attaining military superiority and undermining strategic stability in the world.

The ministers view the latest nuclear explosion carried out by the United States on 3 February of this year as an open challenge to the world community. M. Orzechowski highly appraised the readiness of the Soviet side to return to the moratorium on nuclear explosions should the United States end its own nuclear tests.

Particular attention was paid to the situation in Europe and the advancement of the Budapest program of the Warsaw Pact member-states for a radical reduction in the armed forces and conventional armaments, reducing the military confrontation, and strengthening security on the continent. The determination to strive for an immediate discussion of the practical measures to implement this program was reaffirmed.

The Soviet Union and the Polish People's Republic will apply their utmost efforts for the further development in all directions of the pan-European process and for the successful conclusion of the Vienna meeting of CSCE participant states on the basis of a constructive and nonconfrontational approach to the issues being discussed there. The Soviet side supports the Polish People's Republic's proposals submitted at Vienna for supplementing the mandate of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, as well as for holding a meeting in Warsaw of representatives of the CSCE countries on the 50th anniversary of the start of World War II. The Polish side supports the USSR's initiative for convening a broadly representative conference on humanitarian questions in Moscow.

Both sides confirmed the well-known position of the Governments of the USSR and the PPR regarding the fact that an essential condition for preserving a stable peace in Europe is the inviolability of the territorial-political realities based upon the Yalta and Potsdam accords, which were fixed in treaties between the socialist states and the FRG and also in the Final Act of the CSCE.

The ministers stressed that any attempts by revisionist forces, first and foremost in the Federal Republic of Germany, to subject to doubt the international legal foundations of the existing status quo in Europe, are impermissible. They drew attention to the dangerous tendencies of an arbitrary interpretation and weakening of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, and the striving by certain circles in the FRG to enlist support for this position from other states. All of this goes against the vital interests of peace and stability. Such attempts on the foundations of security in Europe will invariably be given a most decisive rebuff.

Both sides noted the United Nation's great responsibility in maintaining peace and security on all continents and the particular importance in this regard of the implementation of the socialist countries' initiative for the creation of an all-embracing system of international peace and security, which was approved by the 41st session of the UN General Assembly.

The further strengthening of the unity and cohesion of the states of the socialist community and the consolidation of the Warsaw Pact organization, the participants in the talks emphasized, are important factors in maintaining peace, stability, and security in Europe and throughout the world.

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RELATED ISSUES

UK PAPER EXAMINES THATCHER VISIT TO MOSCOW, ARMS ISSUES

Counterpoise to Washington

London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 17 Feb 87 p 14

[Editorial]

[Text]

CONTINUED disarray in Washington, coinciding with a display of apparent reasonableness by Mr Gorbachev, imposes certain tests on Western thinking. There is an appearance, for the time being, of initiatives passing to the Soviet Union. Mr Gorbachev's speech in Moscow yesterday, addressed to a motley audience from 80 different countries, illustrates the trend. He offered no specific disarmament proposals; but he spoke of the recent summit with Reagan in Iceland as a "breakthrough, not a failure". He saw it as a moment of truth. He was speaking a day or two after a Congressional committee had reported that President Reagan was poorly prepared for Iceland. There was, the committee rightly observed, an astonishing degree of confusion surrounding what actually happened. Meanwhile the Gorbachev speech was the right mix for his particular audience, with soothing words about the Soviet Union's new approach to humanitarian issues.

What are we to make of this? The immediate danger is that a combination in Europe of latent mistrust of American policy, anxiety about the nuclear arsenals of the two super-powers, wishful thinking about disarmament and admiration for Mr Gorbachev's style will lead to false measurements and faulty attitudes. There will be an eager disposition to believe that more has changed for the better in the Soviet Union than in reality is the case. As difficulties accumulate round President Reagan, there will be a further disposition seriously to underestimate the strength, tenacity and will of the United States.

Mrs Thatcher's forthcoming visit to Moscow, like her trip to Camp David after the Iceland summit, seems timely. She is not readily blown about by prevailing winds. Her position internationally and vis-à-vis Europe assumes importance. There is an urgent need now for a European voice to get the proportions right. Our own voice would say, with a glance at the past, that appeasement comes in many guises, all of them suspect. There is still a firm prospect, we believe, that before Reagan's term ends, America and the Soviet Union will meet and agree a limited arms agreement. That hopeful prospect is not enhanced by too ready an assumption now that Mr Gorbachev's hand carries all the right cards, and America's only dummies.

Agenda Requirements

London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 26 Feb 87 p 12

[Editorial]

[Text]

MRS THATCHER'S impending visit to Moscow is a more than usually important exercise in personal diplomacy. It takes place at a time when both the superpowers, between which she will be acting effectively as an intermediary, are too heavily embroiled with domestic preoccupations to devote the energy they should to laying the ground for the next summit. Mr Gorbachev's liberalisation programme is encountering opposition from vested interests that it threatens. Mr Reagan's involvement in the Iran hostage affair has raised dissension that increasingly challenges his authority as President.

Both sides will therefore expect the second most important of Western leaders to act as a spokesman for each of them as well as for herself. Washington will undoubtedly wish to communicate to Moscow that its commitment to the Strategic Defence Initiative is stronger than ever and that it will not bargain arms reductions, however much desired, against the postponement or limitation of that programme. Moscow's message to Washington will probably take exactly the contrary form: that any substantial reduction of offensive weapons is conditional on the confinement of SDI research to the laboratory.

Mrs Thatcher, in the circumstances, may have to speak largely for herself. How should she do so? She must, in the first place, make clear her own attitude to Mr Gorbachev's declared policy of *glasnost*—openness—and all that it implies. It will be tempting for her to welcome it at face value. Those who expect her to do so should remember, however, that Mrs

Thatcher is respected in Moscow precisely for her hardheadedness, and that *glasnost* has thus far given the hardheaded nothing substantial on which to chew. If the Prime Minister makes it clear to Mr Gorbachev that she welcomes his declarations of intent but must await evidence of implementation before relaxing her own cautionary attitude to Russian foreign policy aims, she will have struck exactly the right note.

On the broader issue of arms control, the Prime Minister is confronted by the opportunity to speak for once with an expressly European voice. She should take it. It is too often overlooked by American negotiators that Russia's lever of nuclear blackmail is not provided by nuclear weapons in the first instance, but by the enormous conventional army it stations in East Germany. Now is the time to remind both Moscow and Washington that nothing would more sharply alleviate Western European anxieties than a massive cut in the Soviet tank fleet and frontal aviation forces, since it is those military concentrations that provide the threat Europe currently counts on nuclear weapons to offset. Unbalanced conventional force reductions by Russia would offer, in the European view, the most promising way forward to extended measures of arms control by both sides. The Prime Minister might make it a test of *glasnost* that Moscow should now admit the extent of its conventional superiority, and discuss with frankness the impediment that disparity presents to the cause of peacemaking.

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RELATED ISSUES

FAVORABLE REACTION OF GREEK DELEGATES TO MOSCOW FORUM

Athens TA NEA in Greek 20 Feb 87 p 21

[Text] Article by Mikela Khartouli "A New Wind in Moscow"
Jules Dassin and Nikos Koundouros who two nights ago returned from Moscow where they participated in the "Forum for a world without nuclear weapons and for the survival of mankind" are convinced: "There is a new wind in the Soviet Union." Nikos Koundouros would even add: "...Such a meeting would have been inconceivable a few years ago..."

Attending the "Forum" which was organized at the initiative of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev were some 1,000 prominent artists, intellectuals, political scientists, religious leaders, industrialists--but no politicians. Of the famous names in international intellectual circles it is worth noting Graham Greene (who presented the final paper containing the conclusions reached by the Letters and Arts round table), Norman Mailer, Friedrich Dierennat, Max Friel, Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, Isabella Allende, Gregory Peck, Peter Ustinov, Hanah Sigoula, Marcello Mastroyani, Yoko Ono, Bertrand Tavernie, Milos Forman, and others.

Jules Dassin told TA NEA: "I think that the Moscow meeting was very positive because all who participated were convinced that one can trust Gorbachev."

"During the course of the 'Forum', of course, many concrete proposals were made, but what is significant is that all who participated demonstrated their wish to believe or not to believe Gorbachev's words. In the end..." Dassin added, "...they all left convinced." And he clarified further, it appeared clearly that this opening is not a personal Gorbachev matter but that it reflects a general climate.

"That which was also discussed," Mr. Dassin emphasized, "is the role that intellectuals can play in creating a new language to contribute to the clarification of the great dilemmas posed by the issue of peace."

The discussions were held "behind closed doors" in a calm atmosphere, and as described to us by N. Koundouros, these discussions did not stop even during the recesses as everyone, with their stretched antennas, tried to understand the exact meaning of this "opening," which the western world has been witnessing over the past few months.

"The fact that all those brilliant personalities met in Moscow is insignificant when compared with the messages sent forth from there to all the corners of the earth," said N. Koundouros.

The "Forum"—it is now a fact—contributed directly to the new image of Soviet society which the Soviet leader is creating. His very important speech delivered on 16 February, as all political observers emphasized and as confirmed by N. Koundouros, "left everyone speechless."

Niko Koundouros returned from Moscow "enchanted" as he told TA NEA, and having previously visited Moscow a good number of times in the past, sensed the "new wind" now blowing in the USSR. Here are his impressions:

On the selection of those invited: "Showed that the conservative, closed international world of communists decided definitely to proceed with openings, perhaps hazardous to the survival of Gorbachev and his group but a relief to an anguished world facing the clumsy affectations of Reagan and the policy of the generals."

On the discussions during the course of the "Forum": "Despite the respected presence of the men of Arts and Letters emphasis was not given to cultural themes because they were viewed as inherent to the great plea for world peace. It was noted frequently that 20th century civilization is under threat everywhere from the Pentagon and arms producers who to a very large extent determine the fate of mankind on earth."

On Gorbachev's openings: "From the discussions which took place it appeared that the USSR and the whole world is living an historic moment but that there is also an unease over how long this "revisionist leader" can hold up under the current formidable domestic pressures of his country emanating from the old guard echelons but also from the endless number of communists of the new generation who run the Soviet Union's provinces."

On Soviet Academician Andrei Sakharov: "He became the bridge to the western world. Since mankind has learned not to believe in words, his presence and his speech were de facto evidence that something is changing."

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RELATED ISSUES

CPSU'S ZAYKOV IN PRAGUE ON INF, TESTING, SDI

AU090601 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 5 Mar 87 pp 1, 3

[*"From the Speech by Comrade Lev Zaykov," member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at an "aktiv of party and economic officials of Prague and Central Bohemia" held in Prague on 4 March, on the occasion of Lev Zaykov's working visit to Czechoslovakia]*

[*Excerpts*] Today, no one any longer denies the pernicious consequences of a nuclear war catastrophe, said Lev Zaykov. However, the nuclear century also has brought additional problems that show that it is not only nuclear war that would be seriously harmful to mankind. This is attested to by the lesson of Chernobyl.

For example, the nuclear power plants in the West European countries have a capacity of 70 million kw. Even a nonnuclear attack on them could result in Europe's becoming uninhabitable.

From the mutual dependence of states and nations for their survival arises the need for a qualitatively new approach to the issue of national security, which also is one of the typical features of the new political thinking.

Mikhail Gorbachev's speech at the Moscow international forum, For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity, explained the fundamental aspects of the new philosophy of international relations.

We regard the holding of this forum as a success for our foreign policy of peace, as a success for the coordinated line of the fraternal socialist countries.

Our principled position is that the equilibrium of forces must be ensured at the level of reasonable adequacy of armament with a continuing tendency to reduce its volume.

As you know, the Soviet Union, in close coordination with our friends from the socialist countries, has proposed concrete solutions for the problems facing the world.

The Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik has shown that this program is not a utopia, and that a realistic solution can be found. Therefore, we are saying today that Reykjavik was a sort of turning point, the moment of truth, when an exceptional prospect of transition to a world without nuclear weapons appeared.

At the same time, real obstacles on that road were exposed.

As you know, the main obstacle is the effort of the United States to transfer the feverish arms buildup to space, gain strategic superiority, and dictate its will to the world.

On 26 February, after 1 and 1/2 years of unilateral moratorium, a nuclear explosion was carried out in the Soviet Union.

It was a measure forced upon the USSR, by which it responded to the continuing nuclear tests in the United States. We will continue to strive to halt nuclear explosions, and we are prepared to return to the moratorium if the Americans also will declare one.

The Soviet Union, which, despite all the difficulties and artificial obstacles, is striving to resolve the problem of nuclear disarmament, took another significant step in this respect on 1 March.

The statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, proposes that the issue of intermediate-range missiles in Europe be taken out of the entire block of issues involved in the Soviet-American negotiations and a special agreement be concluded on them. At the same time, this must be done immediately, for an agreement on this actually already exists.

After it is signed, Lev Zaykov stressed, we will begin the withdrawal from the CSSR and the GDR of the complexes of operational-tactical designation with enhanced range, which are there as a response to the deployment of American Pershing-2 missiles, and we express our readiness to start talks immediately with the objective of reducing and scrapping further missiles of operational-tactical designation.

This opens up a broad path to a real and momentous step: the complete removal of nuclear weapons from Europe. The U.S. Government now must prove with practical deeds its proclaimed readiness for this agreement.

With regard to Europe's importance in international relations, he said that from Helsinki, where the foundation of these relations was laid, the European countries had arrived at the Vienna meeting.

We note with satisfaction that precisely the European states are submitting momentous and far-reaching proposals, whose aim is to make Europe a continent of peace in which there would be no nuclear weapons, where the number of conventional weapons would be reduced considerably, where economic cooperation would be elevated to a new level, and from where a strong stimulus for cooperation in humanitarian affairs would originate.

You undoubtedly are well acquainted with the joint Budapest initiative of the Warsaw Pact countries, which proposes an extensive reduction of the number of armed forces in Europe, with regard to which the first contacts with the NATO countries now have begun.

We support the proposals of Czechoslovakia and the other socialist countries to convene an all-European economic forum; we propose that a conference on all aspects of humanitarian problems be held in Moscow.

Our countries have begun preparations for the next stage of discussing an important step in the UN aimed at achieving a fundamental change in international relations, at setting up a comprehensive system of international security.

In submitting this program, we are naturally not counting on intergovernmental relations alone.

In the closing part of his speech, Lev Zaykov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said that on his return home he would be able to inform the CPSU Central Committee about the successful course of his visit in the spirit of unity of views and full mutual understanding, which are traditional regarding our meetings with the Czechoslovak comrades.

We note with satisfaction that these meetings and regular contracts between representatives of the CPSU Central Committees and the CPCZ are always useful and make it possible for us, as the saying goes, to synchronize our watches and sincerely and frankly share our problems as well as plans for the future.

He also valued the fact that on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Great October, many collectives in the CSSR have pledged to fulfill deliveries of their products to the USSR on time and with high quality. In this we see the display of true internationalism in the spirit of the slogan of Klement Gottwald, the great son of the Czechoslovak people: "With the Soviet Union forever and never in any other way!"

We all must ensure that this year becomes a year of stable work in the national economy and a year of great successes in the acceleration of the socioeconomic development of our countries for the benefit of strengthening the positions of world socialism and peace, said Lev Zaykov.

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